U.S. will deploy its Typhon missile system to southern Japan

 

 Shinjiro Koizumi just confirmed something that's going to rattle Beijing.

Japan's defense minister announced the U.S. will deploy its Typhon missile system to southern Japan starting Monday.

The system can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles up to 1,600 kilometers.

That's far enough to reach parts of mainland China.

It lands at Kanoya Air Base in Kagoshima for the Valiant Shield drills, which run through July 1.

The U.S. is bringing its HIMARS rocket systems too.

Koizumi was clear that this is a temporary deployment for training, not a permanent posting.

He said the joint drills will sharpen how fast the two militaries can respond together.

It's only the second time this system has touched Japanese soil.
China has already accused Japan of accelerating its remilitarization.

烏克蘭使用美製AGM-188A平價導引彈藥 襲擊俄軍事半導體廠

 

烏克蘭使用美製AGM-188A平價導引彈藥 襲擊俄軍事半導體廠

 
6月22日，烏克蘭空軍對俄羅斯「沃羅涅日半導體生產工廠」（VZPP）進行精確打擊。根據烏軍情報，VZPP主要為俄羅斯軍方Kh-101空射巡弋飛彈、R-500陸基巡弋飛彈與Pantsir-S1機動防空系統供應重要零組件。

發動攻擊的烏克蘭空軍F-16戰鬥機，在確保安全的距離下發射三枚AGM-188A「銹匕首」（Rusty Dagger）空射導引彈藥，對目標進行縱深精確打擊，造成該廠受損。由於VZPP是高度精密的半導體生產工廠，對於震動與空氣中懸浮物質極為敏感，估計受損的廠房短期內很難再恢復生產。

Rusty Dagger是美國空軍「平價量產型空載彈藥」計畫（FAMM-L），由美國無人機系統造商Zone 5 Technologies開發的遠程攻擊彈藥（ERAM），可攜帶227 kg的彈頭，射程超過460 km，飛行速度約690 km/h。

美國國防安全合作局（DSCA）於2025年8月核准烏克蘭購買3,350枚AGM-188A飛彈，總價約8.25億美元，平均單價約24萬6,300 美元。

Useful Idiots

During the Iranian Revolution, Socialist students, Communists, and Muslims were all united in overthrowing the Shah.

The leftists celebrated when Khomeini returned in 1979. They thought they defeated capitalism and imperialism. It didn’t last long.

Around 30,000 Communists/Socialist who helped the Islamic regime consolidate power were soon executed. That’s where the term “useful idiot” comes from.

They served their purpose and were no longer needed. Muslims had always despised their progressive ideals and couldn’t wait to get rid of them.

One of the women celebrating in the picture was killed, the other fled the country for her life.

It’s bizarre that almost 50 years later, Western Communists/Socialists are making the exact same mistake and allying with Muslims. They will have the same fate.

 

A New Era of US-China supply chain war

What began as a tariff dispute between the US and China has rapidly evolved into a supply chain war in which both sides sought to exploit single-source chokepoint vulnerabilities. These events revealed asymmetric vulnerabilities on both sides: China over critical minerals and the US over tech and finance. The result is a new bilateral dynamic Evan Medeiros describes as a fragile stability resting on shifting political calculations and intensifying competition.

 

 Since the end of the Cold War, US-China interactions were largely an exercise in the mutual shaping of the perceptions, policies, and behaviors of the other. For the United States, this meant trying to elicit more and better cooperation from China in addressing shared challenges, paired with efforts to deter Beijing's more disruptive policies. Washington did so by further pulling Beijing into the international system, by directly negotiating with Beijing, and by shaping the strategic environment in Asia to limit China's choices.

Beijing had a similar approach but was more focused on constraining US actions that it perceived as undermining China's domestic and international interests. The dominant feature of Beijing's strategy was to counter perceived US external containment and domestic destabilization of China. In the early 2000s, Beijing also initiated a major military modernization campaign.

As China grew stronger economically and militarily, and as its global footprint expanded, bilateral interactions became more dense, complex, and ultimately competitive. Washington had facilitated China's integration into — and its substantial benefit from — the US-led global economic and trade order. But Beijing used that integration to resist US power more often and to build quasi-alternatives to it. As the first decade of the 21st century passed, US and Chinese interests diverged in more arenas and with greater intensity. Notably, economic ties shifted from broadly complementary to broadly competitive as other differences emerged in the relationship.

These bilateral forces eventually converged around 2018 to produce a new era: strategic competition. The Trump administration, with its more hawkish views on China, gave expression to accumulating US frustrations. It launched the first trade war and technological competition against China in 2018. Following the 2020 election of Joe Biden, US commitment to competition intensified. That was the starting point as both countries headed into the events of 2025 — an exceptional year in US-China relations, marked by tariff escalation, brinkmanship over critical minerals, and the establishment of a fragile truce.

There are several notable features of this opening stage of strategic competition that persist today. First, the competition is broad in scope from day one, covering military affairs, economics, technology, and ideas about governance. Second, a sustained shift in domestic forces in both countries from supporting engagement to encouraging competition. Third, the mutual adoption of more coercive and confrontational strategies toward the other side. Fourth, the narrowing of communication channels. And fifth, its diverse global consequences, from disrupted supply chains to the formation of new alliances.

Analyzing the US-China trade war in 2025

Phase 1: Upping the ante (January–April 2025)

The Trump administration began the trade war soon after Inauguration Day in January 2025 and gradually built toward a bigger confrontation on so-called "Liberation Day," April 2. This first phase had two core attributes. First, the administration was supremely confident in the US economic position and leverage over China. This was based on the view that China needed the United States more than the United States needed China. Second, the Trump team had a large, diverse, and exclusively competitive agenda with China. The team came into office with a litany of problematic Chinese behaviors that it sought to change and wanted to use economic tools — mainly tariffs — to do so.

The trade war began barely two weeks after Donald Trump's inauguration, triggering two months of action-reaction dynamics, which revealed much about emerging US-China dynamics and Beijing's approach. First, Beijing was struggling to understand what Washington wanted from China. Chinese scholars and former policymakers appeared confused about Trump's priorities for US-China ties, and limited official communication in these early days did not help. Second, China's responses to US actions were prompt and reciprocal but, importantly, also proportional, highlighting the Chinese government's focus on controlling escalation. Finally, Beijing prioritized ensuring that US trade actions would not disrupt the Chinese economy, so it began helping exporters find new markets and subsidizing domestic demand.

Phase 2: Escalation spiral (April–June 2025)

The second phase of the trade war opened with a bang when, on April 2, Trump raised or leveled "reciprocal tariffs" on more than 180 economies — what the White House called "Liberation Day." For China, this level was 34%, in addition to the existing tariffs from the first Trump term and the 20% fentanyl-related tariff imposed in February. China responded quickly and both sides continued raising tariffs to levels that functionally stopped all trade: 145% on the US side and 125% on the Chinese side.

Beijing and Washington soon signaled a desire to de-escalate and agreed to meet for talks in Geneva. They announced a suspension of tariffs and China to remove controls on exports of rare earths, though the precise commitments by both sides remain unclear. The situation grew complicated again in mid-May when the US prohibited American and foreign companies from using, selling, transferring, financing, or servicing Huawei's Ascend chips. China viewed this as a violation of the Geneva agreement and did not resume rare earth exports. The United States retaliated by clamping down on the export of semiconductor software and aerospace components.

Both sides held a second round of talks in June and reached a framework agreement. China agreed to resume exports of rare earths in exchange for the United States lifting restrictions on chokepoint items and technology. The trade war had morphed into a supply chain competition focused on chokepoint vulnerabilities.

Phase 3: Probing and testing the boundaries (June–October 2025)

The third phase of the trade war was no less volatile than the first two but had its own momentum, logic, and dynamics. The period began with relative stability before rapidly deteriorating. Following previous talks, officials agreed to meet in Stockholm to discuss extending the 90-day tariff pause. Both sides readily agreed to another 90-day extension.

However, a new cycle of escalation and de-escalation was soon initiated by successive waves of US regulatory action. China's response was unlike past patterns in breadth and depth; it was designed to send a strong message and to teach Washington a lesson. For example, on 9 October, China announced an intention to expand control on Chinese-origin rare earths used in manufacturing globally, after the US Commerce Department adopted the Affiliates Rule, which effectively meant that any majority-owned subsidiary of a foreign company on the Entity List would also be covered by the list's prohibitions.

Each cycle of action-reaction during this phase risks severe consequences but had limited practical effect on both economies. A phone call between Trump and Xi on 19 September effectively ended the escalatory cycle as both leaders agreed to meet during the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan. The resulting framework agreement saw China agree to purchase US agricultural goods and resume rare earth exports. In exchange, the US paused Section 301 tariffs on maritime logistics and shipbuilding. This phase solidified a competition for leverage where both sides sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other while minimizing their own. The core dynamic became a race for time to reduce exposure and gain advantages.

Phase 4: Setting a new floor (November 2025 to March 2026)

Phase 4 began after the October 2025 Busan summit, where a "handshake deal" between Trump and Xi stabilized relations. The agreement featured the United States suspending the Commerce Department's Affiliates Rule for one year in exchange for China suspending its rare earths export control regime. Additionally, the US extended reciprocal tariff reductions and lowered fentanyl-related tariffs from 20% to 10% for increased Chinese cooperation. China committed to purchasing 12 million metric tons of soybeans in late 2025 and at least 25 million annually through 2028. Both leaders agreed to reciprocal visits in 2026, with up to four meetings potentially occurring that year, according to senior US officials.

Beyond bilateral deals, the US expanded domestic supply diversification efforts, for example by partnering with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies in November 2025 to build a rare earth magnets supply chain. In January 2026, G7 ministers agreed on price floors and carbon tariffs on Chinese rare earth exports. In a similar move, in December 2025 the State Department launched "Pax Silica" — a 10-member coalition aiming to build resilient supply chains independent from China.

Implications for US-China relations

Economics and technology have emerged as the central arenas of US-China competition, as events in 2025 highlighted the foundational importance of these sectors to national competitiveness. This is not a classic contest for relative advantage, but a competition for leverage where both sides seek to identify and exploit vulnerabilities while minimizing their own. Central to this is "positional power", or who commands a controlling position in global networks and technology supply chains.

The events in 2025 were less a traditional trade war and more a supply chain war. Beijing's weaponization of rare earth controls fundamentally changed the bilateral dynamic, reshaping it in ways that will persist for years. The core US-China dynamic now is a "race for time" to reduce exposure: China is sprinting to reduce reliance on Western semiconductors, while the US attempts to reduce its exposure to China's monopoly on rare earth production. China's 15th Five-Year Plan specifically calls for extraordinary measures to break through these chokepoint vulnerabilities.

The competition has revealed asymmetrical vulnerabilities. As of today, US vulnerability to China is broad and its leverage is narrow, while China's vulnerability is narrow and its leverage is broad. This has produced a fragile stability one analyst described as "mutually assured economic disruption," but this equilibrium rests on shifting political decisions about costs rather than structural constraints.

The two nations have clearly transitioned to a new phase of competition where questions of technological strengths and vulnerabilities have moved to the forefront. China enters this phase better prepared, having developed new economic weapons and re-engineered its domestic economy for resilience. Conversely, the US faces the monumental challenge of coordinating industrial policy across government and private industry. Finally, the arenas of economic and technological competition will not continue to be compartmentalized from the other arenas, namely diplomatic and military competition. The degree of spillover among these arenas will be far greater and more likely than during the US-Soviet rivalry simply due to the elevated baseline level of bilateral and global interdependence. Future projections for US-China competition are sobering.

現在全俄羅斯有將近五分之一的客機，正被迫停在機坪上長灰塵

普丁發動戰爭這幾年，大家都說西方制裁像抓癢？你看看俄羅斯現在的天空就知道這癢抓得多痛了。現在全俄羅斯有將近五分之一的客機，正被迫停在機坪上長灰塵，甚至被大卸八塊當成「器官捐贈者」。✈️🔧

把鏡頭拉到俄羅斯國內各大機場，那畫面真的慘不忍睹。根據最新數據，掌握全國九成客運量的11家最大航空公司，名下的673架飛機裡，有130架根本飛不起來。

為什麼？因為被制裁，買不到歐美原廠的維修零件。

國營的「俄羅斯航空」因為有普丁政府護航、資源優先灌給他們，勉強把停飛率壓在正常的11%。但離開國家保護傘，民間航空簡直哀鴻遍野。俄羅斯最大的私人航空 S7，旗下有三分之一的客機直接趴窩。他們買的空中巴士，引擎本來該定期送出國保養大修，現在被制裁卡死，原廠直接拒絕服務。

最大的包機公司 Azur Air 更慘，23架飛機只有6架能通過安檢，高達74%的機隊被迫停飛，老闆大概每天看著機坪掉眼淚。

最幽默的，絕對是俄羅斯人引以為傲的「國產客機」蘇愷超級噴射機（SSJ 100）。這台號稱俄羅斯航空業驕傲的飛機，引擎其實是跟法國合作開發的。現在跟歐洲鬧翻，法國不給零件，結果連自家生產的飛機都飛不上天，直接卡死在跑道上。

你一定會問，那俄羅斯這幾年國內線是怎麼飛的？

說白了就是「挖東牆補西牆」。他們把飛不了的客機當成「殺肉車」拆解，把零件硬拼裝到還能飛的飛機上，或者偷偷找土耳其、阿聯酋這些白手套去國際黑市高價掃貨。但航空專家已經預警，這種硬撐的極限大概就到2026年。到了2027年，當這批「拼裝機」的老化程度達到臨界點，俄羅斯民航業將迎來真正的雪崩。更別提烏克蘭現在還三不五時派無人機去炸機場，搞得連飛機燃料供應都出問題。

很多人常說經濟制裁沒用、大國底氣足不怕封鎖。但看看俄羅斯現在連民航機都要靠「殺肉」來續命，就知道現代戰爭打的早就不是單純的火砲，而是晶片、零件跟全球供應鏈。失去這些，再龐大的戰爭機器也會慢慢被勒到窒息。這點，身在晶片供應鏈心臟的台灣人，應該看得比誰都懂。

老實說，就算明天俄羅斯機票打到骨折，這種靠黑市零件硬飛的東歐大怒神，你們誰敢坐？

為什麼烏軍航程1600公里的無人機 ​ 能轟炸俄國內陸2500公里的煉油廠

  

為什麼烏軍航程1600公里的無人機 ​ 能轟炸俄國內陸2500公里的煉油廠？
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（2026年7月6日）烏克蘭遠程無人機奔襲約 2,505 公里，成功轟炸俄羅斯”西伯利亞”最大能源設施之一的「鄂木斯克煉油廠」（Omsk Refinery）。
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鄂木斯克煉油廠站被擊中的設施中，光是確認被擊中的ELOU-AVT-11 原油蒸餾裝置技術塔，每年就可以處理840 萬噸原油，重要性不言可喻。
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#續航力大增的最新款
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問題是，發動攻擊的FP-1中型自爆無人機，發表時的航程為1600公里，現在卻能轟炸距離俄烏邊境超過2500公里的目標？
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原來用的是2026年最新升級款，工程師為 FP-1 改裝了全新設計的機翼，並將「一體化副油箱」直接內建在機翼結構內，將打擊航程一舉暴增到了 2700 公里。
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而原本FP-1可以攜帶120公斤的彈頭，若是將彈頭縮減到50~60公斤，則航程可以增加到3000~3300公里左右。
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這表示FP-1不用沿著直線飛向鄂木斯克煉油廠，還可以設定多個轉折點，就算地面有人員目擊，或是被雷達網短暫捕捉，也很難確認無人機最終的攻擊目標。
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且對於攻擊煉油廠而言，無人機不需要攜帶上百公斤的高爆彈，只要幾十公斤的炸藥精準引爆煉油設施內部的易燃油氣，就能引發連環大爆炸與毀滅性大火。
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#無人機如何突破俄軍電子戰屏障？
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遠程奔襲的導引向來是個致命難題！傳統無人機高度依賴 GPS 等衛星訊號修正航線，這讓它們極易受到俄軍強大電子戰（EW）的干擾，在途中就如同無頭蒼蠅般紛紛墜毀。
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更棘手的是，俄軍在煉油廠、軍事基地等高價值目標周圍，都部署了極其密集的「全頻段高功率壓制干擾」，就算無人機千辛萬苦飛到附近，最終也難逃失控偏離的命運。
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為了解決這個困境，烏克蘭工程師在 FP-1 的導引機制上，玩出了低成本的「魔改黑科技」。
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這套系統主要分為三個階段，精準破解了俄軍的干擾與美國的技術限制：
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第一階段：起飛與邊境突圍（魔改版星鏈）
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在出擊的前半程，無人機主要透過安裝在機身內的「商用星鏈（Starlink）」與後方保持連線。
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讀者問：SpaceX 官方不是在俄羅斯境內設定了「地理圍欄（Geolock）」禁止開通嗎？而且美國也沒提供軍用的「星盾（Starshield）」網路，烏軍是怎麼辦到的？
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答案就在於硬體魔改與黑市灰色帳戶。烏軍透過歐洲或中東的第三方空殼公司，大量購買擁有「全球漫遊權限」的民用星鏈。（這當然還是要美國的默許）
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接著，烏克蘭技術人員在拆解時，直接切斷星鏈終端機內建的 GPS 定位晶片，並用電路改裝、欺騙衛星系統，讓 SpaceX 誤以為這台機器還在烏克蘭境內運作。
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由於星鏈使用的是低地球軌道（LEO）的定向窄波束通訊，天線垂直朝向天空，俄軍部署在地面上的傳統電戰天線很難從側面實施干擾。
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透過星鏈的巨大頻寬，後方操作員能在飛行前段接收即時影像，隨時微調航線、繞過俄軍防空網，將俄羅斯「地廣人稀」的遼闊腹地，轉化為自身隱密滲透的絕對優勢。
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第二階段：深入腹地的漫長自力救濟（去衛星化導航）
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當無人機深入俄羅斯境內數百公里後，由於徹底遠離烏克蘭邊境，加上 SpaceX 系統可能偵測到異常而中斷訊號，星鏈在後半程基本上會完全斷線。
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這時候，無人機就必須進入「完全瞎眼」的盲飛狀態？不，它切換至自主的「慣性導航（INS）」與「地形特徵匹配系統（DSMAC）」，這套系統完全不依賴任何外部 GPS 或衛星通訊，而是靠著出廠前寫入晶片的俄羅斯數位地圖。
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無人機一邊飛，機載鏡頭一邊「看」地面的河流、山脈或公路輪廓，與記憶體中的地圖進行即時比對與修正。它就這樣在完全斷網的狀態下，默默摸黑飛行上千公里。
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第三階段：末端致命一擊（50美元的 AI 邊緣運算）
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既然有了上述導引，為什麼最後還需要 AI？因為當無人機終於飛抵煉油廠等核心目標周圍 1 到 2 公里時，迎面而來的是俄軍的終端電戰屏障，以及放煙霧干擾等措施，地形比對也難以讓無人機擊中點目標。
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這時無人機就必須交給內建的「邊緣運算 AI 晶片」接管，這個 AI 不需要像 Gemini、ChatGPT 這類大語言模型般多才多藝，因為高階軍規晶片太貴（一顆動輒數千美元），在這種一次性自爆武器上根本不划算。
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烏軍大量採用的是「商用民用晶片」（類似高階掃地機器人、智慧型手機用的 NPU 晶片，單顆成本僅約 50 美元）。這顆晶片在出廠前的神經網路訓練中，只被灌輸了一種視覺記憶：煉油廠或常壓蒸餾塔的「3D形狀與幾何輪廓」。
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當外部所有導引訊號歸零時，這顆廉價的 AI 晶片會立刻接管飛行控制，它開啟前方鏡頭、全速掃描周邊地域。
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此時，無論俄軍如何施放電子干擾，都無法干擾到無人機「自己的眼睛」，只要視覺畫面中浮現符合煉油塔輪廓的像素，AI 就會瞬間死死鎖定其坐標，不再更改航向，強行控制著伺服馬達，全速精準撞擊下去。
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#一本萬利的買賣
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傳統軍事工業為了追求 99.99% 的可靠度，一枚巡弋飛彈動輒數百萬美元，光是晶片的封裝與測試就要耗時數月。
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烏軍可沒有大量預算與美國時間（台灣俚語：形容「很閒、時間很多」），為了降低成本，這些星鏈終端機與 AI 晶片，本質上都是便宜的民用大眾商品，它們沒有軍規晶片的抗高溫、耐輻射或極端震動測試，壽命可能只有短短幾百個小時。
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但對於自爆無人機而言，「壽命短」非但不是缺點，反而成了精準控管成本的戰略優勢。
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烏克蘭的作法則是：商用晶片與民用星鏈可能因為過熱、訊號不良或硬體故障，導致 10 架無人機中可能就有 5 架在半路墜毀或被攔截。
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但因為單機造價僅約5萬美元，烏軍可以同時發射 20 架（總成本不超過 100 萬美元，此數量只是舉例），卻能發動足以穿透防空網的蜂群無人機攻勢。
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當這 20 架無人機中，只要有「一架」成功穿透攔截、干擾、在最後一公里啟動那顆 50 美元的 AI 晶片鎖定目標，在煉油廠引爆彈頭，其所創造的戰果就足以用「一本萬利」來形容。

UK nationalises Chinese-owned British Steel to protect nation's steelmaking capacity

UK nationalises Chinese-owned British Steel to protect nation's steelmaking capacity  

The United Kingdom government has nationalised British Steel to secure its steelmaking capacity. This move protects thousands of jobs and the nation's vital supply of domestically produced steel. The government took operational control after the Chinese owners considered closing the plant's blast furnaces. These furnaces are the last in the UK to produce virgin steel from raw materials. An evaluation will determine compensation for the former owner, Jingye Group.

The UK government has nationalised British Steel to protect the nation's steelmaking capacity after the company's Chinese owners moved to shut the plant's blast furnaces.

The Department for Business and Trade announced the move on Thursday, saying it would save thousands of jobs and protect the UK's national interest by ensuring a supply of domestically produced steel for major construction projects and the defense industry.

"British Steel now belongs to the British people, and our focus is on the future: stabilising the business, backing the communities that rely on it and building a sustainable, competitive and decarbonized steel sector for the years ahead," Business Secretary Peter Kyle said in a statement.

An independent evaluation will be carried out to determine whether any compensation will be paid to the firm's former owner, China's Jingye Group.

The UK government took operational control of British Steel last year after Jingye said that it was considering closing the blast furnaces at its Scunthorpe plant in northern England.

The blast furnaces are the last in the UK that make "virgin steel" from raw materials.

British Steel and its forebears have been making steel at Scunthorpe for more than 130 years, building on the UK's development of improved steelmaking technology during the Industrial Revolution. The plant currently employs about 2,700 people.

Jingye bought British Steel in 2020 and says it has invested more than 1.2 billion pounds ($1.6 billion) to keep the plant running in the face of "ongoing production instability".