美国对第一岛链盟友的安全承诺“神圣不可侵犯”

亚洲太平洋地区近期多场大型联合军演同步展开，涵盖美菲、美日、“勇敢之盾”及“环太平洋军演”，演习范围集中第一岛链，引发国际关注。反映出美国对第一岛链盟友的安全承诺“神圣不可侵犯”。

其中，美菲“海上战士合作”军演于6月15日至7月1日在菲律宾最北端巴丹群岛举行，约2000名官兵参演，重点提升联合作战、战备及情报共享能力，日本陆上自卫队最精锐的“第一空挺团”也参与空降演练。

美日“坚毅之龙”军演则于6月20日至30日在九州及冲绳举行，约9000人参加，聚焦日本西南群岛防卫任务。

与此同时，“勇敢之盾”军演于6月22日至7月1日在关岛及北马里亚纳群岛周边展开，约1万人参与，并首次部署“泰风”中程飞弹系统，同时扩大日本、澳洲及加拿大参与，正式转型为多国联合实战演习。

此外，两年一度的“环太平洋军演”也在夏威夷登场，共31国、超过2.5万人参与，演训持续至7月31日，目标是强化印太地区海上合作与维护自由开放。

澳大利亚洛伊研究所专家马斯顿表示，近期军演凸显美国将第一岛链视为印太战略重点，美国对沿线盟友的安全承诺“神圣不可侵犯”，核心目标是强化拒止威慑，阻止潜在对手控制关键海空通道，同时推动盟友提升联合作战能力。

英国中央兰开夏大学政治分析师葛斯卡指出，美军战略已从单纯争夺制海、制空权，转向在第一岛链建立持续作战、侦察、锁定及支援能力，并假设未来冲突地点难以预测，因此强化第一岛链整体防御体系。

多场军演几乎同时在第一岛链展开，显示美国正加快把印太安全从“美国单独防卫”转向“盟友共同防卫”。无论这些演习是否统一规划，都反映出第一岛链正逐渐成为印太战略的核心防线，也意味着区域联合吓阻能力持续增强。

AMERICA IS IN DECLINE! Really?

AMERICA IS IN DECLINE! Really?

 My recent posts appear to have triggered the global population of conceited losers, who are more engaged in hating America (even though they owe most of their lives to it) than actually building up their own nations.

🔴 Well, if America is in decline then everybody else must already be in palliative care.

Let's look at its primary challenger: China.

It is such a rapidly rising superpower that it now has had to clamp down on capital outflows by its citizens desperate for an alternative investment producing decent enough rates of return, after the real estate market imploded 5 years ago and shows no signs of recovery.

This is a country that reports GDP per capita of just barely over 15% of the US, while its society is among the most rapidly ageing in the world (and its labour force has already started shrinking).

🔴 There is not a single case in the history of humanity where capital controls were a sign of a healthy economic situation. There is also not a single case of them ever having worked.

According to Henley & Partners, China has lost over 90,000 High  Net Worth Individuals in the past decade (people with investable assets of $1 million and over) while the US is among the biggest gainers, with a net inflow of over 40,000, comparable to a tax haven like the UAE.

🔴 In other words, successful people are trying to escape China, and quite a few of them head to the US - not the other way around.

Of course, we know of other signs of structural Chinese weaknesses: industrial overcapacity, putting downward pressure on consumer prices, which has erased corporate profits or even pushed companies into losses. And high unemployment, which could have been even worse if it weren't for state intervention propping up state-owned companies to prevent mass layoffs.

People gasp at the sight of modern Chinese cities and their high speed railway network, but don't ask about economic and social costs, which the ruling totalitarian regime is desperately trying to hide by controlling every bit of information in the media, and keeping the country tightly shut from Western platforms that permit more freedom of speech.

🔴 Is that the replacement for the US?

Or maybe Europe is?

Europe which has strangled its economy in its performative environmentalism which has put electricity prices at 2-3x of what Americans pay at home, effectively disqualifying the Old Continent from the AI race, as local entrepreneurs have to compete with one hand tied behind their backs.

The current state of AI is that the US is building foundational models, China is distilling whatever Americans produce and Europe can't be bothered to do even that.
Before the financial meltdown of 2008 American GDP per capita was about the same as Germany's (Europe's preeminent industrial power, after all). Today it's 50% higher.

🔴 Is that the "decline" you're talking about?

When Russia invaded Ukraine, after Europe spent 20 years prostituting itself with Putin for cheap gas, filling Kremlin's pockets, who did the EU capitals call for help first? Washington.

For years they have failed to abide by their defence spending commitments under NATO agreements, often showing their disdain for Americans, only to beg them for help yet AGAIN.

🔴 If America is going down then what do you say about them?
I'm not even going to mention Russia after it set off a meat grinder in Ukraine, where it is losing more people in 3 months than the US lost in Vietnam in a decade.

It's really quite funny witnessing people from all over the world congregate to hate on the US, while represeting nations that are never going to touch its level of influence, power and innovation.

Not to mention their very own dependence on America for  prosperity or even basic security.

The US has by far the strongest - and battle-tested - military in the world. It has the highest GDP of any nation and is the only large state that currently approaches per capita output of $100,000 annually.

To top it off, its stock markets account for about 2/3s of the global capitalisation of public companies, and are hoovering up money from all parts of the world, as they offer the highest rates of return and most investment opportunities.

In turn, that capital is used to build even more ground-breaking businesses, which could not flourish anywhere else in the world.

Decline? You wish

Ten years after Brexit's UK economic impact is becoming clearer

Ten years after Brexit's   UK economic impact is becoming clearer

 Not long after the UK left the EU in 2020, a Bristol-based firm called Eskimo started selling a new kind of high-fashion and energy-efficient electric radiator, based on new technology developed by academics in the city.

They planned to send them around Europe using the Channel Tunnel.

It was a timely product given Europe's green ambitions, and with orders flowing, its Birmingham factory was being kept busy.

The boss Phil Ward tells me his start-up has continued to grow, but that in his view it could have been so much more without what he calls "the Long Brexit effect": in 2020, 40% of his exports went to the European Union, and by 2025 it was just 5%.

The post-Brexit deal agreed with the EU by then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson in December 2020 guaranteed zero tariffs on exports to the EU, but Ward says that despite this, red tape and paperwork not directly related to tariffs were enough to create delays, costs and the expectation of hassle for prospective customers.

Eskimo did manage to export some goods to agents in France but it stopped selling directly to European consumers entirely. A planned expansion to Germany floundered.

And as Eskimo discovered when it attempted to export towel rails to Australia and New Zealand, both countries abide by international safety standards that are heavily influenced by the EU's CE mark.

This matters because one theoretical potential Brexit benefit was that it would allow UK regulators to not follow the EU's safety regulations and take a more pro-innovation, less regulatory approach for high-tech inventions.

Eskimo's experience is one example of a broader trend reflected in export figures. The UK Trade Policy Observatory at Sussex University calculated a rapid 26% reduction in the different types of UK exports by 2023, while a new study from Aston University Business School using five years of more detailed trade data concludes a loss of 53.8% of the type of exports and 31.5% for imports.

These figures for "trade varieties" are falls in the number of products sent to different EU countries.

A decade ago, many economists argued the UK would sustain longer-term economic damage by leaving the EU and many believe that damage has come to pass.

But to make that call you have to compare what did happen with what might otherwise have happened were it not for Brexit and doing that is a matter of method and statistical judgement.

And that judgement has to account for the fact that the period since Brexit has been a time of huge global flux. The pandemic that struck in the spring of 2020, the war in Ukraine that began two years later and, more recently, the energy price shock sparked by the conflict in Iran all have to be accounted for.

So too does the question of whether a Brexit-free UK would have really kept up with the Silicon Valley tech boom in recent years to the extent Brexit Britain has.

The clear consensus of economists making the calculations say they have factored in the global turmoil when assessing Brexit's impact. Others question their methods and the extent of Brexit's impact.

Some of the most negative predictions back in 2016, including those that said the UK could experience a Great Depression‑style hit, proved unduly pessimistic. Whatever economic hit there was, it was not sudden enough to cause an instant recession.

But those who believe the UK did sustain longer-term economic damage by leaving the EU say the hit was no less profound.


"Among economists there is not much debate, but there still is among policy folks. The experts were right. It was, if anything, worse than we thought, but it's taken longer to get there," says Nick Bloom, a British Stanford University professor and author of one of the most prominent recent major studies using Bank of England data.

His work sits among dozens of academic economics papers that have analysed vast amounts of data to try to assess what effect Brexit had on the UK's economy.
UK trade with Europe

UK trade with Europe had been on an upward trend before 2016. But official figures show that compared to 2019, 2025 UK exports to the EU were 14% down and imports were down 10%.

And they've been getting worse. Last year, 2025, was the worst year for UK goods export volumes to the EU this century, apart from one year in the depths of the financial crisis.
A line chart with two lines showing the difference in value of annual goods exports from the UK to EU and non-EU countries between 2016 and 2025. The blue EU line rises from around £205 billion to about £218 billion in 2018, before dropping over time to a low of £184 billion in 2025. The purple non-EU line starts from just below £200 billion and rises higher - over £220 billion - in 2019, before dropping and rising again between the pandemic and 2025. The final value settles on £202 billion

Think tank Niesr calculates exports were 16.9% lower and imports 16.1% less than what could have been expected based on positive pre-2016 trends. The Centre for European Reform uses a different method, trying to take account of what could have happened if the UK had not been excluded from a more recent surge in intra-EU trade, leading to a goods trade hit of 16% to exports and 14% to imports. It's all in the same ballpark and there is other research from European countries that suggest similar drops in their trade with the UK. Again, these calculations rely on selecting a method and statistical judgment.

Most studies conclude similarly, but using raw trade figures, so not accounting for significant inflationary spikes, you see a 4% rise in cash terms since 2019 of UK goods exports to the EU, which some analysts have used to argue there has been minimal impact.
Services trade boom

One area that has performed more strongly since 2016 is services, which make up over 80% of total UK economic output. Services sector exports from the UK to the EU are up 57% over the last decade, driven by a category that includes accountancy, legal services and consultancy. Non-EU services exports are up 49%. Imports from the EU are up 35% in the same time, and up 60% from outside the EU.

It is also true that there has been a service boom across the advanced world and some argue Britain might have done even better without Brexit. But either way, financial services clearly remained in healthier shape than the worst projections during the referendum.
Business investment

Investment by businesses was significantly lower than what might have continued after Brexit, according to two studies. Former Bank of England independent economist Jonathan Haskel calculates a £29bn or 1.3% reduction in the size of the economy from lower investment than would have been expected since 2016.
A line chart with two lines showing actual UK business investment in chained volume measures compared with estimates by Jonathan Haskel. The main purple line climbs from around £43 billion in Q1 2001, to almost £77 billion in Q1 2026. The dotted line, representing Haskel's estimates, starts in Q1 2016 and climbs above the official figures, reaching a peak of £88.5 billion in Q1 2026.

Business investment flattened in real terms immediately after 2016, and notably underperformed various measures of UK long term-trends and comparisons with other countries. Professor Haskel's latest calculation is a shortfall of 13% against the pre referendum trend from 1997-2016.

Using different methods, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and the top US economic research body the NBER find that UK business investment is down 12-13% against where it would have been, compared to a representative basket of advanced economies.

Much of these findings predate the energy shock in 2022, and attribute the hit to uncertainty in the first years after Brexit. The latest analyses show the UK still behind most of the G7 but having overtaken Germany after the hit to its economy from the 2022 energy crisis.

The currency

The most visible sign of economic shock was the fall in the value of the pound in the minutes and then years after the referendum. This makes imports and travel more expensive, and makes UK assets worth less in the world.

Pre-referendum, the pound had reached new highs against major currencies. It then fell sharply after the referendum and has since traded lower, particularly against the dollar and the euro. It fell again further at various points of post-Brexit uncertainty and then too during the mini-budget in 2022 when Liz Truss was prime minister. Since then, sterling has broadly strengthened and taken advantage of a weaker dollar and is currently near the top of its post-Brexit range.

The impact of an overall weaker pound has raised prices for imported goods, from fresh foods to manufactured goods. But it has also helped cushion disruption for exporters by making their goods cheaper in international markets. In turn, some food prices have been helped a little by lower tariffs on international imports not produced in the UK.

The new trade deals

One potential Brexit benefit was the UK's ability to sign its own trade deals outside the EU. The UK-India deal stands out as an example of where the UK broke ground well beyond what might have happened within the EU.

The UK also signed the first "deal" to alleviate the impact of President Trump's tariffs. The Government itself calculates that the trade deals Britain has signed will only slightly boost economic growth, by fractions of a percentage point over decades.

It is worth noting that even former Prime Minister Tony Blair, an avowed Remainer who was previously a backer of a second referendum, recently suggested the UK had enjoyed some benefit from being able to have its own AI regulations and that this would have implications for any attempt to rejoin the EU or single market in the future.

But it is also the case that it is not all one way. The EU has signed a deal with South America, the Mercosur deal, which gives access to EU car exporters to Brazil, the world's sixth biggest market, at zero tariffs, versus 35% for the UK.

And while Britain also achieved the first and best deal to alleviate President Trump's tariffs, the EU has since received many of the same benefits. The rate at 10% is better for the UK than the EU at 15%, but there is no quota for EU car exports to the US, and there is one of 100,000 for the UK.

It could be that the quiet competition between London and Brussels prompted by Brexit has motivated dealmaking that might have otherwise taken years.

The overall hit

There is a place that is as central to the UK's relations with the EU as the Strait of Hormuz is to global energy markets: the Channel Tunnel. When Britain was in the EU, the tunnel was the living embodiment of frictionless goods trade.

Back in 2016, 1.64m trucks went through the tunnel. Last year, post Brexit, there were 1.16m. So there are almost half a million missing lorry journeys a year - nearly 30% of this economically critical, high-value cross-Channel traffic has been lost.

Exactly how many trucks there would have been were it not for Brexit is impossible to say, but the hit from the pandemic, for example, would have subsided by now.

An industry participant describes the pattern as "pure Brexit" with small exporters leaving, unable to afford to invest in systems and surviving business models changing from "just in time" to increased stock-holding. HMRC trade data analysed by LSE also pointed to 16,400 firms - 14% of EU exporters - stopping exporting to the EU between 2019 and 2023 altogether, and that falls in exporting were concentrated among smaller firms.

What has happened in the Channel Tunnel tallies with the academic consensus that the UK economy is smaller now than it would have been based on the trajectory it was on in 2016.

The numbers range from about 3% to 8%. "The fact that it is harder to trade with the EU is about half the hit, in line with previous forecasts," says lead author of the NBER research, Nick Bloom.

He attributes the rest to the consequences of what at times felt like near-nightly political meltdown during the Brexit negotiations. "The other half is the uncertainty from the fact the Brexit process itself was such an enormous mess… We can never get that second 4% back."

These calculations are based on modelling how a UK still within the EU could have been expected to perform economically had it still experienced the pandemic and the 2022 energy shock but not Brexit.

The most recent study by the NBER takes account of population growth, and says the UK lost 6-8% of per capita output.

Bloom says he has used a variety of approaches including accounting for distance, economic gravity, the size of the economy and selectively omitting potential outliers.

There are, however, other figures. The authors, including Bank of England economists, also used a special survey of thousands of firms, accounting for a tenth of private employment, that was created by the Bank in 2016 to track Brexit reaction. The first Brexit analysis based on this survey was only published this year and updated on Friday and it shows how prolonged Brexit uncertainty hit commercial decision-making.

This entirely different firm-level method also leads to a conclusion of an economy about 6% smaller than without Brexit. That means an economy that would have otherwise grown about two thirds of a percentage point faster every year over the past decade.
Next ten years of Brexit

The world that post-Brexit Britain entered in 2016 has changed beyond any recognition.

Back in 2016, Brexiteers talked up the prospects of a free trade deal with the US when the reality in 2026 is a US that has put up higher trade barriers and weaponised tariffs. A decade ago, the idea was floated that the EU could collapse - it hasn't, and has introduced protections for its manufacturers. And China is now increasingly assertive.

The questions the above raise about UK global economic strategy are almost entirely different questions to those posed a decade ago.

It's possible an economically independent UK is well placed to deal with this volatile world. It's also possible that the opposite is true and that UK exporters would benefit from rejoining the EU single market.

Brexit, and its impacts on the economy, remain very much with us

What's clear from the data is that many UK goods exporters, especially smaller ones, have not become used to Brexit and that in certain sectors it's not getting any better.

Does the UK align itself with the US and its focus on lightly-regulated tech and in particular AI? Can a closer UK-EU relationship be squared with that? The EU has responded to the new economic nationalism with "Made in Europe" legislation that may require a certain percentage of parts to be made in Europe - it's unclear if the UK is included or not. An early test will be steel next month, and then a deal to avoid UK-EU electricity car tariffs at the end of the year.

UK officials recently suggested establishing a single market for goods trade with the EU as part of the next phase of a Brexit reset, something the EU says is incompatible with current government red lines around freedom of movement.

Unions have shifted position from wanting to rejoin the customs union, to looking for a Swiss-style deal in the European Economic Area.

In recent weeks government ministers have begun to quietly say that these red lines are specifically for this Parliament and will be looked at again. What path Sir Keir Starmer's replacement as prime minister decides to go down, we don't yet know.

Next month's UK-EU summit has now been postponed. Sir Keir had wanted to seal a deal to row back many of the post-Brexit frictions on food and farm trade that have impacted the cross-Channel trade flows. Other political parties have vowed to rip up the government's EU reset or even try to row back on elements of the post-Brexit deal.

Put bluntly, the status quo will not hold. Ten years on, Brexit, and its impacts on the economy, remain very much with us, and the policy debates may be about to return.

美元正接近一年中表现最好的一个月

 

包括摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase& Co.)、美国银行(Bank of America Corp.)和高盛(Goldman Sachs)在内的大型银行策略师，在美联储主席沃什(Kevin Warsh)誓言恢复价格稳定、并推动市场押注加息后，重新表达了对美元的信心。

摩根大通全球外汇策略联席主管Meera Chandan在接受采访时表示，美联储已经“激活”了美元的看涨前景。她说：“其他央行似乎不会追赶，美债收益率差距也不会缩小，这对美元有利。”

近几周市场叙事发生了转变，重新引发关于“美国例外论”将继续支撑美国资产的猜测，因为数据显示美国经济相较全球其他地区依然保持韧性。与此同时，人工智能持续推动企业大规模支出，并带动股市资金流入，投资者押注生产力提升将进一步支撑美元。

这与一年多前的情况相比发生了巨大的转变；当时“对冲美国”、“去美元化”和“货币贬值交易”还是市场主流的做空美元主题，如今这些声音已经明显降温。

甚至在沃什上任之前，由于投资者在2月伊朗袭击事件后寻求避险，美元已经开始走强。作为全球最大产油国，美国的地位也在油价飙升时支撑了美元，尽管油价现在已回落至战前水平。

Chandan表示：“真正驱动市场的接力棒，现在已经从能源转交给了美联储的政策反应。”

彭博美元现货指数今年6月迄今已上涨2.1%，几乎追平3月因油价上涨带来的涨幅。目前该指数接近去年11月以来的最高水平，今年以来累计上涨1.7%。

“强势美元政策”

不只是偏鹰派的美联储在强化美元多头的信心。美国财政部长贝森特(Scott Bessent)近期也更频繁地强调“强势美元政策”，并公开支持沃什。

不过，贝森特表示，推动美元在全球经济中占据主导地位的关键并不是汇率本身，而是美国政策的确定性。

在这一背景下，对冲基金Man Group Plc预计美元将在年底前上涨约5%；而道明证券(TD Securities)则认为第三季度美元将温和上涨约2%。

道明证券外汇策略主管Jayati Bharadwaj表示：“美国数据具有韧性，经济活动强劲，新任（偏鹰派）美联储主席正在讨论政策可信度与价格稳定性。”她指出：“市场现在认为美联储加息的门槛更低了，这种预期发生了变化。”

美元的挑战

不过，前方仍然存在挑战。Bharadwaj表示，要看到更显著的美元上涨，美联储需要实施比市场目前在明年初之前已经定价的“一到两次25个基点加息”更多的紧缩行动。

一些迹象显示，美元在下半年的上涨速度可能会放缓。

为对冲美元在未来12个月内相对于一篮子主要货币上涨而支付的溢价，已接近一年多以来的最高水平，并逼近五年平均水平。不过，这一水平仍低于上一次“美国例外论”主导市场叙事时的峰值。

巴克莱银行(Barclays PLC)策略师表示，考虑到市场已经充分计入美联储加息预期、市场情绪极度看多，同时油价和美国经济数据也可能接近阶段性高点，“美元的上涨路径未必是线性的”。

美国银行外汇策略师亚Alex Cohen则认为，美元“仍有进一步上涨空间”。美国银行周四将欧元/美元年底目标从1.20下调至1.15，并预计美联储今年将加息三次。

其他主要央行也预计会加息，但幅度将小得多。

由于欧洲地区经济疲软的迹象，欧洲央行行长拉加德(Christine Lagarde)本周早些时候打压了加息预期，推动欧元跌至一年以来的最低水平。

甚至在最近一次美联储会议之前，短线资金和投资基金就已经大举押注美元上涨相关交易。根据美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)数据，截至6月16日，对冲基金、资产管理公司及其他投机者已累计建立价值294亿美元的美元走强押注。

高盛首席外汇及新兴市场策略师Kamakshya Trivedi表示，推动资金流入的部分原因在于“人工智能交易”。

Trivedi称：“现实情况是，人工智能交易正在同时提升美国的经济增长预期和股市回报，使其成为资本具有吸引力的目的地。”

日本加强太空防卫 设“航空宇宙自卫队”

 

 日本加强太空防卫　设“航空宇宙自卫队”


（东京26日讯）日本参议院周五表决通过了《防卫省设置法》修正案等法案，将重组航空自卫队，并将正式名称改为“航空宇宙自卫队”。为因应安全环境快速变化，此举为强化日本太空防卫能力的更广泛政策一环。

中央社根据日本共同社报导，重组的航空宇宙自卫队将在本财政年度（至明年3月止）内成立，并新设由空将（相当于空军中将）指挥的“宇宙作战集团”，以提升太空领域觉知（SDA）与卫星监控能力。

新通过法律也授权防卫副部长员额从现有的1位增为两人，以在突发事件及重大天灾发生时分担工作量，并扩大与美国和其他安全伙伴的高阶防卫交流。

第2位防卫副部长预计最快于今年夏天任命。

小泉进次郎强调太空重要性

防卫部长小泉进次郎表示，太空的重要性日益增加，早已超越国家安全领域。

小泉进次郎在记者会上以卫星导航系统、智能手机地图应用程式与气象预报为例，强调“民众的日常生活已离不开太空技术”。

他指出，政府将持续建立自卫队有效执行任务所需的制度框架。

此外，为因应自卫队在招募及留营方面遭遇日益严峻的挑战，这项法律也将改善自卫队队员退役后的福利待遇。

根据该法律，驻扎冲绳县那霸的陆上自卫队第15旅团将升格为师团，以强化日本西南方离岛防卫能力，部分原因在于应对中国日益强势的海上活动。

德国电信网络中安全战略为优先考量

 
德国电信网络中安全战略为优先考量


在德国目前的电信网络中，中国供应商提供的组件仍占有很大比例。德国总理默茨明确表达了对此的忧虑，强调今后6G网络的建设中，安全问题将占据核心地位。

默茨：绝对没有理由允许他们进入欧盟或德国市场在周三（6月24日）的一次联邦议会与政府的质询问答环节中，德国总理默茨强调，对中国产品仍滞留在德国电信网络中深感担忧。一般认为，默茨的这番表态，预示他的政府将对华为、中兴等中国制造商采取更为强硬的立场，尤其是在德国今后6G网络的建设中，安全战略将是最为核心的考量。

默茨此前就曾表示，无论着眼于地缘政治、或者国家主权，德国的6G网络决不允许中国产品出现.

德国即将禁用华为、中兴5G设备？

如今，默茨在回答社民党议员舍茨尔（Johannes Schätzl）提出的德国的移动网络中是否减少中国产品时，再次重申了他的立场，他说，公平的贸易总是双向的，但欧洲企业的产品基本被排除在中国的通信网络之外。“在这种情况下，如果还存在安全隐患，那么绝对没有理由允许（来自中国的）制造商进入欧盟或德国市场”。

他说，欧洲制造商也可以提供相关零部件，应该充分利用这一选择。许多公司已经在尽可能地替换零部件。

默茨表示，德国政府正在积极应对潜在的安全风险，包括外交部、国防部、内政部等在内的部门正在制定内容广泛的安全战略，其中也针对基础设施。这一议题将得到优先考虑。“我们必须比之前更有效地保护我们的基础设施。这牵涉到外部威胁，也包括系统内部的隐患。”

对于华为 我们应该感到担忧吗？


根据议员的发言，德国电信近60%的基站使用了中国技术。只有在萨尔州、莱法州和巴伐利亚州这三个联邦州，移动网络完全采用了西方技术。由于地缘政治紧张局势，移动网络在军事领域也日益重要，例如，对无人机的防御，需要使用移动网络。有知情人士透露，技术供应商能够访问相关数据，甚至可能操纵网络。

德国目前尚没有6G移动网络，但在之前建设4G和5G网络时，曾大量采用华为和中兴的设备。根据公开信息，德国5G网络中的华为设备占比曾一度达到约50%甚至更高。2024年，德国政府与运营商达成一致，2026年底之前，5G核心网中的华为和中兴关键组件原则上要被移除，德国的运营商需要逐步转向欧洲供应商如诺基亚和爱立信。

法新社 - 新西兰内部文件披露中国在太平洋地区的军事活动正在“常态化”

法新社  -  新西兰内部文件披露中国在太平洋地区的军事活动正在“常态化”


法新社获得的一份新西兰内部文件中显示，随着北京扩大其安全存在，中国的弹道导弹试验和海军活动将逐渐成为太平洋地区的“常态”。


“我们预计中国的行动——例如2025年2月穿越塔斯曼海的解放军海军编队，以及2024年9月向太平洋发射洲际弹道导弹，都将在我们战略环境中常态化。”这是新西兰国防军和外交贸易部于2025年12月撰写的一份报告，当时他们正在监测一支在菲律宾海活动的中国人民解放军海军编队。

这份报告称，去年12月中国在菲律宾海进行的军事部署行动，“与中国过去十年来在南太平洋逐步扩大其海上军事力量的举动一脉相承”。

“北京已向该地区部署了多种类型的海军舰艇，其中包括但不限于医院船、用于支持人道主义援助与救灾行动的大型两栖舰艇，以及航天测控支援船。”法新社报导指出，航天支援船旨在追踪火箭发射、卫星及洲际导弹活动。

新西兰国防部未透露中国向南太平洋部署的其中一艘海军舰艇的具体类型，理由是披露此类信息“可能危及新西兰的安全或防务”。出于同样的原因，新西兰国防部也拒绝透露新西兰将如何应对的细节。

新西兰国防部表示：“无论何种情况，新西兰的应对措施都将符合国际法。”

法新社指出，近年来，中国在国防领域投入了数十亿美元，尽管北京方面坚称其目标是和平，但这一趋势仍引发了一些国家的不安。

在周五举行的中国外交部新闻例会上，当被问及法新社获得的这份文件时，中国外交部发言人表示“不了解相关情况”。这名发言人补充说：“中国的军事发展旨在维护国家主权、安全和发展利益，并非针对任何国家。”