他相信祖国在背后一定背后给予他强大支持

  

近日中共央视播出一段宣传片时，称解放军东部战区空军航空兵某旅周晓锋表示，他相信祖国在背后一定背后给予他强大支持。

但周晓锋的头盔被网友发现，竟出现未经处理的电影《捍卫战士》（Top Gun）图徽，引发国际网友热议，甚至有人调侃“连中国自己都看不下去”、“太懒了吧！不修图吗？”

 

Cina’s new missiles on parade: showpieces or showstoppers?

The Sept. 3 parade was clearly meant to convey China's growing military strength and technological ambition.

 For China’s People’s Liberation Army, massive parades like the recent celebration of the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II are more than propaganda set pieces. Military leaders use them to show their Party superiors that the force is progressing towards its modernization goals, including being ready to fight jointly and to defeat any potential adversary—particularly “the strong adversary,” i.e., the United States. And as PLA texts attest, parades are opportunities to unveil new systems intended to deepen nuclear and conventional deterrence.

The hours-long showcase on Sept. 3 offered glimpses of new weapons—especially missiles—and hints about about China’s progress on key military technologies. These are valuable because the PLA operates in an opaque manner, and because its equipment and weapons, with some notable exceptions, have seldom been tested on the battlefield. But analysts must proceed cautiously: the parade was at heart a carefully calibrated influence operation. As one U.S. military analyst recently noted, the military equipment that the PLA displayed “was exactly what they wanted the world and the U.S. military to see.”   

So what should we make of five PLA missile systems that made their public debut on Sept. 3? Are they mere showpieces—“old wine in a new bottle,” as the Chinese idiom goes—or are they showstoppers that should give U.S. military planners pause?

DF-61 ICBM: Showpiece (mostly). Little is known about this massive, road-mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missile beyond its reported range of over 12,000 kilometers and alleged payload of up to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. But several analysts suspect it may be an incrementally updated version of the DF-41 road-mobile ICBM that appeared in the 2019 parade and is now operated by the PLA Rocket Force. The missiles are similar in design and use the same transporter-erector-launcher. Both systems are made by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology under the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, an enormous state-owned aerospace enterprise that is the country’s sole ICBM manufacturer.

In the parade, the DF-61 rolled among other strategic weapons, which further suggests that it is simply a better version of the nuclear DF-41. And yet: the possibility exists that its placement was deception. It is conceivable that the weapon is a new conventional ICBM—and a significant boost to the PLA’s long-range tactical striking power.

DF-5C ICBM: Showpiece. Bringing up the rear of the parade’s missile column was the DF-5C, an upgraded variant of the four-decade-old DF-5, the PLA’s oldest active ICBM. The arrival of the C variant adds range and warheads to China’s array of liquid-fueled, silo-based missiles. But its technology is not new, having been first tested in 2017; and its predecessor DF-5B could also carry MIRVs to any target in the United States.

In the parade, the DF-5B followed the DF-31BJ, an improved version of the DF-31AG solid-fueled ICBM that first appeared in 2017. The prominence of these two silo-based missiles at the end of the line is a reminder that even as the PLA adds road-mobile ICBMs and works to consolidate a nuclear triad with better sea- and air-launched nuclear missiles, its expanding network of ICBM silos remains another key element of deterrence. 

 CJ-1000 long-range hypersonic cruise missile: Showstopper. The parade’s “cruise missile column” saw the debut of several advanced air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles. None is a bigger gamechanger than the Changjian-1000, which ups the PLARF’s precision-strike capabilities with engines that U.S. missiles still lack.

Unlike the PLARF’s current DF-17 hypersonic missile, which uses a boost glide system, the CJ-1000 and the YJ-19 missile (see below) are propelled by airbreathing scramjet engines, which makes the PLA just the second military, after Russia’s, to deploy scramjet hypersonic weapons. The U.S. Air Force’s effort to develop a hypersonic cruise missile, meanwhile, is delayed and over budget.

The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command reports that the CJ-1000 can launch quickly and penetrate deeply against high-value land or sea targets. And although U.S. missile defense systems such as THAAD have received upgrades to better track and intercept hypersonic attacks, they will be challenged by the high maneuverability and long range of the CJ-1000, which can purportedly launch from Fujian in eastern China and hit Guam in 38 minutes. Xinhua agrees: the speedy, nimble, long-ranged CJ-1000 is a potential gamechanger that threatens U.S. bases in the western Pacific.

YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missile: Showstopper. The parade’s anti-ship missile formation introduced four new types—three of which are likely hypersonic. Perhaps the most notable is the YJ-19, whose scramjet is reportedly capable of flying faster than Mach 10 out to around 1,440 kilometers. Its waverider configuration harnesses its own shockwaves to improve lift-drag ratio.

If the capabilities are as advertised, the YJ-19 will greatly improve the ability of the PLA Navy’s surface ships and attack submarines to strike enemy warships within the first and even second island chains. Like the CJ-1000, it provides a capability that the U.S. does not currently have and raises the level of risk to U.S. forces responding to a contingency in our around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea.

HQ-29 anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite weapon: Showstopper. Among the several HQ-series surface-to-air missiles debuted in the parade’s air defense column, the standout was the Hongqi-29—and not just because it was the largest.

The HQ-29 is a follow-on to the HQ-19 high-altitude interceptor, which employs kinetic-kill technology akin to the U.S. THAAD system. It is road-mobile, unlike other long-range interceptors that are silo-based, allowing for more flexible deployments and optimization of launch position. The HQ-29 also provides the PLA with an interceptor that can hit incoming ICBMs in midcourse—or even low-earth orbit satellites. If and when it is fielded, it will improve China’s regional ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite warfare capabilities.  

China clearly intended its Sept. 3 parade to convey its growing military strength and technological ambition, and it succeeded. The new and not-so-new missiles clearly show the PLA’s growing ability to project power and Beijing’s intention to fundamentally alter the region’s military balance.

 

 

美国零件管制“卡脖子” 中国国产C919交付目标锐减

 
美国零件管制“卡脖子” 中国国产C919交付目标锐减


（北京24日讯）彭博社9月24日援引知情人士消息称，中国国产大飞机C919的制造商——中国商飞（COMAC），已将今年的交付目标下调三分之二，这使其与美国波音（Boeing）及法国空巴（Airbus）竞争的雄心受挫。

知情人士透露，中国商飞目前计划今年仅交付约25架C919单通道客机，远低于原本预期的75架。供应链几乎所有关键环节都出现瓶颈，严重制约了稳定生产能力。

C919可搭载158至192名乘客，定位为波音737 Max和空客A320neo的竞争对手。但至今仍未获得美国联邦航空局（FAA）等欧美监管机构的适航认证。本次交付目标大幅下调，凸显中国商飞在推进大飞机计划上面临的困境。


今年7月，美国撤销了奇异航空（GE Aerospace）部分关键发动机零部件的出口许可，加剧了中国商飞的挑战。该公司高度依赖美国供应商，其航空电子设备、飞控系统和发动机主要来自霍尼韦尔（Honeywell）、奇异航空和派克汉尼汾（Parker Hannifin）等公司。

有迹象显示，中国商飞此前过于乐观。公司一度预期中东、越南等地的航空公司会大量下单，因此年初将交付目标从最初的50架上调至75架。但迄今尚未在南亚和东南亚市场获得突破。

截至目前，中国商飞今年仅向东航、南航和国航交付了5架C919，并额外交付1架给其中一家航空公司旗下的包机子公司。三大航曾预计，中国商飞将在今年底前交付约32架C919，但如今看来目标恐难实现。

習近平已跪了? - 传特朗普今天签署TikTok协议 中国已同意交易条款

 
習近平已跪了?  传特朗普今天签署TikTok协议 中国已同意交易条款


（华盛顿25日讯）白宫消息人士指出，美国总统特朗普预计于今（25日）正式签署关于TikTok的协议，为这起长达数月的国安争议划下关键一步。另有媒体披露，中国方面已同意交易条款，代表TikTok美国业务的未来走向即将明朗。

外媒报道，白宫本周稍早即预告，特朗普将宣布一项符合2024年法律规定的协议内容，要求中国母公司字节跳动（ByteDance）将TikTok的美国业务剥离。

根据协议，美国科技企业甲骨文（Oracle）及私募股权公司银湖（Silver Lake）将参与投资。

彭博引述美国国家广播公司新闻网（NBC News）报道指出，中国政府已对协议条款表达同意，为这项跨国争议案打开绿灯。

TikTok在美国目前拥有约1.7亿用户，是极具影响力的社群平台。特朗普本人在TikTok上的账号拥有1,500万名追随者，他曾公开表示，TikTok在去年大选期间对他的胜选有所帮助。


白宫也在上个月开设官方TikTok账号，正式将此平台纳入政治沟通工具。

依照美国国会先前通过的联邦法律，若字节跳动未在期限内出售TikTok的美国业务，该平台将面临禁令。

该法原订于今年1月、即特朗普就职前一天生效。不过特朗普上任后已多次签署行政命令延长期限，目前已展延至12月16日。

14将军销声匿迹 4将领被免除人大职务 中国军队斗争激烈

 
14将军销声匿迹  4将领被免除人大职务 中国军队斗争激烈


王春宁、汪志斌、张林、高大光这4名中国解放军高级将领被免除全国人大代表职务，被认为与军队腐败有关，显示反腐斗争仍激烈。

9月12日，中国人大网发布公告，公告显示：张林、高大光、汪志斌、王春宁4名来自解放军和武警部队的代表资格终止。

联系到此次九三大阅兵时，两位中央军委副主席只出现了一位，舆论认为，解放军的反腐斗争仍在持续。
中国军队反腐斗争持续
王春宁（左起）、汪志斌、张林、高大光四位解放军高级将领被免除全国人大代表职务，被认为与军队腐败有关，显示反腐斗争仍激烈。

王春宁出身军人家庭

此次全国人大公布的通告中，王春宁为武警上将警衔（武警部队警衔参照解放军军衔），汪志斌、张林为中将军衔，高大光为海军中将军衔。

此次被罢免全国人大代表职务意味着这4人早已接受纪检部门调查，而其军职亦被拿下。

一名上将、3名中将同时被免，如此高级别的调查，表明解放军的反腐斗争仍在持续激烈进行之中。

此次被免军衔最高的王春宁生于1963年，山东牟平人，生于江苏南京。他是中国武警部队前司令员。

王春宁是原南京军区副政委王永明之子，他毕业于俄罗斯总参谋部军事学院、中国国防大学，是中共第19届中央候补委员、第20届中央委员。

王春宁父亲王永明曾任南京军区副政委兼纪委书记、军区党委常委。王永明1988年被授予少将军衔。19993年晋升为中将军衔，但晋升中将后次年即病逝。

王春宁长期在陆军工作，曾在陆军第一集团军工作，最高任职副军长（其间挂职海军东海舰队副参谋长）。

2014年，他晋升第12集团军军长。两年后，他任北京卫戍区司令、中共陆军党委委员。

王春宁2011年晋升少将，2017年晋升中将。

2020年4月，他调任武警部队参谋长。

同年12月，王春宁升任武警司令员，晋升上将警衔。在2025年7月前后，王春宁已不再担任武警司令员，由曹均章代理。

王春宁在武警担任司令员的同时，也担任中央政法委委员。不过，王春宁去年起就缺席多场重要场合，包括上将晋衔仪式、中央政法工作会议等。

被陆军军人代表大会决定罢免的汪志斌曾长期服役于原南京军区，也曾在第一集团军工作过，担任政治部主任等职。

2016年，汪志斌晋升为陆军少将军衔。

2017年，汪志斌出任第73集团军政治工作部主任。据2022年4月新闻画面显示，汪志斌已是中将军衔。

王春宁、汪志斌两人在第一集团军有着共同的履历，而另外一名被免的张林中将则曾担任武警后勤部部长，与王春宁亦有交集。

张林曾任海军青岛综合保障基地司令员，中央军委联勤保障部队副参谋长。

2019年，张林升任军委联勤保障部队参谋长。次年，他调任武警后勤部部长。

张林几乎一年一晋升

再次年，张林任中央军委机关事务管理总局局长。

2022年1月，他升任中央军委后勤保障部部长，晋升中将军衔。

数年之内，张林几乎一年一个职务提拔，直到此次被罢免第14届全国人大代表职务。高大光拥海军中将军衔

此次被罢免的高大光则在履历上与前述3人无特别交集。

高大光早年在解放军沈阳军区服役，曾任陆军39集团军某红军师政委，“师改旅”后改任旅政委。

2016年，任陆军第41集团军副政委，次年军改后任新组建的陆军第77集团军副政委，后担任中央军委政治工作部老干部局局长。

不晚于2021年7月，高大光任中央军事委员会机关事务管理总局政委，不晚于2024年9月，任中国人民解放军联勤保障部队政委。

14将军销声匿迹

自2012年以来提拔的将军中，至少有14人已从公众视野中消失或在接受调查，其中包括3名中央军委委员。

中央军委副主席何卫东未出现在此次大阅兵观礼台，而另一位副主席张又侠则出现在天安门城楼，与前中共中央政治局常委张高丽坐在一排。

这种情况侧面印证传言已久的何卫东正在接受调查的消息。

同样未被观察到出现在观礼台的还有国防部长董军。不过，随后不久的9月9日，董军则与美国防长进行通话。

 

China scrambles to battle Labubu fakes in role reversal on IP protection

Beijing, long accused of lax attitude on counterfeits, sees soft power grow.  Chinese customs authorities seized 1.83 million counterfeit Labubu dolls from January to mid-August, as a country that has faced international criticism over counterfeits of foreign brands now scrambles to protect its newfound global hit.

 

Soybean Politics Between the US and China

Weeks into the export season, the world’s top soybean importer has not booked any shipments of U.S. soybeans.

Back in July, China slashed its soybean imports from the United States, continuing its gradual pivot toward Brazil to satisfy its substantial demand for the crop. Now, weeks into the new export season, data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture shows that China, the world’s top soybean importer, has not booked any shipments of U.S. soybeans, and it is speculated that Beijing does not intend to purchase any soybeans from the U.S. this year. This marks a significant shift, as the U.S. used to be China’s largest soybean supplier.

Soybeans are crucial for both Beijing and Washington: While they are one of the United States’ most important agricultural products, China also relies heavily on imports for its supply of soybeans, which above all are used as animal feed and cooking oil. With trade negotiations intensifying between the two sides, this agricultural product is taking center stage as a key bargaining chip for China. And the diversification efforts go well beyond just soybeans: China has also decreased purchases of American corn, wheat and sorghum, while continuing to buy from Brazil, Canada and Australia. This fits into Beijing’s larger-scale plan to decrease its dependency on U.S. agriculture – something it already intended to do before the trade conflict started.

The situation is not without risks for both sides. U.S. farmers are already feeling the financial stress of the lack of Chinese orders as prices have begun to fall. At the same time, Brazilian soybean prices have shot up, and if Brazil does not have a good harvest, China will have to turn to its own reserves. As long as the two do not reach a trade agreement, things are more than likely to remain uncertain in both nations’ agricultural sectors.