China’s global alliances: A look at the Axis Of Evil

 

China’s global alliances: A look at the countries closest to Beijing today

Over the past decade, China has built a network of alliances without formal defense treaties but rooted in economic, technological, and political interdependence. At the core stand Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. Surrounding them are preferred partners such as Belarus, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Serbia, Venezuela, and Cuba—states that help sustain Beijing’s strategic architecture.

Why These Alliances Matter

 
What binds these countries together? Energy deals, arms sales, shared sanctions, and Beijing’s sweeping development project launched in 2013—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Together, they form the structural framework of China’s outward influence.

 The CRINK Axis 

Analysts frequently group China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into a “functional axis” of military, energy, and sanctions-avoidance cooperation. It’s not an authoritarian NATO, but the coordination is enough to challenge the liberal world order.

Numbers Behind the Geopolitical Web

$244.8 billion in China-Russia trade (2024), up to 1.8 million barrels of Iranian oil per day to China (2025), $60 billion in CPEC investments, and 43 million passengers on the China-Laos railway—figures that turn interdependence into a tool of geopolitical leverage.

Russia: The “No Limits” Partnership

On February 4, 2022, Moscow and Beijing issued a joint statement that elevated their relationship to one “surpassing an alliance.” Since then, military-industrial cooperation and trade have surged despite the war in Ukraine. For Moscow, the partnership mitigates sanctions; for Beijing, it keeps the U.S. in check without direct confrontation.

A Phrase that Defines the Axis

“The friendship between the two states has no limits.” This line, signed by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in 2022, became the cornerstone of their political narrative. It reinforced military, energy, and technology exchanges—yet without a formal defense pact. In other words, it’s a strategic partnership, not a military alliance.

Record Trade with Russia

According to Chinese customs data, bilateral trade reached a record $244.8 billion in 2024, up from $240.1 billion in 2023. The 2025 trend remains strong, driven by energy and machinery exports. This interdependence has softened the blow of Western sanctions and cemented the Beijing-Moscow axis.

Dual-Use Technology and Sanctions

As *The Moscow Times* reported, U.S. intelligence estimates that “about 90% of Russia’s microelectronics and 70% of its machine tools” came from China in 2023, reinforcing its defense industry. Beijing denies direct involvement, but Washington and Brussels have sanctioned Chinese firms linked to such transfers.

North Korea: Political Ally and Buffer
After a period of chill, Beijing and Pyongyang have reactivated their ties—through political coordination, cross-border trade, and diplomatic shielding at the UN. When Russia vetoed the extension of sanctions monitoring, China abstained, signaling implicit support for the North Korean regime.

During their first meeting in years, Xi proposed “deepening strategic coordination to safeguard mutual interests.” The message was clear: ensuring stability on the peninsula while maintaining pressure on the U.S. and its allies.

Pakistan: A Friendship Tested by Time

Pakistan remains China’s oldest and most structural partnership outside the communist world. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at over $60 billion, anchors cooperation in energy, ports, and transport. Direct investments exceed $25 billion, with a “Phase 2.0” underway. The weak link: security for Chinese engineers amid recurring attacks.

Islamabad and Beijing continue to reaffirm their “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”—a diplomatic formula that transcends political cycles and crises. The current focus: accelerating CPEC 2.0 and ensuring the safety of Chinese workers.

Iran: Oil for Investment and Technology

The 25-year agreement signed in 2021 foresees Chinese investments (estimated at $400 billion) in exchange for steady crude supplies. In 2025, China remains Tehran’s largest buyer, importing up to 1.8 million barrels per day in some months, even as Western sanctions intensify.

Regional market data suggest that nearly 90% of Iran’s exported oil ultimately goes to China. This economic lifeline underscores how energy has become the core of their pragmatic partnership.

Belarus: Europe’s Bridge to Beijing

Minsk has emerged as a visible ally—President Lukashenko’s frequent visits to Beijing have deepened political coordination and industrial cooperation. Under sanctions, Belarus has become a logistical link between Russia and China, sharing anti-hegemonic rhetoric with both.

Cambodia: A Port Under Scrutiny 

The expansion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, financed by China and inaugurated in 2025, highlights Beijing’s maritime projection into the Gulf of Thailand. Phnom Penh insists the base isn’t exclusive, yet satellite images suggest expanding Chinese military capabilities—fueling U.S. concerns.

Laos: The Railway of Soft Power

The Kunming–Vientiane railway, a flagship BRI project, has carried more than 43 million passengers and 48 million tons of cargo since its 2021 opening. The line reinforces China’s economic gravity over the Mekong region—but also deepens Laos’s debt dependence.

Myanmar: Pragmatism Amid Chaos

Beijing manages transactional ties with Myanmar’s junta and ethnic militias. Priorities include energy corridors, ports, and border security. Domestic instability limits deeper cooperation, but anti-Western alignment remains intact.

Serbia: Europe’s Outlier Ally

Belgrade has strengthened its ties with Beijing through investment, drone technology, and a free trade agreement. Serbia now functions as China’s technological and logistical foothold in the Balkans—bridging Europe and the Belt and Road network despite EU skepticism.

Venezuela and Cuba: Energy, Security, and Narrative

Caracas seeks capital and technology; Beijing secures oil and influence in the Caribbean. In Cuba, telecom and cyber-security cooperation has tightened the bond. They are not military allies, but political partners that often vote together in international forums.

Conclusion: Alliances Without Treaties

China’s foreign strategy prioritizes partners that provide resources (Russia, Iran), geopolitical buffers (North Korea, Belarus), and logistical nodes for the BRI (Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos). These are de facto alliances—driven by convenience and resilience rather than mutual defense commitments.