Russia and the Israel-Hamas War

Russia and the Israel-Hamas War

Despite unfounded allegations to the contrary, Moscow is much more interested in mediation than aggression.


After Israel said it was at war with Hamas, several countries expressed concern over the conflict’s escalation and called on both sides to halt hostilities. One of them was Russia – despite the fact that some heads of state have accused Moscow of aiding Hamas’ initial attack on Israel, saying it would prove a useful distraction from the debacle in Ukraine. Israel itself has dismissed these allegations as purely conspiratorial, and though Russia could benefit from the conflict, it would do so only as a mediator, not an aggressor.

After all, it’s certainly true that the world has shifted its attention from Ukraine to Israel, and it’s certainly true that Russia welcomes the reprieve. The Kremlin has spent untold resources on its war effort, and it can’t afford to come out as a loser. Losing would rob Moscow of the international status it so desperately seeks, it would very likely lead to domestic discontent, and it would result in the very thing Russia sought to avoid: NATO troops close to its border. These facts have led many to believe Russia will use this moment to launch another offensive. But the opportunity isn’t as good as it appears. Russia is too deeply involved in Ukraine, and in the revitalization of economic growth in the face of labor shortages and crippling sanctions, to aid or abet either side of the Israel-Hamas war. And even if it weren’t, Russia has an interest in maintaining good relations with both parties. The worse the war gets, the harder it is for Russia to do either.

Moscow understands that one way or another, the Ukraine war will end. It understands that Ukraine isn’t its sole avenue for expanding its influence. And it understands that, given the circumstances, it needs to engage politically and economically as much as it can with countries it has good relations with.

Israel and the Palestinian Territories are just such states, and Russia continues to maintain dialogue with both accordingly. In fact, Russia’s ties to the territories are nothing short of historical. After Israel reoriented its foreign policy to the West during the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization and trained its militants at Soviet military educational institutions. They’ve remained in contact ever since. Its support for the Palestinian Territories has contributed to its status among other Middle Eastern countries, many of which have increased trade with Russia dramatically since the onset of Western sanctions. These countries include Iran and Algeria, which also need Russian economic support in these difficult economic times. More, Islam is the second most popular religion in Russia, with many of its practitioners found in the North Caucasus, whose support the Kremlin needs to maintain stability in its southern reaches. Last, there are some 2,000 Russian citizens throughout the formal territory of the Palestinian Authority, of which 1,200 are in the Gaza Strip. This explains why President Vladimir Putin has advocated for Palestinian statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem.

Even so, Russia continues to maintain relations with Israel. Roughly 80,000 Jews live in Russia, and the Russian Jewish diaspora in Israel is likewise large. Israel was also one of the preferred destinations for Russians who fled the country after the invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, more than 37,000 people fled to Israel from Russia, and in 2023, ahead of stricter immigration laws, the number of people leaving Russia for Israel has increased sharply. In terms of foreign policy, Russia sees Israel, a nuclear power, as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and appreciates the fact that it has abstained from the Western sanctions regime. Of the war with Hamas, Putin said that Israel is under unprecedented attack and has the right to defend its citizens.

But perhaps the most compelling evidence that Russia is not involved in the Israel-Hamas war is that, so far, Russia hasn’t really used it to its advantage. It hasn’t undertaken any new offensives, nor is there any indication that the military was on alert for anything too dramatic to happen. All it has done is try to position itself as a mediator in the conflict. In addition to calling for a cease-fire, Putin emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts to establish a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, noting that a ground operation in Gaza would lead to dire consequences and the death of civilians.

Russia knows that the Middle East is a much higher priority for the United States than Ukraine is, and that Washington might be particularly interested in having someone else mediate so that it doesn’t get drawn back into yet another regional conflict. And unlike Russia, the U.S. doesn’t curry much favor among the Palestinian Territories anyway. Already, the Kremlin is trying to figure out how to use its position to resolve its own issues, and there are already rumors of potential dialogue between the U.S. and Russia. Last week, a working-level meeting of the Nuclear Five was held in New York with the participation of Russian representatives.

For Russia, the benefits of mediation are twofold: It helps Moscow break out of its (relative) international isolation by working with partners it otherwise wouldn’t, and it potentially helps stop the war from escalating further or from implicating other regional countries with which Russia has lucrative economic, infrastructural and logistic partnerships.

The real question is whether Moscow will have time to seize the moment, given all the problems it is juggling. The benefits are high, and there’s an opportunity cost of inaction. If the war broadens to include Russian allies, it’ll be that much more difficult for Moscow to balance its powers in the Middle East, and Russia will lose its moment.

By Ekaterina Zolotova