The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Asymmetric Warfare

 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Asymmetric Warfare

Resistance movements in the region have not used this tactic successfully against Israel in the past.


Arabs and Israelis fought conventional wars in 1948, 1956 and 1967. The Six-Day War convinced Arabs that their militaries were no match for Israel’s technologically superior forces. Even before that conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union knew that Israel had a military edge over Arab states. Aware of his army’s weaknesses that led to its poor performance against Yemeni royalists in 1962-67, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser admitted that he had no plans to start a war against Israel. Realizing that they could not count on Arabs to end their forced displacement, the Fatah Movement decided to wage an asymmetric war against Israel as early as 1965.

Asymmetric wars apply to internal conflicts, motivated mainly by ideology or the rejection of a colonial power without ideological attachment to its colonies. This essay argues that all Arab entities that have waged asymmetric warfare against Israel have been unsuccessful and that its further use does not bode well for Arab armies and guerrilla movements in their wars with Israel. The Israelis do not see themselves as an occupation force, and waging war against them, whether conventional or asymmetric, would not cause them to concede.

Asymmetric Warfare Explained

Chinese military general Sun Tzu constructed the asymmetric warfare concept two and a half millennia ago. He understood it as the ability to take on an adversary when it cannot defend itself or counterattack. Mao Zedong gave the term contemporary meaning during his stay in the north-central Chinese city of Yanan in 1937-47. His war strategy centered on using the weak to defeat the strong. The conditions specific to China that led to the defeat of the nationalists (mainly rampant corruption, hyperinflation and the loss of popular support for the movement) and the triumph of the communists do not apply to the Middle East’s asymmetric wars. Later, Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara described guerrilla warfare as the preliminary stage of an armed conflict that does not lead to complete victory unless the insurgents develop into a regular army.

Today, the term asymmetric warfare is applied to conflicts between two opponents with unequal military strength and in which one party resorts to unconventional tactics to bridge the vast gap in power. This can occur when a resistance movement or armed faction confronts a technologically advanced professional and well-equipped conventional army. During the Cold War, asymmetric warfare represented about two-thirds of the conflicts around the world. The trend continued into the 21st century as more than three-quarters of the 118 armed conflicts between 1989 and 2004 were asymmetric. In the conflict between Arabs and Israelis, asymmetric warfare is still ongoing and has recently even gained momentum.

Asymmetry in Arab-Israeli Wars

The founders of the Fatah movement, impressed by the ability of Algeria’s National Liberation Front to lead the country to independence in 1962, decided to start a guerrilla war against Israel in January 1965. Syrian President Amin Hafez and Algerian Army Chief of Staff Houari Boumediene supplied Fatah with munitions. Assistant Regional Secretary of the Baath Party Salah Jadid, who believed in the popular liberation war, continued to support Fatah after Hafez’s overthrow. The Soviet Union advised Jadid against backing guerrilla warfare against Israel because it was beyond Syria’s capability, a view shared by the-Defense Minister Hafez Assad.

Jordan’s expulsion of the Fatah-dominated Palestine Liberation Organization in 1970 weakened its claim to anti-Israel resistance. The PLO resettled in Lebanon, but by 1975, it got mired in the Lebanese civil war until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 forced it to relocate to Tunisia, where it did could not maintain its military wing, effectively ending its armed conflict against Israel.

Egypt’s War of Attrition between 1968 and 1970 represented the first example of asymmetric warfare in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt wanted to test Israeli citizens’ willingness to continue to support the government in its fight against the Arabs. It did not want to wear down the Israeli army but rather to convince the Israeli government that the price of occupying Sinai would be heavy. The Egyptians used artillery to shell Israeli forces deployed along the Suez Canal, not to undermine their ability to operate or destroy their infrastructure but to exhaust the Israeli economy in the hope that this would erode the Israelis’ will to fight.

Although the 1973 October war between Israel and Egypt was not an asymmetric war in the traditional sense because it took place between two armies, it posed significant challenges for the Egyptian military, which lagged far behind the technologically developed Israeli armed forces, especially in terms of air power. Egypt’s army chief at the time said in his memoir that the Israeli army was overwhelmingly superior to his troops.

The Egyptian army did not trust technology. It used water cannons to demolish the sand wall of the Bar Lev line, a feat Israel thought required technology Egypt did not possess. Egypt also deployed infantry carrying shoulder-mounted and unguided anti-tank rockets to avoid a confrontation with Israeli tanks, which were superior in quality and personnel training. The Egyptian army dealt with Israeli armor in the same way Hamas has done since its Oct. 7 attack.

Hamas

One of the severe operational limitations facing Hamas in Gaza is extreme population density in the strip because asymmetric warfare works best in sparsely populated areas and rugged terrain. In addition, Hamas is blockaded by Israel and Gaza and, unlike Hezbollah, does not have the support of a regional power.

Hamas views Israel as a colonial entity that is subject to extinction. It’s unable to confront it head-on but has still managed to strike at its foundations by denying it security, peace and regional integration. Hamas considers these measures more powerful and strategically effective than a military confrontation between two overwhelmingly unequal actors.

Hamas had no delusions about defeating Israel when it launched its attack last October. It assumed that the assault would generate momentum in the region, open multiple fronts against Israel and trigger another intifada in the West Bank. It expected the derailment of Arab-Israeli peace treaties. Instead, not a single Arab country that had diplomatic ties with Israel recalled its ambassador or condemned Israel’s military campaign, merely lamenting the heavy civilian toll in Gaza. Hamas equated its attack to the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive in 1968, which began the countdown to the fall of Saigon in 1975.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s opening of a second front to support Gaza after the Hamas attack did not hinder Israeli military operations on the southern front. However, Hezbollah focused its missile strikes on undermining confidence between the Israeli government, the army and citizens in Upper Galilee.

It sustained heavy losses as Israel assassinated most of its field commanders, not to mention the widespread destruction of southern Lebanon and the relocation of many of its residents north of the Litani River. Nevertheless, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah seemed satisfied that his strategy disrupted industry and tourism in northern Israel, where frustration with the government is growing. Residents there complain that the army has not been able to find a solution that will keep Hezbollah’s rockets away from their homes. The degree of frustration has reached the point where, several weeks ago, the heads of the settlements in the north threatened to secede from Israel and establish the Galilee State.

It seems that Israel is now committed to carrying out a long-awaited military operation against Hezbollah. Dealing with an asymmetric enemy requires launching a limited war every few years. The internal environment in Israel and the conditions in the Middle East seem conducive to launching a significant assault. The element of surprise no longer exists, but the Israeli air force can still unleash an intense campaign against all of Hezbollah’s strategic centers, including leadership headquarters, homes of senior activists, administrative institutions, facilities of the security apparatus, communication infrastructure and media facilities, and follow it with a massive ground operation in the South Litani area.

What’s Next?

Prussian army general Karl von Clausewitz understood war as a means to achieve political objectives. This does not apply in the Middle East. Wars often lead to cognitive restructuring that affects a society’s cultural system and structure, as happened in Turkey after World War I. Defeat causes a breakdown of the collective consciousness that shapes the worldview of the population of the defeated party. Despite the losses it has sustained in the past two centuries, the fragmented Arab region has not abandoned its religious and political values. Attempts at cultural and political normalization with Israel have not succeeded in suppressing the Arab people’s awareness of the origins of the conflict. The defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah will lead not to the end of the conflict but merely to its mutation.