3月发生在伦敦戈尔德斯格林一系列针对犹太教堂和社区场所的纵火袭击事件。（图取自法新社档案照）

22国谴责伊朗是幕后黑手　策划攻击犹太社区和记者

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（悉尼11日讯）包括美国和欧洲国家在内的22个国家周四联合警告伊朗，要求其停止“在其领土上”发动攻击。伊朗安全部门因“令人发指”地利用国际和当地犯罪集团在欧洲、北美和澳洲策划攻击而受到谴责。

法新社报导，各国在一份联合声明中说：“企图在我国领土上杀害、绑架、骚扰、恐吓或以其他方式袭击人民，损害了国家主权和国际准则。这些行为必须立即停止。”

他们表示，伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队的情报部门及其海外行动分支“圣城旅”参与了针对伊朗异议人士、记者以及犹太人和以色列社区和利益的“致命阴谋和恶意行动”。

“我们团结一致，决心保护我们的国家和人民免受这些威胁。伊朗伊斯兰共和国必须立即停止这些行动。”

这些国家指责伊朗是欧洲一系列针对犹太社区、伊朗记者和美国记者袭击活动的幕后黑手，这些袭击活动已被与伊朗有关的组织“Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya”（简称HAYI）认领。

该组织声称对发生在英国、比利时和荷兰针对犹太社区的袭击事件负责。

据报导，HAYI表示对近几个月来在伦敦北部发生的两名犹太男子被刺伤事件以及一系列针对犹太教堂和社区场所的纵火袭击事件负责。

去年8月，澳洲驱逐了伊朗驻澳洲大使，指责德黑兰策划了至少两起反犹太袭击：一起是墨尔本一座犹太教堂的纵火案，另一起是悉尼一家犹太洁食咖啡馆的纵火案。

堪培拉方面也召回了澳洲驻伊朗大使，并暂停了驻德黑兰大使馆的运作。

11月，澳洲将伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队列为支持恐怖主义的国家，称其在澳洲境内发动的攻击是“外国在澳洲领土上策划史无前例且危险的侵略行为”。

伊朗外交部当时表示，澳洲的决定是“侮辱性的、毫无道理的行为”，违反了国际规则和准则。

这份声明由阿尔巴尼亚、澳洲、比利时、英国、保加利亚、加拿大、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、法国、芬兰、德国、爱尔兰、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、荷兰、纽西兰、北马其顿、挪威、葡萄牙、瑞典和美国共同发表。

 

全球最大输油国光环“易主”  力压沙地与俄罗斯　

（华盛顿11日讯）美国正式跃升为全球最大石油出口国，改写数十年来由沙地阿拉伯与俄罗斯主导的能源版图！

外媒报道，美国5月原油与燃料出口量达每日1050万桶，连续第3个月蝉联全球之冠。同期俄罗斯仅出口约700万桶，沙地阿拉伯跌至590万桶。

报道称，这不仅是产量排名的变动，随著伊朗战争冲击中东供应、俄罗斯出口受制裁影响，美国如今除了掌握美元与军事优势外，能源也正成为新的地缘政治武器。 

重置能源市场权力

另一边厢，愈来愈多欧洲与亚洲国家转向采购美国能源，也让全球能源市场权力重心出现数十年来最大转变。

能源正逐渐成为美国影响盟友与对手的新杠杆，同时削弱石油输出国组织（OPEC）长期以来对全球油市的主导地位。

这项变化对美国而言具有特殊意义。

1973年，美国因支持以色列而遭阿拉伯产油国发动石油禁运，重创经济。如今情势完全逆转。

受惠于页岩油革命，美国原油与液态燃料产量已从2000年的约800万桶增至约2200万桶，成为过去15年全球石油供应成长的最大来源。

专家直言，伊朗战争让美国意识到自己握有一项过去未曾真正运用的工具：能源出口。（法新社档案照）

 

 

 

 

外交谈判影响力升级

能源顾问公司——Kpler政策主管布劳哈德（Michelle Brouhard）表示，伊朗战争让美国意识到自己握有一项过去未曾真正运用的工具：能源出口。

当愈来愈多国家依赖美国石油与天然气，美国在外交谈判中的影响力也随之提升。

目前欧洲占美国石油出口约47%，高于2021年的37%；亚洲占比也从去年的37%升至46%。

共和党鹰派愤怒特朗普美伊协议利伊朗

共和党鹰派愤怒特朗普美伊协议利伊朗　


（华盛顿19日讯）美国总统特朗普与伊朗达成的谅解备忘录，在自身与共和党鹰派之间撕开了一道罕见的裂痕。鹰派人士警告，该协议远未达到特朗普此前承诺的“全面胜利”，反而可能让伊朗变得更富有、更强大，且依然有能力对中东地区构成威胁。

法新社报导，这份美国和伊朗之间的谅解备忘录旨在结束数月来的军事冲突、重新开放至关重要的霍尔木兹海峡，在战争推高油价并引发对更大中东危机担忧之际，以此来稳定能源市场。

然而，备忘录条款却让部分共和党人感到担忧，这些人多年来一直谴责民主党籍前总统奥巴马，在2015年与伊朗签署的核协议方面过于软弱无能。

他们表达了担忧，认为特朗普一方面向伊朗提供解除制裁、进入石油市场以及3000亿美元（约1兆2352亿令吉）重建基金的前景，另一方面却未能就铀浓缩、弹道导弹或伊朗支持的武装代理人等问题取得明确承诺。

共和党籍联邦参议员卡西迪在社交媒体X写道，前总统兼共和党偶像里根倘若泉下有知，怕是会“气得在坟墓里打滚”。他称该协议是“数十年来最严重的外交政策失误”。

他说：“战前，霍尔木兹海峡畅通无阻，伊朗正遭受制裁的重创，13名美军士兵还活着。而现在，13名美国人牺牲了，美国家庭在加油站多支付了数十亿美元，制裁却将被解除，轰炸也停止了。”

参议院军事委员会主席威克称这份谅解备忘录与特朗普的目标“完全不符”，并痛斥他通过减免制裁和解冻资金，“仅仅换取伊朗同意再谈判60天”。

威克在一份声明中说：“具体而言，用于伊朗重建和经济发展的3000亿美元基金，虽然并非由美国纳税人出资，但相比之下，会让奥巴马总统2015年达成的协议中给伊朗的甜头显得相形见绌。”

特朗普则为该协议辩护，称这是重开霍尔木兹海峡的务实方式。全球约1/5的原油通常经由该海峡运输。他同时表示，协议并非最终定稿，并警告如果谈判失败，美国可能会恢复军事打击。

不过，特朗普似乎也降低了他先前的要求。在战争期间，他曾公开呼吁伊朗“彻底投降”并取消其核计划。

共和党籍联邦参议员克鲁兹敦促特朗普，不要“突然拿出巨额资金，让他们重建核武库并再次对美国构成威胁”。

他说：“我不想看到那些想要杀死我们的神权伊斯兰主义者变得更强大。因此，如果这个协议要给他们3000亿美元，那就是大错特错了。”

得克萨斯州共和党籍参议员科宁告诉记者，他担心该协议可能不过是一场“中场休息”，让伊朗能够重建他们的军火库并继续进行铀浓缩活动。

民主党人批“灾难的艺术”

参议院多数党领袖、共和党籍图恩态度则更为谨慎，但他表示，议员们需要得到明确答复，即该协议是否解决了伊朗的核计划、弹道导弹以及对武装组织的支持等问题。

特朗普的其他盟友则呼吁保持耐心。

共和党籍联邦参议员格雷厄姆表示，该协议开放了霍尔木兹海峡，暂停了敌对行动，并创造了测试外交手段能否遏制伊朗核野心的空间。

美国《国会山报》引述格雷厄姆称：“在核计划问题上，我怀疑他们是否能做到（遏制），但为什么不试试呢？”

民主党人一致反对该协议，他们认为特朗普发动了一场代价高昂的战争，最终却接受了一份基本上恢复战前现状、同时又赋予伊朗新筹码的协议。

参议院民主党籍领袖舒默在院会发言中讽刺说：“每一个买了特朗普《交易的艺术》这本书的人都应该向他退款，因为特朗普在伊朗的所作所为，完全是‘灾难的艺术’。”

塔利班宣布：官员禁用智慧型手机 违者“当场砸烂”

塔利班宣布：官员禁用智慧型手机　违者“当场砸烂”



（喀布尔19日讯）阿富汗塔利班政权近期颁布命令，全面禁止政府官员使用智慧型手机，违者不仅手机会被当场砸烂，更将依伊斯兰教法追究刑责。分析人士警告，此举恐是对全国人民实施禁令的前兆。

根据《卫报》取得的塔利班军事法庭指令，新规定显示适用于高阶官员、低阶官员、圣战者及相关服务人员，且任何豁免均须取得最高领袖阿洪扎达的书面批准，本周生效。

命令指出，违反禁令者手机将被销毁，并可能同时受到法律及伊斯兰教法制裁。

有网上影片显示，一名塔利班官员正看著手机宣读禁令，同场有工作人员则在一旁砸毁智能手机。

据阿富汗境内报导及消息人士称，上述禁令实施方式很“随意”，执行情况混乱，在一些地区仅针对政府官员，在另一些城市和省份，禁令范围却扩及妇女、平民、医务人员、教师和学生。

一名长期研究阿富汗局势的分析人士指出，“很多事情都是在地方层面发生的，取决于当地某些人的决定。但同时，这也可能是全面禁令的前奏，他们只是在试探民意。”

此次禁令背景因素众多，首先是西部赫拉特省今年爆发抗议塔利班逮捕女性的示威行动，塔利班开枪镇压造成至少2人死亡，相关画面在网路广泛流传。

此外，塔利班内部也担忧官员利用手机拍摄文件、录制会议，导致机密资讯在最高领袖批准前外泄，加上担心员工上班滑手机影响效率，种种考量之下催生这道禁令。

事实上，塔利班早在去年9月就曾以“防止不道德行为”为由，强制执行长达2天的全国断网令，导致全国商业活动停滞，并影响了紧急服务和航空运输，私营部门和银行业一片混乱，随后禁令仓促撤回。

分析人士称，就连安全部门和最高领袖办公室内部也慌了神，意识到“确实没考虑周全”才取消断网。

自塔利班从新上台以来，女性已遭受严荷的女限制，包括必须穿“全包”的波卡罩袍、不能接受中学与大学教育、难以外出和就业等。

Trump’s US‑Iran ceasefire deal is a costly return to prewar conditions – and resolving nuclear questions will run into the ‘indivisibility problem’

 

Trump’s US‑Iran ceasefire deal is a costly return to prewar conditions – and resolving nuclear questions will run into the ‘indivisibility problem’

Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan, which served as the key negotiator between the U.S. and Iran, announced on June 14, 2026, that the two sides had agreed on a deal to end the war. It will be officially signed on June 19 in Switzerland.

President Donald Trump announced it on Truth Social as a triumph, claiming that the Strait of Hormuz is open for everyone, the U.S. blockade has been lifted, and the oil is flowing again. What Trump did not mention was Iran’s nuclear program and what happens to its enriched uranium stockpile, one of the main reasons cited for starting the war.

The nuclear issue – along with core issues such as ballistic missiles and Iran’s proxies – has been deferred for 60 days.

This raises two important questions: What was the war actually for? And what did the U.S. achieve?

As an international and nuclear security expert, I believe the answer is nothing – and in the process the U.S. lost credibility as a negotiating partner.
What did the U.S. get from the war with Iran? “Nothing,” says Farah Jan, who studies and teaches about nuclear weapons and international relations in the Middle East.
Why the nuclear question is the hardest

The “rationalist theory of war,” as developed by political scientist James Fearon in 1995, identifies three problems that drive states to war when they would prefer to reach a deal: incomplete information about each other’s resolve; the inability to credibly promise a deal or commitment; and what international relations scholars call the indivisibility problem – when the thing in dispute cannot be split or shared, because it leaves no middle ground to settle on.

The war clarified the first reason. Each side saw what the other would actually do – how much force the U.S. was willing to use and what Iran could absorb while still staying in the fight.

What the war could not solve was the nuclear commitment problem. And this goes far back between the U.S. and Iran.

Iran adhered to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the landmark nuclear deal that restricted Tehran’s nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Tehran kept uranium enrichment to 3.67% and its stockpile under 300 kilograms – a concentration used to fuel a power reactor but far too low for a weapons program.

But the U.S. walked away in 2018, and Trump later called it “the worst deal ever” over its sunset clauses and on its silence on Iran’s ballistic missiles.
A woman waves a flag in a city square.
A woman waves an Iranian flag in Islamic Revolution Square in Tehran, Iran, on June 14, 2026. AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Iran returned to negotiations in 2025, and the U.S. and Israel bombed Iran while those talks were still taking place. Similarly, in February 2026 the negotiations were ongoing and a deal was within reach when Israel and the U.S. struck Iran – killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and lead negotiator Ali Larijani.

The U.S. has demonstrated a record of reneging on its deals and breaking the negotiating process. Which is why Iran now insists on guarantees and demands sanctions relief before signing a deal, and not just good faith.

A state that previously kept its commitments and was still bombed has little reason to accept promises of relief in the future. For this reason, I believe the 60-day deferral is a window for Tehran to watch whether the U.S. and Israel will hold the ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon.

The third problem of indivisibility – when the thing or issue in dispute can’t be split or shared – is why the nuclear question is the hardest.

Most disputes can be split. Sanctions, for example, can be lifted by degrees. Even a nuclear program can be split, which the world saw in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal, with centrifuges counted, enrichment capped and a stockpile metered.

What cannot be split is the U.S. demand for zero uranium enrichment and Tehran calling uranium enrichment a sovereign right.
A deal, a war and a ceasefire

The 2015 nuclear deal also limited Iran’s centrifuges – the machines that do the enriching – and placed Iran’s nuclear program under the most intrusive inspections, all in exchange for sanctions relief.

The nuclear question was not part of the 2015 deal – it was the actual deal.

During the June 2025 negotiations with Iran, and again in February 2026, the U.S. position was about the nuclear program, but in the opposite direction from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It was not about limits but the total elimination of Iran’s nuclear program.

In both rounds of talks in 2025 and 2026, Washington’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, demanded zero enrichment and the dismantling of Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan – Iran’s three most important nuclear sites. Iran called enrichment a sovereign right and refused.

Both rounds of negotiations ended in bombings.
A man points at a screen with a map of the Strait of Hormuz.
A man points toward the positions of ships in the Strait of Hormuz on a screen at the Maritime Information and Cooperation and Awareness Center in Brest, France, on April 27, 2026. Fred Tanneau/AFP via Getty Images

The current deal to be signed on June 19 does not put a cap on Iran’s enrichment, nor does it discuss the elimination of its nuclear program. It ends the fighting, reopens the Strait of Hormuz and consigns enrichment, the stockpile, missiles and Iran’s regional proxies to 60-day negotiations.

In a recent New York Times interview, Trump said he was in no rush to remove the near-bomb-grade fuel still buried under the bombed sites. He claimed Iran would suspend enrichment for 15 or 20 years and enrich only for nonmilitary purposes.

In the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal under President Barack Obama, the nuclear question was addressed where 97% of Iran’s stockpile was shipped out of the country and the cap was a verified fact.

Because it doesn’t address any of these issues, the Trump deal is a ceasefire agreement, not a nuclear agreement.
A costly return to the status quo

Going back to the bargaining theory, we know the war settled the information problem – it revealed what each side would endure.

The commitment problem remains. Neither side can yet make a promise the other believes, least of all an Iran whose negotiators were killed.

And I believe the indivisibility problem is now worse. The question of zero enrichment versus a sovereign right cannot be split. The current 60-day deferral is not a resolution. It is the same unsolved problem with a clock attached.

The one thing that could change is American restraint. If Washington holds Israel from striking Iran and Lebanon, it can slowly rebuild its credibility that was destroyed by the two wars. And that is a real challenge for the Trump administration.

Even as the deal was being finalized, Israel struck Beirut, the kind of action that can derail any talks.

In my view, the 60-day window should be read not as the path to a settlement but as the interval or pause before the next one fails.

I argued in April that this conflict would not end in a clean settlement but in a series of contested pauses. The deal to be signed on June 19 is the first of them.

Iran emerges with its enrichment knowledge intact, its stockpile buried and fresh reason to believe that only a nuclear weapon would have deterred the U.S.-Israel attack.

But Iran also knows that it stood its ground and was able to strike U.S. bases and allies in the region. It has discovered leverage it did not previously know it held. The Strait of Hormuz has proved a better deterrent than the nuclear bomb.

The strait is open, the oil is flowing, and the question the war was fought over sits exactly where it began. Thousands of lives were lost to arrive back to square one. Nobody has won, though both sides will say they did.

 

Western troops have been expelled from Africa’s Sahel – so why are Italy’s Carabinieri still there?

Western forces have largely beat a hasty retreat from Africa’s coup-prone Sahel region in recent years.

In 2022, French forces departed Mali as insurgents made incursions into the capital, Bamako. A United Nations peacekeeping mission also left, with the security void filled by Russian forces. Burkina Faso and Chad followed suit, ordering French troops out in 2023 and 2025, respectively.

But Niger presents a different scenario. While the junta that came to power there in 2023 has expelled many Western forces from its borders, there is one exception: a contingent of about 350 Italian troops.

As a geopolitical security analyst who has advised the European Parliament on counterinsurgency in the Sahel, I believe that the Italian model – deploying a small numbers of highly skilled technical troops to train local personnel – offers an alternative to a large-scale Western military presence that led to serious local blowback.
The context of anti-Western sentiment

Between 2020 and 2023, six countries in the Sahel saw civilian governments replaced with military leaders. Many of these coupists capitalized on public discontent over deteriorating economies and security conditions to overthrow their predecessors.

But they also leaned into growing anti-Western sentiment.

From around 2013, Sahelian countries, including Mali and Niger, allowed military personnel from the United States, France and other Western countries to assist in efforts to counter jihadist and separatist movements throughout the region.

Despite the initial welcome for such interventions, local populations largely came to view these troops as ineffective vestiges of the colonial era. As such, they welcomed the anti-Western rhetoric of coup plotters.

Yet the military men who took over faced the same instability that undermined the governments they replaced. To compensate for the lack of Western military support, many governments in the region turned to Russia’s Wagner Group, now named the “Africa Corps,” for security needs.

Nigeriens in the country’s capital, Niamey, display Russian flags during a pro-coup protest in 2023. 

Best known for its presence in Mali, the military group now controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense has seemingly shifted tactics. Gone are brutal attacks against extremist groups and civilians alike, replaced by a more conservative, defense-focused strategy that some have argued places a greater burden on African forces.

Such developments have led NATO countries to worry about their dwindling influence amid growing instability along the security bloc’s southern flank – an area that comprises the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the Sahel. The security situation has also spurred internal displacement and external migration.

Furthermore, the withdrawal of the U.N.’s peacekeeping mission from Mali, as well as the forced departure of the U.N. resident coordinator from Niger in 2023, indicates a growing local rejection of the status quo on international aid and security operations in the region.

A surge of violence

For civilians throughout the Sahel, the implications of the dangerous status quo are alarming. Since 2020, the area has accounted for the world’s largest increase in the number of fatalities linked to militant Islamic groups.

Niger, which houses the world’s eighth-largest reserves of uranium, is not immune to this surge of violence. On Jan. 29, 2026, the Islamic State Sahel Province took credit for an attack against the Diori Hamani civilian airport of Niamey, as well as the adjacent military airbase. Although no civilian or military deaths were reported, the attack signaled a potential shift in IS-Sahel’s strategy in Niger and an emboldened strategy of attacking larger cities and infrastructure.

While the Russian foreign ministry claimed joint responsibility for neutralizing the attack along with the Nigerien armed forces, a contingent of Italian forces and its gendarmerie, known as the Carabinieri, were also present.

A satellite image shows security roadblocks and vehicle checkpoints near the entrance to Niger’s Niamey airport following an attack in January 2026.Since the withdrawal of all other Western and U.N. groups, the Italians, including the Carabinieri, have become the only Western force still in Niger.

Gendarmeries like the Carabinieri operate differently from conventional army forces. They mix military force with policing functions – a setup unfamiliar to countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. that tend to keep these roles separate.

Such a combination of mandates makes them ideal for certain tasks, such as training domestic military forces and quelling unrest in acute situations.

The Carabinieri also have experience investigating complex crimes – a skill developed over years as the special forces in high-profile mafia cases. This is particularly useful in the Sahel, as the tactics of jihadist groups progressively resemble those of organized criminal networks.

Over the years, Italy’s Carabinieri have been invited by foreign governments emerging from armed conflict or fighting low-intensity conflicts to train local forces and help maintain order. Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority have all turned to the Carabinieri as an effective and efficient alternative to traditional peacekeeping forces.

In the case of Niger, such an invitation reportedly arrived in Italy around December 2016, when the then-government requested a contingent of 470 Italian military personnel, including the Carabinieri. The plan was to reinforce control over Nigerien territory, thereby stabilizing one of the main transit countries for migrants attempting to reach the Italian and European coasts.

Notably, this invitation was extended even after the change of government in Niger in 2021.

Carabinieri as a model

In 2023, when the Nigerien government forced the military, economic, and even media presences of France, the U.N. and the U.S. from the country, the Italians were permitted to stay.

The reasons, I believe, are threefold.

The first relates to the fact that Italy lacks the same reputation as a colonizing power that France – and also the U.S. – maintains among many governments and populations of the Global South.

Italy has a colonial past, of course, and its government forces committed atrocities in areas under Italian dominion in East Africa between the 1880s and 1941.

But as a result of its defeat in World War II, Italy was forced out of its overseas territories earlier than some of its European peers. Having avoided the subsequent turbulent decolonization movements experienced by, say, France, Great Britain or Belgium throughout the 1950s and ’60s, Italy has largely been able to avoid postcolonial animosity, enabling it to maintain ambiguous ties with African and Arab states.

The second reason for the Italians’ continued presence in Niger rests on ongoing diplomatic relations and strategically timed comments from the Italian government that have reassured current Nigerien authorities. Following the 2023 coup d’état, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani called for a return to democracy, in line with other international voices. But he refused the idea of a Western-imposed military intervention even before one had been formally proposed.

Finally, the targeted, highly specialized nature of Italian operations has made them useful for Nigerien forces. The Italians’ willingness and ability to cooperate with local authorities – along with the relatively large footprint that a small number of troops can leave – have left the Italians, and the Carabinieri more specifically, with a reputation for effectiveness. Moreover, their reduced size relative to the much larger U.S. and French operations has dampened any opposition from locals.

While the security void of departing Western forces has been partially filled by other actors, notably the Russian Africa Corps, the increased instability across neighboring countries has shown these forces’ limits. In that environment, this small contingent of Italian forces may well make Italy the only actor in a position to negotiate for Western interests in the area.



 

150 years old Xi

 

73-year-old Xi Jinping resists generational shift

Chinese leader Xi Jinping turned 73 on Monday, and this week's China Up Close explores whether he is thinking about grooming a successor. It emerged this month that Cai Qi, China's security czar and Xi's closest aide, has become the president of the Party School of the Communist Party's Central Committee, which educates young elites. While attention is focused on a reshuffle of China's top leadership team at the party's national congress in 2027, the appointment of 70-year-old Cai to the key post has sparked speculation. Political pundits point out that with the appointment, Xi sent a signal he will reject potential pressure for generational change. When China held a military parade last September in Beijing, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin were caught on a hot mic chatting about human longevity. Xi reportedly said that these days 70-year-olds are still young and mentioned the possibility "of living to 150." Their chat might help us understand Xi's thinking about passing the torch to the next generation.