Belarus’ shift away from balancing and toward Russia

 
New Strategic Documents Preserve Belarus’ Options

The country’s shift away from balancing and toward Russia is pragmatic and temporary.


At the end of April, Belarus updated its Military Doctrine and its National Security Concept to respond to urgent security threats, regional volatility and its neighbors’ military buildups. The Kremlin hailed the documents as marking the end of Minsk’s traditional balancing strategy in favor of full alignment with Moscow. Though there is truth to this reading, Belarus is being cautious not to grant Russia too much influence or eliminate any options – even with Europe – in hopes that it can return to a more neutral stance after the Ukraine war.

The End of Balancing

The complementarities between the Belarusian and Russian economies that built up over decades, especially in energy, helped keep the two countries close after the Soviet Union’s breakup. As they had in Soviet times, pipelines through Belarusian territory continued to carry Russian oil to energy-hungry Europe. Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia could pipe nearly 70 million tons of oil annually to Europe via pipelines in Belarus, such as the 60-year-old Druzhba (which in Russian means “friendship”) pipeline. For the fragile new Belarusian state, access to discounted Russian energy and the collection of tariffs on the Russia-Europe oil trade were financial lifelines.

Aside from energy and trade, Belarus and Russia are also tight military allies. Like other post-Soviet countries, Belarus tries to preserve as much independence as it can, namely by engaging with Western countries to balance against Russian domination. However, this strategy broke down after the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, when allegations of electoral fraud led to mass protests against the government of Alexander Lukashenko, who is still the only president Belarus has known. To fend off the uprising, which by now had won Western government backing, including tough EU sanctions, Lukashenko moved the country closer to Russia. In 2021, Minsk and Moscow agreed to extend until 2046 the Russian military’s use of bases in Baranovichi and Vileyka, Belarus.

Belarus’ new Military Doctrine reflects its closer alignment with Russia. The updated document is more critical of NATO activities and enlargement, as well as the United States’ military preponderance in Europe. The war in Ukraine and the Western response have intensified Minsk’s concerns. For one thing, it vividly demonstrates what might happen to Belarus itself were it to permit too much Western influence for Russia’s liking.

Additionally, the war justifies steps to modernize and strengthen Belarus’ military, which can help not only deter foreign threats but also intimidate and defeat potential insurrectionists. According to the updated doctrine, Minsk is worried about its neighbors’ military buildups and the unstable balance of power in the region. The document flags what Belarus considers to be the aggressive policies and active militarization of Poland and the Baltic states, which collectively account for nearly a third of Belarus’ borders. (Ukraine makes up roughly another third, with Russia forming the rest.) Poland’s military expansion is particularly dramatic and includes an increased army presence on the border with Belarus and plans for stronger civil defense capabilities. From Minsk’s point of view, Washington and London share most of the blame for inciting this anti-Belarus buildup.

However, the Belarusian government is also afraid that its political opponents, who found refuge in the West after the 2020 election, will destabilize the regime before and after the presidential elections in 2025. Anti-Lukashenko Belarusians have thrown their support behind Kyiv in its war with Moscow, even forming a volunteer regiment – now integrated with the Ukrainian armed forces – to resist Russia’s advance.

Anxious and isolated, Minsk had little choice but to grasp for Moscow’s outstretched hand. In accordance with their so-called Union State, Russia is committed to the military defense of Belarus. Moscow is helping to modernize Minsk’s armed forces, including transferring nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile launchers to the country. Moreover, since their leader’s failed rebellion against the Kremlin in 2023, mercenaries from the defunct Wagner Group have been training Belarusian troops on lessons learned in Ukraine. By bolstering the Belarusian military, the Kremlin can force Ukraine to commit scarce resources to monitoring its northern border, while also equipping the Belarusian regime to resist efforts by the opposition and Kyiv to destabilize it.

Economically, the Ukraine war deprives Belarus of most of the perks of being a transit state between Russia and Europe, further pushing it toward the East. EU measures to source oil and natural gas from non-Russian producers have greatly reduced oil flows through Belarusian pipelines, while a tightening of EU sanctions over Belarus’ pro-Russian alignment sent Western demand for Belarusian goods through the floor. Counterintuitively, the Belarusian economy has benefited, with growth hitting 3.9 percent in 2023. This was the country’s fastest growth since 2011, though it was inflated by the previous year’s 4.7 percent contraction. Bilateral trade with Russia surged to a record $43 billion in 2022 and continued to climb in 2023, as Belarusian firms replaced Western businesses that had left the Russian market. Belarusian companies have also helped Russia acquire restricted Western goods while benefiting from greater access to Russian territory and ports to expand trade with Asia.

Escape Hatch

Despite its increased dependence on Russia, Belarus is keeping some options open. According to the new National Security Concept, the country is also pursuing a stronger strategic partnership with China, progress in the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, and comprehensive cooperation with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. So far, Belarusian exports to China increased by around 20 percent in 2023, while total trade with Iran climbed by some 40 percent. Diplomatically, Minsk has stepped up contact with neglected areas, such as when Lukashenko toured several African countries last December. Belarusian personnel also joined command and staff exercises with Iran known as the Security Belt 2024 drills.

Not even the door to Europe is completely closed. In the new strategic documents, Minsk refrains from accusing the European Union of posing a direct threat to its national security. Instead, it portrays the Europeans as victims of aggressive U.S. and British policies that it says destabilize Europe and deprive EU countries of their strategic autonomy. The documents indicate Belarus’ readiness to resume pragmatic dialogue with the EU and its member states as well as the United States on topics such as lifting sanctions. They also do not exclude the resumption of Belarus’ participation in European regional and subregional organizations and initiatives.

One thing no Belarusian strategic document can do is relocate the country. Sandwiched between Russia and Europe, its most attractive strategy remains serving as a middleman between the major European powers. China is thousands of miles away; the EU is across the border. So although Minsk is setting aside its usual balancing strategy, the updated doctrines suggest it already has its eyes on life after the Ukraine war.