Takaichi’s Steady Foreign Policy

 

Japan’s Foreign Policy Under Takaichi: Steady as She Goes

Takaichi Sanae is looking to accelerate the changes that Abe set in motion over a decade ago, despite a host of new challenges. 

For the past decade, Japan’s foreign policy has been organized around a strategic purpose: promote and defend the international rules-based order. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his successors, Suga Yoshihide and Kishida Fumio, emphasized this Japanese interest even as the postwar order was under increasing challenge.

The late Abe, more than most, recognized that Japan had to play a far more active role in global affairs and had to coordinate the tools it brought to bear on its strategic aims. He centralized strategic planning, reinterpreted how Japan’s Self Defense Force might act in case of a crisis, and mobilized a coalition for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The world was changing, and Abe argued that Japan had to change too.

Takaichi Sanae is now Japan’s prime minister, and she begins her tenure with a promise to accelerate the changes that Abe set in motion over a decade ago. She embraced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision that Abe authored and Kishida updated. Long an advocate for greater defense spending, Takaichi immediately announced her intention to complete the goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on Japan’s security by the end of this fiscal year, a year ahead of the original goal set out by Kishida in late 2022.  

Takaichi does not enjoy the domestic political foundation that Abe used to build his strategic vision, however. Her party faces far less certainty after losing two consecutive elections over the past year. The Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) now must govern with a minority and thus is dependent on opposition party cooperation to legislate policy change.

To make matters worse, the LDP’s 26-year coalition with Komeito ended when Takaichi rejected calls for limiting campaign contributions. Takaichi quickly pulled in Nippon Ishin no Kai, or Japan Innovation Party, giving her sufficient votes in the Diet to become prime minister.  Yet they remain outside of government and wary.

In short, Takaichi is in a far weaker political position than Abe and his successors and will have to work harder than her predecessors to build political consensus to realize her strategic vision.   

Japan’s Strategy Under Takaichi

Takaichi is a committed disciple of the Abe doctrine, and prior to becoming prime minister, she worked on the most significant changes in Japanese security policy. She has been a strong proponent of bolstering Japan’s defense capabilities, authoring the first LDP policy goal of pushing spending to 2 percent of GDP as head of the party’s influental Policy Research Council. That goal was subsequently adopted as national policy in the 2022 security reforms announced by the Kishida Cabinet. She also served as minister of state for economic security, a Cabinet post created by legislation passed in 2021.

Japan’s foreign policy challenges have only grown since Abe left office. Like Suga and Kishida, Takaichi will face a complex world, one in which there is open major power contention and an escalation of the use of force. Much of Japan’s reassessment of its strategic aims can be attributed to these challenges to the postwar liberal order, coming first from the rise of Chinese regional power and then from Beijing’s “no limits” partnership with an aggressive Russia. Wars in Europe and the Middle East have accelerated this shift in the stakes of major power contest and will require far more of Tokyo.

Japan committed to coordinated sanctions on Russia through the G-7 and offered sustained humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. In the Middle East conflict, Japan aligned diplomatically in the United Nations with European and other partners to advocate for Palestinian self-determination.

Takaichi will face greater pressures on Japan’s defenses. China continues to demonstrate its military power and resists meaningful problem-solving with Japan. The tensions across the Taiwan Strait, of course, loom large, and Takaichi has openly affirmed her support for Taiwan. Closer to home, Moscow’s new security agreement with Pyongyang demonstrates the complex strategic dynamics that Tokyo must navigate. Russia has declared Japan an unfriendly nation and has placed reciprocal sanctions on groups and individuals it deems especially problematic. Even the relationship with the United States, now led by a president who is placing new demands on U.S. allies, must be factored into Japan’s foreign policy choices.   

It may be too early in her term to outline how Takaichi will shape Japan’s strategy, but already there are some clear signals of her intentions. Just days after being sworn in as prime minister, she faced three regional diplomatic tests. The first was at the ASEAN Summit, long a venue of importance for Japanese leaders. There she left the impression of a far warmer and more friendly Japan, largely due to her personal overtures to ASEAN leaders.

From Malaysia, she flew home again to welcome U.S. President Donald Trump to Japan, and again her personal style and her emphasis on building a friendship with Trump seemed to bring her success. The U.S. president told her, “I want to just let you know, anytime you have any question, any doubt, anything you want, any favors you need, anything I can do to help Japan, we will be there,”   

Just as important, however, is Takaichi’s emphasis on the Japan-U.S. alliance. She has made it clear that she will bring continuity to the efforts to improve cooperation with Washington, and to strengthen the trilaterals it facilitates with South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Her goal of getting  defense spending to 2 percent of GDP earlier than first planned suggests she anticipates the need to make even greater investment in Japan’s military capabilities in the next five years.

As Trump left Tokyo, Takaichi once again hit the road, this time to Seoul and the APEC leaders meeting. All eyes were on the Trump-Xi meeting, but Takaichi had her own agenda. First, and most important, was the demonstration of common goals with South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung. Many have worried about Takaichi’s views of South Korea and particularly of the thorny war legacy issues between Japan and South Korea. But since running for Japan’s highest office, Takaichi has tempered her views. As noted above, after winning the LDP presidency, she endorsed her support for the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, and in media interviews, told Japanese audiences how much she liked Korean dramas, make-up, and food.  A second assignment at APEC was a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. This was less successful from the start. The encounter was brief, and the anticipated handshake photo showed unsmiling expressions by both leaders. The Chinese government’s concerns about her Taiwan policy are never far from the surface.

In the weeks after her handshake with Xi, Takaichi sparked controversy with a response to a question from an opposition legislator. The new prime minister started that “if China deployed its naval forces and used military force, no matter how you think about it, this would be a situation that would threaten Japan’s survival” (sonritsu kiki jitai).

This was a reference to the 2015 security laws adopted after the Abe Cabinet reinterpreted Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense. The implication is that Japan could see a Chinese military action against Taiwan as reason to allow the SDF to invoke collective self-defense. While this is not a departure from past policy, it does put Takaichi on record early in her tenure as being ready to make that call should she face it.

In a startling response, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian issued a now-deleted tweet on X: “That filthy neck that barged in on its own – I’ve got no choice but to cut it off without a moment’s hesitation. Are you prepared for that?”   

The Japanese government immediately protested this threat to the prime minister and is reportedly considering his expulsion. But a Chinese government spokesperson responded with its own warning:

    For the leader of Japan to try to wade into cross-Strait affairs is an affront to international justice, a provocation to the post-WWII order, and a serious blow to China-Japan relations… We, the Chinese people, have every resolve, will and conviction to thwart any external interference in and obstruction to China’s reunification.

A foreign policy crisis is the last thing Japan’s new prime minister needs at the moment, but she cannot yield to Chinese pressure either.

Takaichi’s imprint on Japanese strategy will largely depend on how long she can stay in office. Abe had eight years to develop his strategic approach and design the domestic reforms needed to implement them. He also had the comfort of successive electoral wins. Takaichi does not have that luxury. She must attract voters back to the LDP  and demonstrate that her party can once again offer the best solutions to Japan’s challenges, both at home and in its relations abroad.  

In the meantime, there is work to be done in ensuring Japan has the strategic tools it needs to implement its foreign policy goals.

Strengthening Strategic Leverage

The aims of Japan’s strategy are unlikely to change significantly but Takaichi is likely to increase the tools Japan needs to cope with a quickly changing regional and global environment. Three reforms characterize how Japan seeks to pursue its national strategy. First, diversifying strategic partnerships, at times alongside the United States and at other times working to build coalitions on its own, has been the hallmark of Japan’s recent diplomatic strategy. Encouraging greater hard power capability has been another, and the commitment to raise security spending to 2 percent of GDP and perhaps beyond, reflects the realization that military self-restraint no longer aids Japan. Finally, developing an economic security component to these two traditional tools of statecraft has encouraged greater connectivity between Japanese private and public sectors. It also introduces more methodically the technological innovation necessary for Japan’s defenses.

Diversified Strategic Partnerships  

Changes in Asia have prompted a reconceptualization of Japanese interests. Now looking beyond East Asia to encompass the Indo-Pacific, Japanese thinkers have identified a greater maritime area of influence over their nation’s security. To be sure, China’s growing military reach, especially on the seas, has prompted this, but so too has the growing potential for strategic partnerships with other like-minded nations, such as Australia and India.

This Indo-Pacific framing now characterizes U.S. thinking as well. The Quad of Japan, U.S., Australia, and India reflected this new coalition of interests. Suga Yoshihide found a welcome partner in the White House during the early months of the Biden administration and Kishida Fumio, an experienced foreign policy maker, carried the vision to fruition through his close work with Biden. Regular Quad Leaders Meetings became a path to collaboration on regional needs as diverse as maritime security, supply chain resilience and the research and development of accessible healthcare.

The military ties being built by Japan are also significant. Today, Japan’s Self Defense Forces are welcomed for strategic dialogues, port visits, and air defense trainings across the Indo-Pacific. Some of these ties were built in concert with U.S. military exercises, and some bilaterally. The Japanese SDF now trains with forces in Australia and the Philippines, and in integrated multi-domain exercises with the U.S. and South Korea (Freedom Edge). The recent decision by Australia to purchase 11 Mogami-class frigates from Japan also integrates maritime security planning.  

The Maritime Self Defense Force visits nations across the region, and is welcomed in the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand, India, and ASEAN maritime states, such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The SDF and other agencies help train for U.N. peacekeeping, and the Japanese Coast Guard also works with other regional coast guards to enhance capacity in maritime law enforcement. Japan’s new security assistance program offers aid to Southeast Asian nations and includes provision of ships and other capabilities to support their defense goals.

Coalition building has not been limited to the Indo-Pacific, however. Russian aggression against Ukraine now too shapes Japanese diplomacy. The G-7 became the primary forum for developing a collective sanction of Russia following the invasion in February 2022. Assistance to Ukraine has developed bilaterally but also coordinated  through various European efforts.

The European Union and NATO each represent venues for Japan’s upgrading of its engagement with European security. Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy are working on a next generation close support fighter jet, for example. NATO allies have conducted various military exercises in and around Japan with the SDF. Japan also championed the need for other Indo-Pacific allies to step up their leader-level support for NATO’s goals, and the Indo-Pacific 4, as they came to be known, expanded the influence of these U.S. allies across the globe to support Europeans in their time of need.

Centralized Strategic Planning

Institutional changes within the Japanese government, such as the creation of a National Security Secretariat (NSS) under the prime minister, as well as the reinterpretation of the constitution to allow the SDF to work with other national militaries in case of a threat to Japan (the right of collective self-defense) began under Abe. A supermajority in the lower house gave successive Abe Cabinets the ability to legislate these changes, and in the 11 years since, the NSS has become the locus of national strategic planning and crisis management.  

Related to this institutional adaptation is the creation of a regular review of the National Security Strategy and its linkage to long-term defense planning. The first national strategy was drafted under Abe in 2013, and it integrated diplomatic and defense priorities.  

By 2021, the Kishida Cabinet reviewed this strategy and issued a new version in December 2022. The process allowed for Japan to update its assessment of global changes and their impact on Japanese interests. The accompanying ten-year defense plan also allowed Tokyo to integrate increased defense spending with an overhaul of capabilities needed to ensure Japan was militarily prepared to cope with the shifting regional military balance. Both Chinese behavior and the upgrade in North Korean capabilities suggested Japan needed to make some important changes, including the introduction of long-range missiles.

Alongside these investments in hard power, the Kishida Cabinet also initiated a new security assistance program designed for Japan’s emerging interest in enhancing the capabilities of others in the Indo-Pacific confronting China’s maritime challenge.

Immediately upon assuming office, Takaichi announced she would again revise the National Security Strategy and the defense plan that accompanies it. She has appointed as her national security adviser Ishikawa Keiichi, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucrat with strategic planning experience under the Abe Cabinet.

The goals of Japanese strategy remain consistent, but the means by which Japan will defend its interests are changing.  

An Emphasis on Economic Security

Like other advanced industrial economies, Japan has added economic security to its national security. A new law passed in May 2022 outlined a broad array of related measures, from protection from cyber and other attacks to ensuring supply chain resilience to investing in new emerging technologies. The Japanese government has tasked a variety of ministries with improving economic resilience.  

Takaichi previously served as minister of economic security in the Kishida Cabinet. Her main task during that time was to develop a security clearance system for the Japanese government. Concerns by other security partners prompted this upgrade in how classified data was protected. Legislation drafted under her, largely modeled on measures implemented by the United States and its closest allies, passed the Diet in 2024. Kobayashi Takayuki, who drafted the economic security legislation, has been assigned as head of the LDP’s Policy Research Council and is expected to highlight this new strategic priority.  

Onoda Kimi, the youngest member of the Takaichi Cabinet, was appointed minister of state for economic security, and has been given the added responsibility for science and technology policy as well as a new initiative to develop ways to ease tensions between Japanese and the growing number of foreign residents in Japan. While immigration policy remains the purview of the Ministry of Justice, this assignment reflects the growing political salience in Japan of the increased presence of non-Japanese.

Tourism has ballooned, and social media is full of references to foreign tourists who behave badly in Japan. But there is also the reality that Japan’s economy will need more foreign workers. Demographics have prompted a shift in immigration policy to allow for greater long-term foreign residents in Japan. This new priority for Takaichi suggests she is looking for a different approach. Treating this tension between Japanese and foreign visitors to Japan as an economic security problem may not be Takaichi’s intent, however.

During Trump’s visit to Tokyo, Japan and the U.S. concluded a new science and technology cooperation agreement that will open up new avenues for cooperation in “strategic science disciplines.” AI innovation was given particular emphasis, but other areas included advanced radio access networks, pharmaceutical and biotechnology supply chains, quantum information science, fusion energy, and space. The memorandum of understanding also spoke to the need to improve research security, identifying yet another area for future reforms in Japan.

Politics and Strategy

Takaichi Sanae does not represent a break from past strategy but rather a deepening commitment to the path forged by Abe Shinzo more than a decade ago. Yet she does not have the luxury of domestic political support that Abe had. The LDP’s two-thirds majority in the lower house gave him a foundation for legislating important changes to the planning and implementation of Japan’s strategy.

Abe’s reckoning with an increasingly worrisome regional balance of power set in motion changes that strengthened Japan’s ability to respond to its external environment. These external pressures have only accelerated since Abe left office. Building on that foundation has been the priority of each of his successors, and Takaichi surely hopes to continue that process.

Yet Takaichi also faces a more troubling world as she considers Japan’s strategic priorities. Tokyo faces the possibility that the United States is fundamentally rethinking its own strategic priorities. China is now a global power, and has made vast inroads in the Global South, especially since U.S. policy has become less predictable. China now teams up with Russia to challenge the global status quo, including Moscow’s use of force in Ukraine. Moscow’s overtures to Pyongyang bring home the possibility that for the first time one of the world’s leading nuclear powers will help others proliferate, raising quiet concerns in Northeast Asia of a potential nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula.

Even as she considers upgrading Japan’s ability to cope with these complex external challenges, Takaichi’s priority must be focused for the immediate future on persuading the Japanese people that she and her party can address their frustrations. Passing a budget that eases cost-of-living strains is paramount. But Takaichi too wants to up defense spending in this supplementary budget, and for that she will need help from those outside the LDP.  

Deciding when to call the next election is a trickier prospect. The loss of two elections over the past year, one in the lower house and a second this summer in the upper house, has set Japan’s conservatives back on their heels. The comfort of the old coalition with Komeito is gone, and in its place the prime minister must manage a new partner. It remains to be seen how long this coalition with Nippon Ishin no Kai will last, and how beneficial it will be to each of them come election time.  

Meanwhile, this early crisis with China creates new stresses for Japan’s new prime minister that will distract from domestic politics. On the one hand, she must respond to those within Japan who seek to clarify her approach to the one scenario that would prove the greatest test of her leadership: a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. On the other, she must also avoid an escalation in tensions with Beijing. China’s consul general in Osaka has angered many in Japan, and Takaichi’s coalition partner, Nippon Ishin no Kai, is calling on the government to declare Xue Jian persona non grata, a serious diplomatic punishment. Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu called on China to take steps to avoid further damage to the relationship.  

For now, the prime minister will need to be steady as she goes through these tricky waters. Focusing on improving how Japan builds the strategic levers it needs may be Takaichi’s best approach. Strengthening Japan’s strategic coalitions means more of her time spent with Japan’s partners and friends. Updating the National Security Strategy and a new defense plan, which will take at least a year, seems prudent, and it has the advantage of a year of bureaucratic review. Defining the priorities for economic security will help, and will undoubtedly, require more government investment and a deepening of understanding with Japan’s private sector as they tackle more responsibility for ensuring Japan is ready for whatever comes.

Time is needed for much of the reforms Takaichi has initially prioritized, and time is what she needs to put her government on a firmer political footing.