Wednesday, October 21, 2026

民调:极右翼勒庞或成法国大规模示威及暴力事危机最大受益者

法国“最危险的女人”、极右翼政党领导人——走近马克龙“老对手”马琳娜·勒庞 

民调:极右翼勒庞或成法国大规模示威及暴力事危机最大受益者

法国各大主要报纸继续大篇幅围绕10月17日法国大规模示威及暴力事件的社会危机展开,À la rue 陷入困境,《解放报》以带有讽刺意味的标题,凸显政府在危机中的被动与失措,事件过去四天,尽管执政阵营内部不断有升级强硬安全措施的主张,但政府寻求政治解决方案仍显无解。《费加罗报》头版聚焦事件对总统选举格局的影响,民调显示,极右翼国民联盟成最大受益者。《十字架报》头版标题“算法下的暴力”,关注社交媒体对示威动员和暴力扩散的影响,反应法国社会对平台责任、信息传播与公共安全关系的争论。


《费加罗报》报道,根据Ifop-Fiducial为该报所作的最新民调,10月17日重创法国的严重暴力骚乱事件,可能强化极右翼国民联盟及玛丽娜·勒庞的选民基础,使其成为危机最大受益者,民调显示,勒庞首轮投票支持率达到34%至38%,较10月中旬上升1至2个百分点,并创下其历次总统选举民调中的新高。

同时,调查预测勒庞在所有可能情形的第二轮对决中均占据优势,对阵菲利普和阿塔尔时支持率分别为56%和58%,对阵梅朗雄的得胜率更高达68%。显示暴力事件减弱了勒庞长期面临的政治形象障碍,使其更容易以维护秩序的代表自居。

与此同时,中央阵营支持率明显下滑,前总理菲利普的首轮支持率降至15%,一周内下降3个百分点,难以进入第二轮。而对于极左不屈法国党的梅朗雄,尽管他面临对骚乱态度的指责争议,其支持率依然保持稳定,晋级第二轮的机会有所增加。

高市早苗就任一周年:加速推进强化国防战略

高市早苗_百度百科 

高市早苗就任一周年:加速推进强化国防战略

10月21日是日本首相高市早苗就职一周年,《十字架报》报道关注一年来日本防卫策略的转变,在地区安全形势恶化和美国安全承诺不确定性上升的背景下,日本正强军事建设,并逐步突破战后和平限制。

Japan is accelerating a major defense shift under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and it's drawing sharp attention from Beijing. Backed by a strong electoral mandate, Takaichi's government is boosting报道说,高市早苗在上台两天后的首批声明中,就宣布将国防开支提高至GDP的2%,比其前任设定的时间提前两年,并加快修订国安战略文件,今年二月,她再次打破禁忌,推动重新讨论日本宪法第九条、四月,批准已被禁止50年的致命性武器出口,并呼吁就敏感的无核原则展开讨论。

文章指出,日本的军事转型并非始于高市,而是其延续安倍晋三以来的战略调整,尤其在俄乌战争爆发后,日本进一步强化反击能力,并逐渐摆脱国防开支不超过GDP 1%的限制。调整的背景,也包括日本面对中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜带来的安全压力,以及特朗普重新执政后对日安全承诺的不确定性上升。

法国日本问题专家德拉莫特指出。高市有关台湾的表态与承认集体自卫一致。但她比其前任更为明确,并拒绝让步。文章援引专家分析认为,尽管东京不断释放加强军备的信号,但修宪和调整无核原则在日本仍面临政治、伦理及战略障碍,同时,还有资金问题,高市尚未明确新增国防开支将如何筹措。

欧盟正式发布改版后的《北极战略》

🇪🇺The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have unveiled a new EU Arctic Strategy, setting out a framework centred on security, climate ... 

欧盟正式发布改版后的《北极战略》

欧盟周二(10月20日)正式发布改版后的《北极战略》(Arctic Strategy),全面将“安全与防御”置于政策的核心位置。并与美国、英国和加拿大等“志同道合”的伙伴密切合作,共同遏制中俄日益扩张的影响力。

欧盟官方明确强调:“北极是欧洲‘北部邻近区域’(Northern Neighbourhood)不可分割的一部分,直接关系到欧洲的安全、气候、繁荣与韧性。”

欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表卡娅‧卡拉斯(Kaja Kallas)周二表示:“自我们2021年提出上一份北极战略以来,我们面临着日益严峻的安全环境。北极不再孤立于全球地缘政治紧张局势之外。我们更新后的北极战略反映了这一新现实,将安全坚定地置于其核心。”

NATO Launches Arctic Sentry 🛡️ Strategic Arctic Mission Explained | UPSC (NATO Arctic Sentry, Arctic security mission, NATO Arctic strategy, militarization of Arctic, geopolitics of Arctic, UPSC inte欧盟委员会在官方新闻稿中指出,欧盟在北极拥有直接且重大的利益——当地生活着超过50万名欧盟公民,且欧盟透过丹麦王国、芬兰和瑞典这三个成员国直接存在于北极地区。此外,欧洲也与挪威、冰岛、英国、加拿大和美国等战略伙伴保持紧密合作。

过去,欧盟主要将北极视为推动多边合作与环保的区域;但本次战略转变表明,布鲁塞尔已正式将北极定位为“欧洲战略邻近区域”的一部分。战略文件直言,多边合作虽不可或缺,但不能再作为欧盟北极方针的唯一基石,与伙伴的合作必须与保护自身利益的能力相辅相成。

针对俄罗斯与中国在该地区日益频繁的军事与经济活动,欧盟官员发出明确警讯。卡拉斯指出,俄罗斯近年重新开放了苏联时代的军事基地,并在北极圈内的科拉半岛集中大量核武器,甚至将该区域作为新式导弹的试验场。

俄罗斯近数周不断升级混合战争手段。上个月,北约(NATO)展开联合行动,成功应对了俄方针对海底电缆的深海演习,遏止其切断挪威本土与斯瓦尔巴群岛联系的破坏企图。

卡拉斯补充强调:“中国在高北地区(High North)的战略野心也在增长。北京在港口、矿产和关键基础设施(如‘冰上丝绸之路’)方面的投资需要仔细审查。”

欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉‧冯德莱恩(Ursula von der Leyen)在新闻发布会上直言:“北极是地缘政治地壳板块发生碰撞的地方之一。当我们看到主权、领土完整以及维持该地区稳定的规则不再被视为理所当然时,我们就必须采取行动并改变我们的战略姿态,与志同道合的伙伴一同挺身捍卫这些价值观。”


为抗衡威胁并捍卫区域稳定,欧盟提出了多项具体计划措施:

建立海底电缆中心与海上安全中心:参照地中海与波罗的海模式,欧盟将与美、英、加等伙伴合作设立“北极电缆中心”与“海上安全中心”,共享“从海底到太空”的情报,监测并修复通讯电缆,同时追踪俄罗斯用于非法运输石油的“影子舰队”。

扩充破冰船队与卫星监控:目前欧洲仅拥有约10艘破冰船(大多位于芬兰),远落后于俄罗斯的40艘。欧盟战略提出将集资扩充破冰船队,并扩大“哥白尼”(Copernicus)卫星网络对北极的监测能力。

The Arctic Security Threat - Nato-Veterans推进基础设施与关键原材料:欧盟正加速推进“北欧铁路”(Rail Nordica)工程,并开发格陵兰及北欧地区的稀土、锂等矿产,这些资源对清洁能源转型至关重要,以降低对外部供应链的依赖。

坚持环保立场:欧盟能源专员丹‧约恩森(Dan Jørgensen)强调,尽管提升安全防御,欧盟对北极开采化石燃料的立场保持不变:“石油、煤炭和天然气必须留在地下。”

法德罕见联手 批评人民币低估加剧中欧贸易失衡

 德總理點名人民幣被低估歐盟醞釀「歐洲版301」對華貿易戰升溫- 兩岸- 中時

法德罕见联手 批评人民币低估加剧中欧贸易失衡

 有关中国,《回声报》财经版报道,面对中国对欧贸易顺差持续扩大及欧洲企业竞争力承压,法国和德国罕见地在汇率问题上联手,批评人民币被低估。报道说,两国在10月5日联合发布的立场声明中,就涉及货币这一外交和商业上都始终敏感的议题,他们未点名批评,中国通过汇率低估促进出口,加剧欧洲的贸易失衡,今年前九个月,中欧贸易顺差增长了26%,达到2470亿欧元,创历史新高。德国总理默茨此前也曾指责人民币被低估25%至30%,德国对中国创纪录的贸易逆差使其失去储备。

中国人民银行对此的回应是,人民币汇率由市场决定,并非存在北京“隐形之手”操控。尽管人民币今年兑欧元升值约10%、对美元升值约5%,但多项估值指标仍显示其存在低估,如高盛评估人民币对美元低估15-250%。不过报道最后也指出,汇率并非中欧竞争失衡的唯一原因。中国企业在电池、太阳能等十大前沿产业均占具有巨大成本优势,平均较竞争对手成本低约58%,报道援引麦肯锡评估,即使人民币升值25%,也只能削弱这一优势的四分之一。

为什么金家世袭王朝能传到第四代?

8 Kim Jong-un Memes ideas | kim jong un memes, kim jong‑un, memes 

看到蔡霞教授谈朝鲜,也引发了我对一个问题的重新思考:为什么金家王朝能够延续至今?而与之相伴的另一个问题则是:为什么中共党国专制体制能够长期存在,甚至在经历饥荒、贫困、腐败和无数政治灾难之后,依然表现出惊人的韧性?

这些年,我读过不少关于极权主义的研究,也不断在想这个问题,却始终没有找到一个完全满意的答案。

许多人习惯从暴力、镇压或宣传机器来解释极权统治的延续。但如果答案仅仅如此,那么历史上的许多独裁政权早就应该崩溃了。因为暴力固然能够让人服从,却很难让几代人持续相信;宣传固然能够制造幻象,却难以永久对抗现实。

真正值得追问的问题是:为什么一个建立在谎言与恐惧之上的政治怪胎,不仅不死不僵,反而能像癌细胞一样在封闭中不断自我繁殖?

在我看来,朝鲜提供了一个极其典型的观察样本。

Prompt Funny guy: Kim jong-un | Download Script for AI | Prompti.ai金家王朝掌握的不仅仅是国家机器,更是一套对人性弱点、心理需求和社会关系的系统性控制技术。它将共产主义意识形态朝鲜化、宗教化,把赤裸裸暴力窃取的政治权力伪造为神权,又借助现代组织体系和监控技术,逐渐构建起一个完整的极权神权生态系统(totalitarian theocracy)。

而朝鲜之所以值得研究,不仅因为它是世界上最封闭的国家之一,更因为许多极权统治赖以维系的基本机制,在那里都呈现出最极端、最清晰的形态。

理解朝鲜,并不仅仅是在理解朝鲜。我以为,朝鲜这个极权神权生态系统大致建立在如下几个支柱之上。

一、绝对神化的“教主/领袖”

在邪教中,教主是神、是先知、是不可质疑的真理化身。金家王朝的领袖也被赋予了神话般的色彩,如朝鲜的“白头山血统”。金家老大不仅是政治首脑,更是“慈父”、“人类的救星”。他的话就是法律和真理,他全知全能,甚至在官方叙事中,他的诞生都会伴随天象异动(如长白山顶的双彩虹和圣星)。

这种肉体凡胎的神化包装,很容易被本来就迷信愚昧的朝鲜人所接受,于是二战以来,金氏家族被塑造成民族救星与革命圣裔,把原本最危险的接班问题,转化为一种近乎王朝继承的政治传统,从而在很大程度上化解了独裁体制普遍面临的继承危机。

我记得,1980年代中期,刚刚走出文革浩劫、开始改革开放的中国,正经历一场思想解冻。经历过造神运动破产的人们重新回归常识,普遍把朝鲜那套还在进行的肉麻而荒谬的个人崇拜当成笑话。

然而,当时在北京的朝鲜留学生面对中国人的嘲讽,却认真地辩解道:“我们的英明领袖和你们的不同,我们的英明领袖是不会犯错误的。”这句话听来荒诞,却真实地揭示了金家王朝洗脑程度。

其中一个做法是,将“主体思想”和“领袖绝对化”写入宪法,将金氏家族彻底神化。日常教育、媒体宣传和公众活动均围绕对领袖的无条件忠诚展开,从思想根源上剥夺民众的独立思考与反抗意识,让绝大部分朝鲜人变成金家王朝的忠实追随者。

二、举国爱心轰炸与感恩洗脑

邪教用伪造的爱来包装对信众的控制;金家王朝则用国家机器来编造“爱”与“恩”的谎言,进行举国爱心轰炸,并把国家公共资源包装成领袖的爱心和恩赐。人们从幼儿园开始,就被灌输“一切幸福生活都是领袖赐予的”。孩子们生日和节假日收到的糖果、玩具、校服和各种福利,都被宣传成“慈父领袖送来的礼物”。吃饭前要感谢领袖,分到住房要感谢领袖,一切所得都要感谢领袖。

这种长年累月的感恩教育,实际上是对国民进行系统性的忠孝领袖理念以及心理负债感的灌输,强制人们形成一种认知:自己的生存、教育乃至未来,都源于领袖的慈悲和恩赐,而对领袖的忠孝则是人伦天理。

这样的认知颠倒了谁养活谁的基本常识:不是人民养活领袖、党国,而是领袖和党国养活人民;不是公民创造财富,而是一切财富都来自领袖和党的恩赐。把父母的养育之恩变为领袖的养育之恩,让国民对领袖的忠孝成为理所当然。同时把不感恩等同于背叛,将质疑和批评领袖和党政府视为忘恩负义,并把这种背叛和忘恩负义定为最无耻的行为,从而将人民彻底改造为自愿献身给领袖的愚民。

然而,金家王朝政治最讽刺之处在于,它要求国民忠诚、感恩,而其权力核心内部却往往奉行最无人伦的残酷斗争。

1980年代中期,我在中共外交部工作期间,有一场被严密封锁的朝鲜宫廷政变:当时羽翼已丰的金正日为了抢班夺权,不仅不感恩父亲的栽培,竟然把金日成抓了起来,逼他让位。随后,金正日企图获得北京的外交支持与背书。但这场逼宫戏被邓小平所否决而未能演下去。

上台不久的金正恩对自己的姑父张成泽——被视为是朝鲜实际上的二号人物、父亲金正日留下的辅政大臣——痛下杀手,也是家族争权的血腥继续。据韩国情报官员,金正恩将张成泽及其两名助手,在成百上千的高官观看下用高射机枪打成粉碎,再用火焰喷射器将尸体烧成了灰烬(此说有争议,但张被处死是事实)。

三、把国家与个人捆绑在一起

邪教利用现代社会中人们的疏离感,提供了一个看似温暖平等、安全的“大家庭”,让人产生归属感,来迅速填补个人的精神空虚,从而攻破个体的心理防线。

金家王朝则通过把国家伪装为大家庭,长期灌输一种观念:国家就是人民,人民就是国家。国家富强,个人就富强;领袖光荣,人民就光荣;导弹升空,民族就获得尊严。

这种身份认同感、归属感,自豪感让民众产生虚假信心和认知,即使生活贫困、挨饿受冻、缺乏自由,人们仍然能够从“祖国伟大”、“民族复兴”的宏大叙事中获得心理补偿。

当个人价值和尊严被完全剥夺后,国家荣耀便成为替代品。这也是为什么许多极权国家特别热衷于大阅兵、火箭发射、核武试验、体育金牌和各种宏大工程。因为它们能够不断强化一种幻觉:国家地位升高,就是个人地位升高,个人值得为此付出一切。朝鲜在这方面做得很成功。

四、极端的信息铁幕与社会隔离

为了防止外界戳破谎言,邪教必须切断信众与现实世界的联系。邪教通过断亲和不接触外界来隔离信众;金家王朝则直接动用国家机器,用边界、军警和法律进行实体和信息封锁。他们彻底切断国民与外部世界的联系。没有自由的网络,没有外国的报纸和影视作品,没有短波收音机等等。私自收听境外广播或看韩剧,会被定性为反社会主义罪,甚至判处极刑。只有在完全没有外部参照物的信息真空里,官方那套荒谬的意识形态和“我们是世界上最幸福的人”的谎言才能维持不破。

当一个社会长期笼罩在信息铁幕之下,缺乏外部信息参照,当自由、权利、民主、幸福等概念从小就被偷换了内涵,人们不仅难以获得不同观点,甚至难以想象另一种社会运行方式。极权神权最成功的信息控制,不只是让人不知道真相,而是让人失去想象真相的能力;不只是让人不敢追求自由,而是让人根本无法想象自由是什么。

五、垄断终极真理与危机制造

邪教最核心的思想控制术之一,就是宣扬某种形式的末日论、大灾难论,或社会堕落论。它通过系统性歪曲现实世界,夸大外部环境的危险与邪恶,让信众产生持续的焦虑、恐惧与不安全感。在制造恐慌之后,教主再把自己包装成唯一的救世主和真理化身,让人相信只有追随他,才能在即将到来的灾难中获得拯救、生存甚至永生。

这种控制术的关键,并不只是制造恐惧,而是垄断对现实的解释权和对未来的定义权。当教主成为唯一能够解释世界的人时,信众便逐渐失去独立判断能力。无论现实发生什么,无论预言是否落空,无论教义如何自相矛盾,教主都能重新定义事实、修改解释,而信众则只能继续依附于他提供的答案。

金家王朝同样深谙此道。几十年来,朝鲜政权不断向国民灌输帝国主义亡我之心不死的叙事,把外部世界描绘成一个充满敌意、阴谋和掠夺的丛林社会,把国家长期置于亡国灭种、生死存亡的危机氛围之中。

在这种叙事框架下,贫困不是制度失败,而是外部封锁造成的;饥荒不是政策灾难,而是敌对势力的阴谋活动;个人苦难不是统治者的责任,而是民族复兴必须付出的代价。所有问题最终都被导向同一个答案:国家需要更为强权的领袖、更强大的军队和更严厉的控制。

危机感因此成为一种取之不尽的政治资源。只要敌人始终存在,只要危险永远迫在眉睫,民众便会倾向于接受牺牲自由、忍受贫困、服从权威。于是,先军政治、核武发展以及各种极端动员措施,都被包装成民族生存的必然选择。

对于极权统治而言,最大的危险从来不是外部敌人,而是人民不再感到恐惧。一旦人们发现外面的世界并没有宣传中的那样黑暗,一旦开始怀疑所谓永恒危机的真实性,统治者所垄断的真理便会出现裂缝,而神话往往正是从这样的裂缝开始崩塌的。

六、极端恐怖高压下的生存认同与认知沦丧

在封闭环境中,邪教控制者会系统性地瓦解信众原有的自尊与独立人格。他们通过长时间的集体冥想、公开忏悔和羞辱、高强度劳动以及反复的诵经听训,使信众长期处于身心极限疲劳的状态。极度疲惫的大脑,其逻辑思维与防御机制会发生断崖式下跌,变得极易接受暗示与驯化,并在付出惨重代价后,对一切荒谬的虐待进行病态的自我合理化。

金家王朝则将这种手段放大为国家行为。它让国民深陷于无止境的思想改造学习和密集的政治运动中,在巨大的生存恐惧与物质苦难双重夹击下,逼迫人们通过崇拜施暴者来寻求内心的心理平衡。面对饥荒与极端贫困,国民如果承认这是体制的罪恶和领袖的无能,其赖以生存的精神世界就会瞬间崩溃。为了逃避这种彻底的认知痛苦,民众的心理防御机制只能走向极端的斯德哥尔摩症思维——他们自欺欺人地坚信:“生活这么苦,一定是因为美帝国主义的封锁”;或者“英明领袖一定是在为了更宏大的民族复兴在忍辱负重”。

金家王朝依赖严密的国家暴力机器,管控民众,它将全国人口划分为核心、动摇、敌对三大阶层和51个子类别,以此严格控制个人以及社会的方方面面,实施精准监控。

还有人盯人和株连九族。朝鲜国家安全保卫省和人民保安省等安全机构遍布全国,通过居民组织(人民班)建立起严密的人盯人、连坐与告密系统。一人“叛国”或违规,其直系甚至旁系亲属都会被牵连,通常被直接关入政治犯收容所。

不仅民众,朝鲜高层官员和军方将领时刻面临被肃清的威胁。金家王朝以铁腕手段消灭潜在的政治威胁,巩固权力。同时,朝鲜设有多个臭名昭著的政治犯收容所(如臭名昭著的14号、15号管理所)。被关押者(包括未经过正当审判的连坐家属)在极其恶劣、甚至致命的环境下遭受残酷的奴役和酷刑,以此作为惩罚异见和恐吓全社会的重要工具,从而保证对教主领袖的绝对顺从。

长期处于这种极端暴力和恐惧中的个体,为了降低持续的心理痛苦,往往会逐渐认同施暴者,并把服从解释为忠诚,把恐惧解释为热爱。这种心理机制与认知沦丧共同作用,使极权统治获得了一种看似自愿的服从。

七、完整的极权生态系统的建立

金家王朝能够延续至今,并不仅仅依靠暴力。它用一系列的机制完成对人民的控制。在这个过程中建立和完善了一套完整极权神权的生态系统。

其主要构成是一个庞大的既得利益集团。从党政干部、军队将领到安全系统和国营经济体系中的特权阶层,他们的地位、财富乃至安全,都与现行体制深度绑定。维护金家统治,不仅是领袖个人的需要,也是整个精英统治集团的共同利益。

长期极权统治还会形成一种逆向淘汰机制。独立思考、敢于质疑和坚持原则的人,更容易被边缘化甚至清除;而善于服从、表忠和维护现状的人,则更容易获得资源和晋升机会。经过数代人的筛选,精英的自我改造和整体投降,体制会逐渐形成一种有利于极权神权自身复制和延续的人才结构。

八、结语

研究洗脑术的著名心理学家利夫顿(Robert Jay Lifton)证明了:邪教就是微缩的极权国家,极权国家就是放大的邪教组织。朝鲜就是这样一个在邪教组织控制下的极权神权国家。

而当一个邪教只是一个民间组织时,它只能摧毁成百上千个家庭;而当一个邪教掌握了一个国家的政权、军队和原子弹时,它就能把数千万国民变成了活着的僵尸,让他们在饥饿与狂热中,世代为奴,并心甘情愿充当炮灰。这样的国家对自由世界也是一颗巨大的定时炸弹。

金家王朝最大的成功,不只是让人民害怕,更是让人民把自己的身份认同、价值感、荣誉感乃至人生意义,都寄托于金教主所建构的神话之中。

当朝鲜人民相信领袖的话是绝对真理、自己的幸福来自领袖的恩赐,相信国家与领袖及政权不可分割,相信质疑权力就是背叛祖国,相信外面的世界充满敌意与危险,那么金家王朝的统治便不再完全依赖暴力,而开始依赖人们自身的心理认同。

这些人不仅不会反抗,反而会主动维护那套束缚自己的枷锁。

金家王朝能够延续至今,并非因为它比历史上的其他独裁政权更高明,而是因为它把极权神权统治的各种要素——领袖神化、感恩教育、国家认同、信息封锁、恐怖统治、利益集团和社会筛选机制——精致地组合成了一套相互支撑、彼此强化的完整邪教生态系统。

然而,任何建立在谎言与封闭之上的生态系统,即使能够驯化几代人,也无法永远逃脱一个根本规律:随着代际的推移与外部信息的渗透,时间终将侵蚀神话,现实迟早会击碎谎言。

“领袖永远正确”、“你的一切都是党给的”、“没有领袖就会亡党亡国”之类的谎言叙事,可以靠暴力和封闭维持一时,却无法在常识和现实的全面复苏面前,无限透支。

第四代接班人的提前频繁亮相,某种程度上恰恰说明,教主领袖自己也意识到“白头山血统”的神圣光环正在逐渐贬值。血缘可以继承权力,却无法自动继承威望;神话可以被复制,却无法永远维持其效力。

历史上许多看似坚不可摧的极权政权,都曾给人一种永远不会倒下的错觉。东德如此,罗马尼亚如此,苏联亦如此。

问题从来不是神话会不会破灭,而是谁也无法预知,它将在什么时候、以什么方式突然失效。但可以肯定的是,压力容器的阀门焊得越死,一旦出现裂缝,释放出来的能量往往也越猛烈。

因此,研究朝鲜最重要的意义,或许并不在于预测金家王朝还能维持多久,而在于理解:任何邪教式的极权体制究竟是如何形成、如何运作,又为何能够在漫长岁月中不断自我复制,在一次次危机之后仍死而不僵,甚至不时展现出回光返照般的活力。同时,在此基础上找到铲除它的方案。

我始终认为,由自由世界提供一个全球性开放、自由、免费和不受干扰的互联网,以此拆除极权神权的信息铁幕和防火墙,是瓦解极其生态系统最重要的第一步。

 

Tuesday, October 20, 2026

Anti Putin forces inside Russia

Shadowmen: Russian operatives who say they're sabotaging Putin’s war – BBC World Service Docs 

 Inside the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage from within Russia


Two Russian men secretly working for Ukraine's intelligence services have given rare accounts of operations they claim to have been involved with, that have targeted military assets and personnel inside Russia.

One of the men, whom we are calling Ivan, claims to have played a role from Russia in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories on his home soil.

He features in a BBC World Service documentary about the shadowy world of Russian saboteurs.

The documentary, by independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon, also features a man we are calling Foma, a Russian living in exile in Poland.

Foma runs a network of undercover volunteers in Russia, that surveils high-level officers that the GUR - Ukraine's military intelligence service - is considering targeting, he says. He stresses they are never involved in the attacks themselves.

He was also tight-lipped about who they were surveilling, but after Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov was assassinated in December last year in Moscow, Foma admitted he had provided the Ukrainians with intelligence on him.
Getty Images An investigator wearing a face mask and a blue padded jacket looks into a destroyed car in southern Moscow on December 22, 2025. The car is white and has a shattered windscreen and damage to the roof and bonnet.An investigator wearing a face mask and a blue padded jacket looks into a destroyed car in southern Moscow on December 22, 2025. The car is white and has a shattered windscreen and damage to the roof and bonnet. Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov was killed in Moscow last year by an explosive device hidden under his car

There have been previous media reports of Russian sabotage groups, but it is rare to get access to someone operating on the ground, like Ivan, explaining alleged activities.

The GUR has confirmed that Ivan and Foma are both working for the agency. But it also has acknowledged that it cannot know the full picture. When Ivan's handler was pressed on whether he could be trusted, the handler replied: "I'm not sure of anyone, except myself."

And both the GUR and the men are cautious about how much detail they share, making it impossible to verify the activities the men claim to have carried out.

The broad tactics Ivan and Foma describe, however, have been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities. Kyiv has spoken of its strategy of co-ordinated drone attacks on what it claims are legitimate targets inside Russia, and has acknowledged it uses secret agents for this.

There have also been several political assassinations in Russia since the start of the war. As a matter of policy, Ukraine never officially admits or claims responsibility for targeted attacks, though a Ukrainian intelligence officer has previously admitted to the BBC it was behind the killing of senior military figure Lt Gen Igor Kirillov in December 2024.

It is difficult to confirm how many Russians are doing this kind of work for Ukraine. According to Foma, they number about 300-500, though this is impossible to verify.

    If you are outside the UK, watch on YouTube and listen to the BBC World Service Documentary Podcast - Shadowmen: Russians working with Ukraine

Ivan and Foma say they are both opposed not just to Russia's war in Ukraine, but to President Vladimir Putin's regime - and believe his political future depends on the war's outcome.

"At the moment... I think the [Putin] regime might fall if they lose the war… Through our actions... we are trying to speed this up," Ivan says.

His work, he told Mamon, involved surveilling military sites, and locating places to hide drone components, in preparation for potential attacks on Russian assets.

"When these [drone] components are combined… it turns out a formidable weapon, which with a single blow can destroy an object that costs many, many millions of dollars," Ivan said.

He sent Mamon a video which showed him apparently hiding explosives near a Russian military airfield.

If he had been caught, he would have been charged with terrorism, and jailed for decades.

Foma's work is different - he operates remotely, training his volunteers in Russia, online. Mamon watched him conducting one such tutorial - on how to trail a senior military official marked for surveillance.
Foma's computer screen, showing buildings and cars in Russia - and his hand on the computer keyboard Foma's computer screen, showing buildings and cars in Russia - and his hand on the computer keyboard


Foma explained how he taught his undercover volunteers to trail Russian officers

"You will get a file... from me or a colleague… with the proposed target. The file will contain [the target's] photo, his data, his details, date of birth, age, and a description of him. There'll be information on his car, if he has one. When you go to the target, don't take a phone," he told his volunteers.

Foma was once part of the Russian elite, so he claims to have a unique set of contacts and constant flow of insider information.

He showed Mamon on his laptop how he mapped military targets.

"This shows a database... the location of storage warehouses, and military units. Where generals live… Where the pilots of strategic bombers who shell Ukraine live.

"In order to break the system, you need to understand how it works. Then you can aim for their weak points."

He said there were about "three dozen" people in his network split between Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, with the contingent outside Russia providing logistical support, such as tracking targets' digital footprints.

Foma stressed that the GUR suggests the targets to be surveilled, but that he and his team check for themselves that these individuals should be considered military criminals.

"As a rule… we also check the data [on that person]… Only after that we say whether we work or not."

But he argued that his team's actions were justified.

"I want people who do terrible things on behalf of Putin and Russia in Ukraine… to understand that they'll have to pay for it. I want them to get scared."

Foma stressed that he only passed on intelligence to the Ukrainians, and his network did not carry out any assassinations themselves.

Of the assassination of Gen Sarvarov, killed in December 2025, he later texted Mamon to say: "Keeping track of him took quite an effort. He lived alternately with his mistress and his colleague. Covered his tracks and constantly changed his schedule."

But Foma did not share any plans with Mamon and the BBC in advance.

Ivan, however, was tight-lipped about the work he had been involved with, even after the event.

Foma did his own digging on Ivan.

After checking with his military intelligence contacts in both Ukraine and Russia, he thought it likely that Ivan had been involved in a plan to strike Russia's largest military drone factory at Yelabuga in June last year. One person was reported to have been killed in the incident.

Ivan stressed that the aim is always to try to avoid harming civilians.

Operations have clearly been risky for Ivan too.

"The most serious case was when my car was stopped for inspection and I had the handmade explosives on me. The risk was very high - however as you can see, I was not detected," he said.

To mitigate the risk of being compromised, "there is no clear structure" to the work, he said, adding he had never met and did not know the identity of others he had been working alongside.

Foma has the same rule for his operatives.

"As soon as you start gathering people in groups, in general chats… leaving a mark on the internet, with a high probability this whole group will be quickly detained or destroyed," he said.

Ivan stressed there were few people left in Russia suitable for this kind of work.

"Most of the ideological people have either left the country or are already behind bars," he said.

Many Russians involved in sabotage work on their native soil are therefore either oblivious - for example lorry drivers unaware that their cargoes have been compromised - or are individuals who have been paid, the BBC understands.

Ivan, on the other hand, says he is doing this work for ideological reasons - he used to be a member of the political opposition. As such, his movements would be expected to be monitored closely by the Russian authorities.

So it was a surprise that he managed to frequently leave Russia and return.
Marcin Mamon is wearing a white t-shirt and dark glasses. He is standing with his hands in his pockets waiting by a stone wall. Marcin Mamon is wearing a white t-shirt and dark glasses. He is standing with his hands in his pockets waiting by a stone wall.
Marcin waiting to meet Ivan in Georgia - we were surprised by Ivan's apparent freedom to travel

Mamon persuaded Ivan to drive him into the Georgian desert, where they could speak freely - and asked him how the Ukrainians could trust him.

"You go to a third country… where [Ukraine's] agents meet you… and conduct lie detector tests," Ivan told him.

Mamon asked Ivan to put him in touch with one of his GUR handlers in Ukraine. This man immediately rang Ivan on speaker phone - apparently demonstrating that Ivan worked for him. They spoke in code, referring to "repairs at the school".

But later, the handler admitted he could not rule out the possibility Ivan might work for the Russians too, either voluntarily or under duress.

Foma thinks the fact that Ivan can travel freely does not necessarily constitute a red flag.

"There are all sorts of holes in [the country's governance], and if you know them, or are just lucky, then you can jump through the holes… and live in the system. Like a mouse in a piece of cheese," he told Mamon.

Perhaps more compellingly, if Ivan had also been spying for FSB, it would seem likely that he would share what he knew of Ukraine's attack plans with the Russian agency. More than a year before a devastating strike by more than 100 Ukrainian drones, Ivan had been telling Marcin there would be a major attack on strategic bombers on military airfields across Russia, though he never said when or where.

Marcin asked Ivan how he coped with the work.

"Fear is always present," he said. "It follows me everywhere. Even if you don't do anything, you're still afraid. This is Russia."

But he was optimistic that eventually his life would change.

"Putin won't live forever," he said.

印尼调查疑似中国火箭残骸坠落险些酿成事故 事件

Near miss: Indonesia probes crash of suspected Chinese rocket fragment印尼调查疑似中国火箭残骸坠落险些酿成事故 事件

印尼官方今天展开调查疑似中国火箭残骸事件,此前一块如汽车大小的金属残骸坠落在该国婆罗洲中加里曼丹省的一座棕榈油种植园,所幸未造成任何人员伤亡与财产损失。


据印尼政府机构称,该残骸很可能来自一枚中国火箭,坠落在了一处靠近居民区和工作场所的棕榈油种植园内。

此前当地居民曾报告称,前一天晚上在中加里曼丹省的一处偏远地区听到了一声巨响,大家起初还以为是飞机残骸。

当地警察局长约加·西德希曼特拉形容该物体为“一块相当大的铝板桶装物体,长达九米,形状不规则,上面还有明显的烧焦痕迹”。

印尼民航部门发言人扎赫鲁丁表示,此次事件未造成人员伤亡或财产损失 , 他还补充说,该残骸碎片不存在辐射或毒性风险,在距第一块残骸约一公里处发现了第二块碎片,可能来自同一枚火箭 , 材料似乎也是铝合金,但还需要进一步验证。

印度尼西亚国家研究与创新署表示,这块残骸碎片可能来自中国的一枚“朱雀-2E”火箭, 由中国民营航天企业蓝箭航天研制,是一种一次性液体动力中型运载火箭。 中国政府上周曾宣布,一枚“朱雀-2E”火箭从中国西北部的一个商业发射场将10颗商用卫星送入了太空。

不过目前中国国家航天局没有对此置评。

据欧洲航天局称,火箭残骸由于不受控制的重返大气层而造成的地球上人员伤亡风险相对罕见,不过有造成人员伤害的风险还在上升。

欧洲航天局太空碎片办公室曾经在去年的一份报告中表示:“尽管重返大气层的风险仍然相对较小,但从 2019 年到 2024 年,这种风险已大幅增加,这主要是由于太空活动的增加所致。”