Why China Shuns the Russia-North Korea Alliance

 
Why China Shuns the Russia-North Korea Alliance

Mending fences with the U.S. takes priority over their temporary affair.

Victoria Herczegh


Early this year, there was no greater advocate of a China-Russia-North Korea alliance than Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea for more than a decade. Trade with China would continue to normalize and grow after a sudden stop during the COVID-19 pandemic; Russia would exchange advanced military technology for North Korea’s spare ammunition and weaponry. Together, they would provide another layer of security for Kim’s regime. Russia, with its all-consuming focus on defeating Ukraine, was and is eager to upgrade relations with any country willing and able to support it, but China has conspicuously kept its distance from anything resembling a trilateral partnership. For Beijing, propping up Pyongyang is less important than mending ties with the United States, maintaining Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and containing the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Over the longer term, Moscow’s interest in Pyongyang will wane, and Kim’s regime will be driven back into Beijing’s arms.

Trade with China is the lifeblood of the North Korean economy. In 2023, after three years of economic contraction and pandemic-related border closures, North Korea and China resumed cross-border trade. Though it traded almost exclusively with China (the rest of the world accounted for less than 2 percent of North Korea’s trade by volume), the North Korean economy expanded by 3.1 percent for the year, its highest growth rate since 2016. Speaking in January, an exuberant Kim declared 2024 the “North Korea-China friendship year.” China’s president, Xi Jinping, appeared to reciprocate, emphasizing Beijing’s readiness to cooperate with Pyongyang and its “strategic and long-term perspective” on their relationship.

By mid-June, things had changed. For weeks, there were rumors of an imminent trilateral summit, during which Kim, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin were expected to sign a major defense agreement. Kim and Xi last met face to face in 2019, since which time Putin and Xi have become “all-weather friends.” But when the day arrived, only Kim and Putin were in attendance. While they signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, Beijing seemed intent on distancing itself from whatever might transpire in Pyongyang, even scheduling meetings with South Korean officials for the same week.

The Chinese-North Korean relationship is complicated. The stability of the Korean Peninsula is a critical strategic priority for Beijing. A nuclear war would be in no one’s interest, but Beijing must also keep the North Korean regime from collapsing and sending millions of refugees over the border. Therefore, it is vitally important that China provide North Korea with substantial economic and diplomatic support. In China’s ideal version of the relationship, North Korea would be its vassal. When it suited Beijing, it could encourage Pyongyang’s erratic and threatening tendencies to coerce South Korea and the United States. Then, when Seoul and Washington were ready to give Beijing what it wanted, it could bring Pyongyang to heel. In this way, China could exact concessions from its foes while maintaining an air of magnanimity. Crucially, this strategy depends on North Korea’s isolation.

At the moment, however, North Korea and China need different things. North Korea needs all the financial, economic and humanitarian help it can get. China needs U.S. investment to help revitalize its sputtering economy, and it wants better relations with South Korea, which it hopes will translate into a more stable relationship with Washington and progress on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. What Beijing does not need is Pyongyang making threats and fueling a regional arms race and U.S. military buildup.

Were North Korea devoid of other sponsors, this might not be a problem. But while China is keeping its distance in the name of neutrality, Russia is more than willing to deal. Two and a half years into a war many expected would last only weeks, Moscow badly needs ammunition, weapons and workers. Since late last year, it has received missiles and 5 million artillery shells from North Korea, according to South Korean estimates. The other side of the transaction is murkier, but Moscow may be assisting Pyongyang in developing ballistic missiles, satellites and launchers, air defense systems and other weapons. It could even help North Korea with its nuclear weapons program.

Secure in the belief that Russia will continue to need its help, North Korea has communicated to China its dissatisfaction with the recent level of Chinese support. For example, Pyongyang switched from a Chinese to a Russian satellite to broadcast its state television, and when hit with severe flooding this month, it turned down Beijing’s offer to support rescue efforts – reportedly leading to several drownings. China has not taken these slights lying down. According to reports in July, China ordered all North Korean workers in the country on expired visas to return home immediately, not gradually as Pyongyang had planned.

At the moment, China looks to be losing its influence over North Korea to Russia. But while Pyongyang’s interest in stabilizing its economy and earning international recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear-armed state is constant, Moscow’s pursuit of victory over Kyiv at nearly any cost is not. When the Ukraine war ends, Russia will not be as desperate for foreign weapons, though it may still be subject to sanctions by most advanced economies, in which case it could still benefit from cooperation with North Korea in the agricultural sector. At the same time, its recent gestures notwithstanding, Pyongyang cannot afford to alienate Beijing, its most important traditional ally. Similarly, China needs North Korea in the long term to support its strategic interests. The trilateral alliance of Kim’s dream is unlikely to happen, but China and North Korea’s partnership will be back on track sooner rather than later.