Will a coup happens in North Korea ?

Sending 12,000 troops to war has to irk some who go and enrage some of the lesser number who will come back 

 

When you’re sending 12,000 troops to battle under the command of a side not exactly known for its kind treatment of conscripts, you’ve got to be thinking twice about the the soldiers you’re threatening to send and the soldiers coming back. If those troops end up as cannon fodder as a result of Kim Jong Un’s policy choice, the coup d’etat speculation is back on!

There’s a history. In 1996, the Korean People’s Army Sixth Corps, headquartered in Chongjin, planned a coup d’etat. With the failure of state services and the continuing restrictions on trading, North Hamkyung Province was hungry and dissatisfied – including the leadership and officers in each link of the self-monitoring triumvirate of political committees, military command and National Security Agency. We know the coup attempt failed, but we also know it was a very real threat.


Edward N. Luttwak’s Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook is the best known book on how to undertake a coup. Luttwak’s book explores the mechanics of seizing state power through small, organized efforts, bypassing mass uprisings or large-scale warfare. It details how modern states’ bureaucratic and military structures can be exploited for swift takeovers.

His work has influenced both coup plotters and governments worldwide, prompting them to refine strategies for seizing power or preventing it, respectively. The book’s impact spans decades, providing insight into real-world coups and shaping political-security frameworks to counteract internal threats to regimes.

The nature of the North Korean state presents unique challenges, requiring a strategy that considers both internal vulnerabilities and external pressures. Drawing on the insights from Luttwak’s text, to destabilize and ultimately collapse the North Korean regime, plotters would need to check several boxes.

    A vulnerable centralized state apparatus ☑

Luttwak emphasizes that a coup or regime change becomes feasible in a highly centralized system where power is concentrated in a few hands. North Korea’s tightly controlled bureaucracy and military chain of command make it vulnerable to disruptions at key nodes. However, these same characteristics act as both strengths and weaknesses. While the leadership relies heavily on elite military units and inner-circle loyalty, these structures also create isolated factions that can be exploited.

Targeting North Korea’s leadership requires infiltrating the command structure or amplifying internal distrust among elite factions. This could involve intelligence operations designed to increase paranoia within the ruling elite, planting the seeds for a self-fulfilling cycle of purges and defections.

    Economic deprivation ☑

Luttwak argues that regimes become especially vulnerable during economic crises, which fuel public discontent and elite dissatisfaction. North Korea already suffers from chronic economic deprivation, but the regime’s ability to suppress mass uprisings has limited the destabilizing effects of poverty.

Sanctions, already heavily employed, should be refined to better target the regime’s elite class rather than the broader population. Simultaneously, humanitarian aid directed at border regions and marginalized communities could increase resentment among those outside the elite circles, undermining the regime’s narrative of strength.

    Exploitable communication and information gaps ☑

According to Luttwak, coups succeed when they disrupt the flow of information within a regime, creating confusion and limiting the leadership’s ability to coordinate a response. In North Korea, the state’s rigid control over communications isolates it from both domestic and international information networks.

Operations should focus on introducing alternative sources of information into North Korea. For example, the distribution of propaganda via radio waves, smuggled devices, or leaflets can erode the regime’s monopoly on truth. This disruption would weaken the state’s ideological control and embolden potential dissidents.

    Elite discontent and defections to leverage ☑

Luttwak highlights how military factions and dissatisfied elites often play a pivotal role in coups. While North Korea has implemented strict control mechanisms, recent high-profile defections indicate cracks within the elite class.

Incentivizing high-ranking officials to defect or cooperate covertly can further destabilize the regime. International guarantees for defectors, along with financial incentives, could increase the likelihood of defections from within the military or political elite. Encouraging these individuals to disseminate counter-narratives within the regime could accelerate the erosion of loyalty.

    Perceived or actual external threats ☑

Luttwak emphasizes that external military threats or diplomatic crises often lead to internal disarray, particularly in regimes where survival is tied to militaristic policies. In North Korea’s case, the regime relies heavily on the narrative of an external threat to justify its existence and maintain internal unity.

Strategic displays of military strength, combined with diplomatic isolation, could force the regime into overreactions that expose internal weaknesses. Simultaneously, diplomatic outreach to China and Russia – North Korea’s traditional allies – can erode the regime’s geopolitical support, isolating it further.

    Psychological operations and disruption campaigns ☐

Luttwak’s analysis suggests that successful coups rely on psychological operations to undermine public trust in the regime and create confusion within the leadership. In North Korea, the state ideology is central to regime stability, making it a prime target for psychological disruption.

Targeted messaging campaigns should aim to discredit the Kim dynasty’s legitimacy, highlighting corruption, contradictions and failures. The spread of dissident voices and testimonies from defectors can further destabilize the regime’s narrative. These operations should be coordinated to coincide with economic or diplomatic pressures, maximizing their psychological impact.

While there have been continuous attempts to undermine public trust in the North Korean regime and create confusion within its leadership, the intensity has been tempered by recognition of South Korea’s concern that collapse threatened economic well-being, and US concern that collapse threatened regional security.

    Localized resistance movements ☐

While Luttwak warns against large-scale revolutions, he acknowledges that localized resistance movements serve as catalysts for regime change. In North Korea, the heavy surveillance and repression make organizing such movements difficult, but small-scale resistance is still possible.

Empowering underground networks and opposition groups within North Korea, particularly along the Chinese border, could create pockets of resistance. Providing logistical and financial support through covert channels would allow these groups to sustain operations and challenge the regime’s control over remote areas. However, financial support must be coupled with a deeper level of inspiration. Whether this comes from ethnic nationalism, evangelical Christianity, or any other anti-regime belief, there needs to be some form of inspiration that pushes individuals and groups to rise up.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in any attempt to undermine the North Korean regime is the absence of a recognized local resistance movement and the impossibility of supporting them through covert channels. Without an opening of the North Korean regime, this is unlikely to change.

Collapsing the North Korean regime requires a nuanced strategy that integrates internal subversion, economic pressure and external isolation. Drawing on the principles outlined by Luttwak, this strategy emphasizes exploiting vulnerabilities within the leadership structure, promoting defections and disrupting communication channels.

While a direct coup may be challenging, the cumulative impact of these efforts can destabilize the regime and pave the way for meaningful change – and then another problem appears: What comes next?