Why Australia Needs Nuclear
Subs
Australia’s government is considering developing the
country’s own submarine fleet. It would be better off buying
American.
The Australian Government is courting disaster with its approach
to this country’s largest-ever defense program, the purchase of
new submarines. The government seems determined to spend over $30
billion designing and building in Australia 12 new submarines that
will almost certainly have serious flaws, will be delivered late,
will be unnecessarily expensive and will be inadequate for our
defense needs.
How could the government get itself into such a bad position?
Some key decision-makers have failed to appreciate that Australia
now faces a much more demanding security future. As the Pentagon’s
recently released annual report on China’s military development
makes clear, Beijing’s surveillance, missile, air and naval
developments are transforming the strategic balance in the Western
Pacific. Indeed, by 2025 China’s military power will be
predominant in parts of our region.
There’s also a need to take account of China’s much more
aggressive recent military operations, especially in disputed
areas of the South and East China Seas. Australian security
planners should do everything in their power to negotiate peaceful
resolutions of these issues. They would, however, be naive to
neglect strong investment in defense capabilities that can deter
coercion against us in the 2025-2050 timeframe.
Advanced submarines offer special strategic leverage in the more
demanding security environment that’s in store. The best
submarines are highly survivable in intense military operations
and have the potential to force the leadership of even a major
power to pause and think carefully before attacking Australia or
our key interests. They are one of only two or three military
capabilities that carry this game-changing leverage. So, while
Australia will always need some surface warships, armored vehicles
and transport aircraft, the truth is that advanced submarines
offer unique strategic advantages for us in the troubled times
ahead.
All this means we need to get the new submarine program right and
do so quickly. Australia has three main submarine options. The
government currently favors designing and building our own unique,
rather large, diesel-electric submarines, essentially a Collins
Mk 2. Second, we could purchase much smaller diesel-electric
submarines that are currently in production in Europe. Third, we
could purchase or lease from “hot” production lines advanced
nuclear-propelled submarines from the United States or Britain.
Designing and building a Collins Mk2 would probably
eventually deliver a class of the largest diesel-electric
submarines in the world. However, given that the government has
yet to launch even preliminary design work, the first of these
boats couldn’t be delivered until at least 2028 and more likely
2035-2040. Because they would be a completely new design, they
would inevitably experience technical problems, would probably
possess some unreliable systems and we should expect them to have
relatively low availability. As these Australian-designed boats
would be “orphans,” they would also be expensive to maintain and
update.
Another problem with the Collins Mk2 option is that
buying these boats would be very expensive. Although some parts of
local industry would wish us to believe otherwise, by the time
that these boats are built, drive-away costs for each boat are
likely to have escalated to between $2.5 billion and $3 billion.
Moreover, managing a design, development and acquisition project
of this complexity may be beyond the capability of the Defence
Materiel Organisation. Far worse is the prospect that by 2035,
these diesel-electric boats would be vulnerable to detection – and
probably early destruction – in intense combat environments.
Australia’s second submarine option is to purchase one of the
much smaller class of European diesel-electric submarines. The
Spanish S-80 or the German Type 214 boats could be expected to be
somewhat more reliable than Australian-designed and built boats.
In their most basic form, they would also be less expensive at
some $500-$600 million per boat sail away. However, by the time
that these boats were modified to carry some of the modern
U.S.-sourced sensor, fire-control, weapons and stealth systems,
their sail-away price would climb to $1.3 billion to $1.5 billion.
Because of their modest power generating capacity, small
diesel-electric boats are relatively slow, have limited endurance
and lack the ability to power sophisticated long-range sensors.
They would be outclassed in the Western Pacific towards the middle
of this century, and they wouldn’t give Australia the powerful
deterrent it needs.
The third option is an off-the-shelf purchase or lease of either
American Virginia Class or British Astute
Class nuclear-powered attack submarines. These boats are at the
cutting edge of submarine technology, offer operational dominance
in the Western Pacific till at least 2050 and would deliver
powerful deterrence against any serious coercion of Australia in
this timeframe.
The Virginia and Astute classes are fast and
possess almost unlimited endurance. They carry sensors with
extraordinary performance such that they can routinely “see”
potential opponents well before they themselves can be detected,
often at trans-oceanic distances. They have also been designed
from scratch to be very flexible and perform a broader range of
functions of relevance to Australia.
Both of these submarine classes are in series production. The
contract for the 14th Virginia was recently
signed for a price of $1.2 billion, but by the time that they are
fully fitted out, the sail-away price is $2.5 billion. These boats
have now been thoroughly sorted, are demonstrating exceptional
operational performance and high reliability and would bring with
them class-wide training and upgrade programs.
The most obvious obstacle to an Australian purchase of Virginias
or Astutes is that these boats are nuclear-powered.
However, their propulsion systems have an exemplary track record,
their reactors never need to be refueled and if the boats were
leased – say for 30 years – they could be handed back to the
suppliers for disposal.
Given these circumstances, one would think that the choice of new
submarines for Australia was clear-cut. By far the most capable,
lowest risk, most reliable and probably in the long run the most
affordable submarines are the Virginias (and possibly
the Astutes). The acquisition of 12 of these boats would
herald a new level of operational partnership with the United
States and substantially strengthen Australia’s contribution to
allied operations in the Western Pacific. Canberra’s diplomatic
clout in Washington and across the Asia-Pacific would be greatly
enhanced. But, most importantly, Australia would have bought an
effective insurance policy against the danger of serious coercion
or attack during the coming 40 years.