I recently rose from a slumber to discover that many of
the learned had risen up to declare the U.S. war in Iraq not only a
failure but also a misbegotten undertaking that no person of minimal
intellect would have undertaken. There are two dangers in this view. The
first is that there is a class of warriors who went into harm’s way and
now carry the bitterness of the dead. The second is the bitterness of
those who didn’t go into battle yet held fragments of knowledge, enough
to mislead.
Obviously, all have a right to discourse, but judging anything as
complex as wars mere decades after they were fought risks
misunderstanding and rubbishing those who were there. The war’s veterans
can distort the facts too, but they are owed the benefit of the doubt
that they were not fools and that their memory carries with it a measure
of truth. I have children who fought in Iraq. They have the right to be
bitter if they choose. Those who judge a war whose real truth will not
be known for centuries – and even then it will be debated – are peering
into the dark.
If these lines sound bitter, they are not meant to be. I wrote a book
as the war was intensifying, fully aware that my children would carry
the burden of casual thought. I want to begin by quoting from that book,
something always in bad taste but important to understand the necessity
of the war:
On the morning of September 11, 2001,
special operations units of the international jihadist group Al Qaeda
struck the United States. In a classic opening attack, they struck
simultaneously at the political, military, and financial centers of the
United States. The attack on the political centers failed entirely when
the aircraft assigned to that mission crashed prematurely in
Pennsylvania. The attack on the military center was only partially
successful. The aircraft assigned to that target crashed into a section
of the Pentagon that had been modernized with fire-resistant materials,
which effectively contained the explosion. The planes assigned to attack
the U.S. financial center succeeded completely, not only destroying the
World Trade Center towers but closing down the financial markets for
several days and disrupting the U.S. economy.
The nineteen men who carried out the
mission were capable operatives. Their achievement was not taking
control of four airliners simultaneously, although that was not a
trivial accomplishment. Rather, it was planning, training, and deploying
for the operation without ever being detected by American intelligence –
or, more precisely, acting in such a way that in spite of inevitable
detection, the data never congealed into actionable intelligence. While
their military capabilities were enormously inferior to those of the
United States – they had to steal an air force – their skills at covert
operations were superb.
A major asset of al-Qaida was that it possessed a highly dispersed
force that enabled it to group and regroup. It had demonstrated the
ability to operate globally while maintaining political relations in a
fixed position. Al-Qaida had political operations in Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Afghanistan and as far east as Southeast Asia. It operated
throughout these areas, growing its regional influence and maintaining a
capability to operate widely. The attack on the United States
demonstrated the ability to operate in many environments. Most
important, al-Qaida could disperse while maintaining offensive power.
Al-Qaida therefore posed multiple threats in multiple regions. It
could strike covertly as in the United States while maintaining regional
bonds in Afghanistan and exploring the Pacific. Its force was so highly
dispersed that its ability to strike would outrun even U.S.
intelligence, which was focused on operational threats. Al-Qaida was
focused on maintaining a wide range of options without providing
relations and resources that could be neutralized. It was precisely this
capability that enabled al-Qaida to operate covertly in the United
States and kill 3,000 people without putting the group’s core at risk.
This was a force that could not be rapidly defeated. Nor could it be
negotiated with or even located for negotiations. There was no political
option or opportunity to divide the force. And the possibility to
penetrate it was an illusion.
At the same time, the United States could not accept the status quo.
Al-Qaida had demonstrated its capabilities, and there was no reason it
would not strike again. Lacking political solutions, Washington’s only
option was a military strike – a broad and diffuse campaign designed to
fragment al-Qaida. That meant U.S. operations on a nearly global basis,
from Saudi Arabia to Myanmar.
This could not be a conventional war for three reasons. First, the
enemy had no center of gravity. Second, the attacking force had to
disperse. Third, the normal logic of intelligence did not apply.
Following 9/11 with meticulously targeted attacks against al-Qaida was
not an option, as the intelligence did not exist. Al-Qaida was hidden
even within the United States, had no center, and was seen as relentless
in its hostility and ability to strike.
Invading Afghanistan and Iraq was the only practical option if the
goal was to cripple a very capable enemy. The U.S. launched broad
attacks in multiple countries. This could provoke hostility, but there
was no better option. It was an unconventional counteroffensive, and
this is what its critics dislike, but they offer no clear alternative.
After 9/11, the threat was simply too great. The strategy was worldwide
disruption. It was not pretty, but it worked. There were no other
large-scale attacks on the U.S. homeland.
Posts
