Showing posts with label Religions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Religions. Show all posts

Friday, April 10, 2015

逊尼派,什叶派已经开始战争

中东逊尼派国家拟 建联合部队压制伊朗


中东紧张局势昨日有所加剧。在德黑兰方面与全球大国试图达成核协议之际,阿拉伯领导人宣布组建一支联合部队,寻求加大对伊朗的压力。

沙特战斗机继续轰炸也门境内得到伊朗支持的胡塞(Houthi)叛军的阵地,令人担心一场沙特-伊朗代理人战争扩大。在此背景下,阿拉伯领导 人在开罗结束了一个峰会,宣称他们将组建一支阿拉伯联合部队。

尽管阿拉伯共同行动经常停留在口头阶段,但阿拉伯联盟(Arab League)建立联合部队的计划突出表明,中东逊尼派国家决心对伊朗不断扩大的地区影响力发起挑战。

以沙特为首的逊尼派国家担心,核协议的达成将使伊朗更加胆大,并让伊朗掌握相关资源,使他们眼里伊朗夺取地区霸权的野心得逞。上周,沙特组建 了一个联盟,并争取到美国支持,对也门展开军事干预。此前也门的胡赛叛军把沙特支持的政府打得节节败退,控制了该国大片国土。不久前被胡赛叛 军赶下台的也门总统阿卜-杜拉布•哈迪(Abd-Rabbu Hadi)已被迫逃离该国。

过去几日里,P5+1——联合国安理会(UNSC)五个常任理事国加上德国——的外长在瑞士洛桑举行的核谈判取得了进展,但昨晚似乎在两三个 关键问题上陷入了僵局。外交官们表示,他们仍在努力赶在明日截止期限之前达成一致,尽管谈判似乎注定会持续到最后关头。

“鉴于此事事关重大……我相信,谈判将持续到最后一刻,除非出现某种奇迹,”一位驻洛桑的西方高级外交官表示。

谈判中最棘手的未解决问题,是伊朗要求修改联合国层面的对伊制裁。其他僵持点包括,禁止伊朗研究一款新型、更先进的、旨在提高该国铀浓缩效率 的离心机,以及有关在任何协议的第一个10年之后,在进一步减轻对伊制裁并允许其进行部分核活动方面可能发生情况的决定。

在逊尼派阿拉伯国家心怀顾虑地关注洛桑谈判之际,埃及总统阿卜杜勒•法塔赫•塞西(Abdel Fattah al-Sisi)在周末的阿盟峰会上表示,目前已别无选择,只能组建联军来迎接对地区“身份认同”构成威胁的挑战——此言指的是什叶派的伊朗和强硬的伊斯 兰主义分子正寻求通过武力把自己的宗教信仰强加给其他人。

“也门处于深渊边缘,需要阿拉伯乃至国际社会采取有效的应对行动,”阿盟秘书长纳比勒•阿拉比(Nabil Elaraby)表示。

 

Sunday, March 1, 2015

The World Is Blind

MSM

The Moderate Islamic Countries have a history of supporting an Al Qaeda affiliate

Qatar, the tiny and astronomically wealthy Gulf emirate with a notoriously independent-minded and polarizing foreign policy, has often been accused of supporting extremist groups throughout the Middle East.

A lot of those claims have been poorly substantiated. There’s only scant evidence, for instance, that Qatar assisted Ansar al Dine during its brutal occupation of northern Mali in 2012. Other data points suggest that Qatar has at best a worryingly permissive attitude towards individual jihadists: the country’s government recently secured the release of a high-level Al Qaeda operative from US prison. He received a hero’s welcome when he returned to Doha.

On Feb. 24, the Wall Street Journal published some of the firmest proof yet that Qatari officials and other prominent figures gave material assistance for jihadist groups. The Journal reported that “the US has uncovered Qatari connections — such as involvement by members of the emirate’s elite business, religious and academic circles — in financing for Hamas, al Qaeda and Islamic State.” 

Although “there are signs Qatar has begun paring back support for the most extreme militant groups following repeated warnings from Washington and certain Arab states,” the Journal details several instances in which Qataris provided funding or other forms of support for a range of terrorist organizations.

Commanders from Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda’s chief Syrian affiliate, “began visiting Doha in 2012 for meetings with senior Qatari military officials and financiers,” the Journal reported, citing “US and regional Arab government officials.” Abd al-Aziz bin Khalifa al-Attiyah, a cousin of Qatar’s emir, was caught traveling to Beirut to supply funding to Nusra in 2012, and in September, the US Treasury Department “said publicly that an Islamic State commander had received $2 million in cash from an unnamed Qatari businessman.”

According to the Journal, during Obama’s first term, members of his National Security Council were so concerned with Qatari support for extremist groups that they lobbied to pull some American aircraft out of Al Udeid aribase, a forward headquarters for US Central Command, in order to convey Washington’s displeasure.

The airbase’s presence in Qatar is a glimpse into why the US hasn’t openly penalized the country for its ties to terrorist groups — unlike the fellow Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which temporarily pulled their ambassadors from Doha in March of 2014 to protest the emirate’s allegedly destabilizing regional policies.

For the US, Qatar is valuable precisely because of its ability to partner with the US while maintaining relations with some of the region’s more powerful extremist groups. Washington views Qatar as an inroad to the Taliban and Hamas, and possibly as a facilitator for ransom payments to other regional terrorist groups. At the same time, Qatar hosts a significant US military presence and craves mainstream international acceptance and influence, an aspiration epitomized by the monarchy’s ownership of Al Jazeera’s global media empire and the country’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup.



Qatar world cup
In this Jan. 3, 2011 file photo, a worker cleans the road outside Khalifa sport complex in Doha, Qatar. Amnesty International said Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2014, that 2022 World Cup host nation Qatar is lagging behind on addressing concerns about the abuse of migrant workers.

This diplomatic balancing act has been perilous for Qatar, whose support for the Muslim Brotherhood is still a source of strain with Egypt, the Middle East’s most populous country. But it’s worked as far as Doha’s relations with the US go. Qatar was allowed to make 2014′s single largest international purchase of US weaponry, buying $11 billion worth of Patriot missile batteries and Apache attack helicopters. And Qatari’s emir met with president Barack Obama at the White House on Feb. 24.

But the Wall Street Journal report shows that for some in the Qatari government, support for extremist groups is more than just a way of currying influence and making Doha indispensable. It’s also a sign that many of the country’s most prominent citizens believe in what extremist organizations like Jabhat al Nusra is fighting for. As the Journal report notes, many in the Qatari government don’t even consider the Al Qaeda affiliate to be a terrorist group.

 

台北市长杠上慈济人掀 骂战 


无党籍的台北市长柯文哲自从去年尾当选后就争议不断,最近还和备受尊崇的佛教团体慈济起口角冲突。

柯文哲日前接受北市建国高中刊物《建中青年》专访,感叹慈济花一大笔钱买保护区的土地,“要改成开发,奇怪耶!”。

释昭慧抨羞辱慈济

慈济人认为柯文哲在羞辱慈济。玄奘大学社会科学院院长释昭慧说,柯文哲羞辱慈济是“软土深掘”,“有种,就用这套一再羞辱慈济的狂言,拿来羞 辱IS(回教国)吧。”

柯文哲日前针对慈济内湖开发案提出质疑,引起释昭慧不满,批评柯文哲“羞辱慈济、恩将仇报”。

对此,柯文哲24日表示,自己只是讲了“奇怪了”3个字,却引发风波,并回击释昭慧是“反应太过度”。

柯文哲解释说,对于保护区开发,会有都市计划委员会、环境评估委员会,由专家审核,专业问题专业解决,会尊重委员会的评审结论再做决定。

他又表示,“这些保护区,除非用行政力特别去干预,一般环境评估是不会通过,因为牵涉永续经营的概念,内湖开发案还牵涉到过度开发会不会引起 土石流问题”。
 台北市“慈济内湖园区开发案”,因为现任市长柯文哲的一句“奇怪耶”,再次成为近日来台湾社会关注的焦点。慈济——台湾最大的慈善组织,正 陷入舆论漩涡。这块被慈济购买的土地,由于地处保护区的地质敏感带,长期在台北议而不决。当地居民和环保团体,与慈济的长年争论难分难解。此 次争端再上头条,除了引发“口水战”之外,也被视为为这个案件解决带来转机。

  风波再起 释昭慧、柯文哲隔空交战

  “慈济内湖开发案”时至近日再起风波,是与柯文哲的一次采访有关。柯文哲受访时提及此案,感叹慈济花一大笔钱买保护区的地:“保护区要改 成开发用地,奇怪耶”!引发玄奘大学社科学院院长释昭慧的痛批,她指责柯文哲“太不用功”,没有认真阅读慈济的企划书,是“口出狂言,羞辱慈 济”。

  一语激起千层浪,释昭慧与柯文哲的冲突引发争议,也让此案再次浮于台面。其实,不只是柯文哲对“慈济内湖开发案”有异议,陈水扁担任台北 市长期间也驳回过此案的申请。据台媒报道,慈济1997年购入此地时,是经过当时政府单位的引荐遴选与担保之后,出于岛内缺乏儿童发展复健专 业医疗单位的考量,规划兴建儿童医院与志工大楼。然而,此案曝光之后受到来自于民意代表的庞大压力,遭到了扁市府的都发局驳回申请。时至今 日,尽管慈济曾多次想在市府“闯关”,却因为环保团体抨击,使得这块土地一直无法变更使用。

  回应质疑 慈济拟造“钻石级”生态园区

  慈济内湖开发区为何如此敏感?这块土地位于大湖公园北侧,在地质上属于湖区回填的山坡地集水区,大规模开发可能危及生态地质。能不能开 发?会不会破坏?一直是争论的焦点。当地居民质疑,在保护区大肆开发,可能会造成内湖本来就存有的淹水问题加剧。但实际上,慈济曾发布官方声 明强调,这块区域在购入前曾被作为公交总站使用,场区内铺设柏油路,铁皮屋林立,脏乱不堪,本就已遭到严重破坏。

  出于依法行事,目前慈济只在该园区原有建物上添加竹子、木材点缀装饰,通过小型修复作为办公室和资源回收厂。为了证明生态破坏的质疑是 “莫须有”,慈济还打算在此地打造“钻石级”生态园区,针对排水等问题做妥善规划。除了作为未来台北市灾难发生时救援及物资集散中心之外,园 区内的图书馆、公园等等设施,都可以变成便民的服务。
舆论围攻慈济 证严法师力挺

此事件后来演变为舆论围攻慈济的现象,指慈济俨然成为“台湾地主”,在台湾各地拥有大批信徒捐赠或购买回来的土地。外传慈济在台北市与新北市 共拥地近5万坪(每坪约36平方尺)。

释昭慧后来再出面说明时落泪,表示柯文哲并不是那么邪恶,可能资讯被蒙蔽,未了解真相。

经过多日口舌之争,慈济精神领袖证严法师25日打破沉默,力挺释昭慧。

她说:“怎么慈济这么大的字浮现在报纸上。这么多的大报,我真的很感恩昭慧法师,她这样维护慈济。其实我这几天也忙得没时间看新闻,总而言之 她这样是很有义气的,就是我很感恩她,不过很不舍。”

释昭慧又被爆料 出入马赛地接送

释昭慧法师今天凌晨在面子书贴文澄清,接送的马赛地不是她的,而且“那是二手车!”

释昭慧近日上电视节目,说明慈济土地案,“宅神”朱学恒在面子书上说:“请问,为什么如果释昭慧真是出家人,真是比丘尼的话,不可以说谎和用 贵松松手机与坐名车吧?”

此贴文为慈济风波再添争议。

释昭慧今天凌晨在面子书上说:“是否有开马赛地?开车的居士载我到三立时,与我一同下车询问摄影棚位置,巧遇同上节目的徐嶔煌先生,听说他在 脸书幽我一默,说我随行两个助理,其实不是啦!我哪付得起‘两个助理’的薪水呢!”

释昭慧还补充说,“那是二手车!”

背景:- 慈济贡献大,争议也不小


  慈济不仅是台湾最大的慈善组织,在国际上也有极高的知名度,
对全球慈善事业贡献良多。不过,慈济的少数做法在台湾岛内也引发争议,这也是此次 慈济陷入舆论漩涡的深层次原因。

  慈济究竟在哪些方面招致批评,据台媒报道,慈济作为佛教团体,其部分援助计划曾被批不尊重原住民的文化与宗教信仰;也有人认为慈济吸收了大量 慈善资源,造成了岛内其他慈善团体陷困境,而且行善太高调,“有摄影机就有慈济”;慈济的志工经营资源回收业务,让靠捡破烂为生的中下阶层收入锐 减,前“国策顾问”戴胜通就曾呼吁“请留口饭给‘艰苦人’吃”;此外,慈济的静思堂被指建 设、装潢过于豪华,部分民众质疑其对公益事业不够真诚。

慈濟內湖開發延燒! 民眾呼籲:公開透明

慈濟內湖開發案引發社會輿論關注,間接影響社會大眾對慈濟的正面印象!議題持續延燒,曾任台北市都發局長張景森跳出來緩頰,要大家不要將「反內湖開發」演 變成「反慈濟」無限上綱,不過不只知名律師呂秋遠,音樂家許常德在臉書探討,長期觀察慈濟土地變更案的文化大學教授楊重信也質疑,宗教在台灣 確實受到禮 遇。

文化大學前環境設計學院院長楊重信:「受到爭議的是說,(內湖)既然是保護區又被破壞掉了,那你慈濟買這塊地幹什麼?」

對慈濟開發內湖保護區無法認同,曾任職內政部委員會的楊重信,長期觀察,慈濟從1991年來,全台購買再個案變更的12筆土地,質疑宗教確實 受禮遇。

文化大學前環境設計學院院長楊重信:「以我們的看法(慈濟)就是特權,因為別人不可以,你為什麼可以?別人(個案變更)要弄個3到5年,(慈 濟)1到2年就夠了。」

從農業區、工業區到保護地,全台擁有81公頃土地,慈濟不同於別人,變更名目得花上3到5年,1到2年就搞定,這次因為內湖保護區開發案受外 界注目。

名人群起激憤,知名律師呂秋遠在臉書質疑,「讓這塊土地保留原貌,另外找地方,到底會有什麼問題?」,但慈濟始終迴避這問題,為什麼一定要強 行通過變更保留區,音樂家許常德也關注,連PO多篇留言探討慈濟土地開發,要求宗教如果不課稅,就應該公開透明。

民眾:「倒也不是用批判的角度,可能有很多事情是我們不夠了解,所以希望(慈濟)多點資訊讓我們清楚,這個可以受公評嘛,不是說都在公布所有 的財產嗎?那我希望(慈濟)也能這樣。」

保護區開發案議題延燒,慈濟正面形象出現兩極評價,張景森幫緩頰,透露自己是拒絕慈濟內湖保護區變更,第一位都發局局長,認為慈濟值得批評但 也是台灣珍惜資產,不贊成把反內湖開發案無限上綱成反慈濟,但內湖開發案何時落幕,就看慈濟人如何面對。

Friday, January 16, 2015

西方的伪善 - 这是适当时机的进行反击伊斯兰教法西斯主义

 

Rupert Murdoch Tweets About ‘Jihadist Cancer’ in Wake of Paris Shootings

rupert murdoch tweets

传媒大亨默多克:所有穆斯林必须为“查理” 血案负责

巴黎恐怖袭击事件发生不久后,媒体巨头默多克发表了一则推文称,即使是和平的穆斯 林教徒都应该为“圣战者毒瘤”负责。此番言论在社交媒体上引起批评与讨论。美国新闻集团(News Corp)总裁默多克(Rupert Murdoch)周六凌晨在其推特上发表了一则备受争议的推文引发熱议。推文内容写道:"或许多数穆斯林是和平的,但在他们承认并摧毁不断壮大的圣战分子 毒瘤前,他们必须为此负责"。截至周日下午1时,这则推文已经被转发4100余次。默多克不久后又发出另一则推文,似乎是为前一则发言作出辩论。他在推文中写道:"圣战者构 成的巨大威胁无处不在,从菲律宾直至非洲,从欧洲到美国","政治正确导致否认和伪善"。

Fox chairman tweets that
Muslims “must be held responsible” for extremists

Rupert Murdoch took to Twitter on Friday night to weigh in on the terrorist shooting spree currently plaguing Paris, specifically addressing the jihadist group behind the attacks.

“Maybe most Moslems peaceful, but until they recognize and destroy their growing jihadist cancer they must be held responsible,” he wrote, following up with “big jihadist danger looming everywhere from Philippines to Africa to Europe to US.
Political correctness makes for denial and hypocrisy.

德国反伊教游行再起


国极右组织「欧洲爱国者抵制西方伊斯兰化」(Pegida)週一再发动群眾,抗议伊斯兰教 影响力在欧洲抬头。有观察估计,示威人数可能突破2万人。

分析员相信, 隨著法国发生「圣战」者血洗杂誌社恐怖事件,这个运动的力量將会更加壮大,並乘机捞取政治资本。

德国维滕贝格大学的政治学者霍尔特曼告诉德国《商报》,巴黎发生的恐怖袭击事件预料將「促使本国的排外情绪浮上檯面」。

霍尔特曼指出,Pegida 这个极右组织预料將藉著这股「伊斯兰教恐惧情绪」而变得更壮大。

据报导,该运动的领导人呼吁支持者週一戴上黑色臂章,为「巴黎恐怖事件的受害者」哀悼一分钟。

不过,在这个组织的发源地德累斯顿,上週六有3万5000人示威反对Pegida发动游行;他们的人数比该组织上一轮游行的1万8000人多 出近一倍。

计划扩大群眾集会

Pegida去年10月发起的第一场群眾集会只有500人参加。近期,它每週一都举行游行示威,並吸引上万人参加。

该组织抗议政府让大批穆斯林难民涌入德国,反对所谓的西方社会伊斯兰教化,並声言要保护犹太—基督教西方文明。

此前,德国总理默克尔已多次呼吁民眾,不要参与针对外来者的煽动性活动。她在新年讲话中明確表示,德国应包容並接受那些因战乱而流离失所的难 民。她批评排外运动领导人充满「偏见、冷漠,甚至心怀仇恨」。

德累斯顿公民教育中心负责人里希特预测,週一参与反伊斯兰教群眾大会的人数,预料將比上一次1万8000人的最高记录还要多。

负责德国移民事务的市政官员温策也认为,巴黎接连发生的《查理週刊》血案和两组凶手挟持人质事件,將促使更多人参与週一的反伊斯兰群眾大会。

Pegida 的一些支持者宣佈,计划把群眾集会扩大到奥地利和斯堪的纳维亚。与此同时,欧洲一些极右组织也声援这个运动。

德累斯顿科技大学政治学家帕泽尔特估计,週一的示威人数可能会突破2万大关,因为巴黎袭击事件「印证」 Pegida 的说法。

荷右翼支持率新高

Pegida 在其网站贴文说:「过去12週,Pegida 不断对这些穆斯林发出警告, 现在, 他们向法国证明了, 他们要的不是民主, 他们寻求的是暴力和死亡。」它更称,德国的政治领导人一直淡化移民问题,结果悲剧还是发生了。

另一边厢,巴黎恐袭令欧洲对本土伊斯兰极端分子的担忧成为现实,同时势令各国领袖进一步受极右势力挑战。


荷兰週日公佈的最新民调显示,右翼自由党(PVV)支持率飆升至逾一年以来新高,倘若即时举行大选,甚至可望成为国会最大党。

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Defiant Charlie Hebdo depicts Prophet Muhammad on cover





The cover of the next edition of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo will show a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad, holding a sign "I am Charlie".

The slogan in French "Je suis Charlie" ("I am Charlie") was widely used following the 7 January attack on the magazine, as people sought to show their support.

Three million copies of Wednesday's edition are being printed. Normally only 60,000 are sold each week.

Charlie Hebdo's lawyer Richard Malka told France Info radio: "We will not give in. The spirit of 'I am Charlie' means the right to blaspheme."

Survivors of the massacre have been working on the magazine from the offices of the French daily newspaper Liberation.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Top Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Hoaxes of 2014

Posted on December 31, 2014 by creeping
Robert Spencer provides a top five list after yet another Muslim crime blamed on non-Muslims.
via The Top Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Hoaxes of 2014 | FrontPage Magazine.

1. The Saleh and Akbar viral video.

In October, the Muslim bloggers Adam Saleh and Sheikh Akbar released a video entitled “Racial Profiling Experiment.” It showed the duo in Western clothing, coming to blows in front of an indifferent NYPD cop. In the second part of the video, they pass by the same cop in Muslim garb, arguing mildly – only to be harassed and frisked by the same policeman.

The video went viral. The Huffington Post hysterically proclaimed that it offered a “small glimpse into the ugly world of racial profiling.” Hamas-linked CAIR called for an investigation. But then it turned out that the whole thing had been staged. The Smoking Gun called the video a “cynical and duplicitous attempt to capitalize on New York City’s documented racial profiling problems.”

2. The German mosque arson.

Another “Islamophobic” hate crime took place in Germany in February, when there was an arson attack at the Central Mosque in Cologne. But in October, a Muslim who had been held in a psychiatric ward ever since he had been arrested (as the mainstream media and law enforcement officials have now apparently agreed that all Muslims who commit acts of violence are mentally ill) confessed to having set the fire.

“I wanted to make a clear sign,” the arsonist explained. “Because they treated me badly at the Koran school. It has always hurt me.” He also had tried to burn down two other mosques; it wasn’t reported whether or not he had been to Qur’an school and been treated badly in all three. But until he was apprehended, his arson attacks provided rich material for the “Islamophobia” mythmakers.

3. The burned Qur’ans in Dearborn.

Last June, after three burned Qur’ans were found in front of the Karbalaa Islamic Educational Center in Dearborn, the mosque’s imam, Sheikh Husham Al-Husainy met with lawyers to discuss his proposal for a statute criminalizing the desecration of holy books. “We want all of the religions to cooperate with us,” he declared, “to bring respect to the word of God, whether the Quran, Bible, or Torah.”

But as it turned out, the Qur’an barbecuer was none other than a Muslim named Ali Hassan Al-Assadi. Al-Husainy opined that al-Assadi was (surprise, surprise) “mentally unstable.” Crazy or not, the discovery that al-Assadi had burned the Qur’ans threw a large monkey wrench into al-Husainy’s plans to use the incident as the cornerstone of his campaign against the freedom of expression.

4. The Montclair State University attack.

Combine the relentless Muslim striving for victimhood with the cult of victimhood on college campuses these days, and even non-Muslims get into the faked hate act. Last April at Montclair State University in New Jersey, a student claimed that three white men in jeans and hoodies assaulted him. They called him an “Islamic terrorist.”

MSU police began an investigation, only to find that the whole incident was a hoax: a student named Navjoat Aulakh had filed a false report. Aulakh may not even be a Muslim. His full name is Navjoat Singh Aulakh; “Singh” is a name closely associated with Sikhs. The Aulakhs are a Jat clan from the Punjab area, and while many Jats are Muslims, the name Singh here suggests that this young man is himself a Sikh. His Facebook page gives no sign that he cares about much of anything but sports and babes, but apparently he does have some significant political concerns. If he is a Sikh, this would by no means be the first time that Sikhs have served as useful idiots for the Islamic supremacist victimhood posturing enterprise. Sikhs even stood with Hamas-linked CAIR to call for the allowance of hijabs on an amusement park go-kart ride that had already seen one Muslima killed as her hijab was caught in the axle.

In this case, a Sikh apparently tried to aid the false Muslim victimhood narrative. And failed.

5. The Shaima Alawadi murder.

Last April in El Cajon, California, an Iraqi Muslim named Kassim Alhimidi was found guilty of murdering his wife, Shaima Alawadi, after she had told him that she wanted a divorce.
Before Alhimidi was arrested, this murder was widely reported as an “Islamophobic hate crime”: a note was found by Alawadi’s body that read, “Go back to your country, you terrorist.” Leftists and Islamic supremacists made a great deal of this, claiming that the murder was the work of an “Islamophobe” who hated Shaima Alawadi for wearing a hijab. They even staged a campaign, “One Million Hijabs for Shaima Alawadi.”

Reza Aslan, the celebrated author of Zealot, bashed out a sub-literate tweet blaming Pamela Geller and me for the murder: “If a 32 year old veiled mother is a terrorist than [sic] so am I you Islamophobic fucks Gellar [sic] Spencer et. [sic] al. Come find me.” This tweet indicated how much mileage the “Islamophobia” propaganda machine thought it could get from the Alawadi murder in its efforts to intimidate people into thinking it wrong to oppose jihad terror.

Yet it was another fake hate crime. And since the mainstream media remains so uncritical about Muslim claims of having been victimized, there will be many more in 2015.

Connecting the dots: 100 years of jihad against Australia

 
 
via From Broken Hill to Martin Place: Individual Jihad Comes to Australia, 1915 to 2015. h/t sheikyermami
One hundred years ago today, a lethal jihad attack was staged against New Year’s Day picnickers in Broken Hill, Australia. This attack and the recent Martin Place siege, events separated by almost exactly a century, show striking similarities.

For Australians, the anxious question about the Martin Place attack, which has grabbed the attention of everyone, is whether this atrocity is but a harbinger of a further series of deadly attacks on Australian soil, or whether it will pass into memory as an exceptional one-off event, much as the 1915 New Year’s Day massacre in Broken Hill did.
Alma Cowie, killed in Broken Hill 1915, and Katrina Dawson, killed in Sydney 2014

On New Year’s Day, 1915, two Muslim men, Bashda Mahommed Gool and Mullah Abdullah, shot and killed four people and wounded several others before finally being killed by police. They had both come to Australia more than a decade previously.

Beginning in 1860, many Muslim cameleers came to Australia to help open up the arid outback. Today a famous train from Adelaide to Darwin is known as ‘The Ghan’ to commemorate the contribution of the ‘Afghans’ – as they were known (although they came from many different places across the Middle East and South Asia) – to the development of Australia.

The jihad attack was staged against a picnic train which was taking 1200 picnickers out on a New Year’s Day in open ore trucks.  Bashda Mahommed Gool and Mullah Abdullah first made enquiries at the station beforehand to make sure they would be in the right place at the right time to attack this particular train.  They then positioned themselves on the side of a hill around 30 meters from the tracks, and opened fire as the trucks passed.  Among the victims was Alma Cowie, aged 17, shot dead. By the end of the incident the jihadi cameleers had themselves been killed by police.
The two were found to have left notes to explain that they were responding to a call to jihad issued by the Ottoman Caliphate (on 11 November 1914).

Mullah Abdullah said that his intention was to die for his faith in obedience to the Sultan’s order, and Mahommed Gool wrote “I must kill you and give my life for my faith, Allahu Akbar, apparently in reference to Sura 9:11:
Allah has purchased of their faithful lives and worldly goods, and in return has promised them the Garden. They will fight for His cause, kill and be killed.
The  Ottoman fatwa declared that it was a religious duty “for all the Muslims in all countries, whether young or old, infantry or cavalry, to resort to jihad with all their properties and lives, as required by the Quranic verse of enfiru.” The verse of enfiru (Arabic ‘go forth’) is a reference to Sura 9:38:
You who believe! What is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the path of Allah, you cling heavily to the earth? Do you prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter. Unless you go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place…
The enfiru verse calls upon Muslims to ‘go forth’ for jihad, or else face a painful doom under the judgement of Allah;  better to fight as a martyr and go to paradise than burn in hell for hanging back.
A more detailed fatwa, ‘A Universal Proclamation to all the people of Islam’ was published by the ‘National Society of Defense of the Seat of the Caliphate’ (reproduced in Andrew Bostom’s Legacy of Jihad, p.216 ff).  This ‘Universal Proclamation’ declared that ‘every Muslim without exception must be considered as a soldier’ and the duty of jihad ‘is enjoined upon all the peoples of Islam who are spread abroad upon the face of the whole earth’:
They must know that the killing of infidels who rule over the Islamic lands has become a sacred duty, whether it be secretly or openly, as the great Koran declares in its words: “Take them and kill them whenever you come across them, and we have given you a manifest power over them by revelation. [Sura 4:91]. 
This fatwa goes on to define three different forms of jihad, including ‘individual jihad’, in which an individual Muslim attacks an infidel in a solo act. It names contemporary examples of attacks on Westerners in colonial contexts which were familiar to Muslims at the time, including the killing of an English governor, Peter Galy,[1] as well as the assassination of an English chief of police in India.  The fatwa suggests the use of ‘cutting, killing instruments’.  It also cites as a precedent the assassination of certain Jews by Muhammad’s companions.

The fatwa urges faithful Muslims to rise up, ‘go out … and kill one of those who belong to the Triple Entente (Russian, France and Great Britain) of the infidels’:
… let every individual of the Muslims in whatever place they may be, take upon him an oath to kill at least three or four of the ruling infidels, enemies of Allah, and enemies of the religion. He must take upon him this oath before Allah Most High, expecting his reward from Allah alone, and let the Muslim be confident, if there be to him no other good deed than this, nevertheless he will prosper in the day of judgment …
The two ‘Afghan’ jihadis of Broken Hill, according to their own testimony, acted in accordance with such instructions: they went out to kill infidels as an act of individual jihad.
Another mode of jihad recommended by the ‘Universal Proclamation’ is ‘jihad by bands’, which it claims to be particularly effective when Islam is weak.  The ‘Universal Proclamation’ states:
… the most profitable of them is that which makes use of secret formations, and it is hoped that the Islamic world of today will profit very greatly from secret bands, and therefore it is in the degree of duty to him who wishes to participate in the Jihad that he should take council with people of experience in the formation of secret bands and gain profitable information of this kind.
‘Jihad by bands’ is the mode of Al-Qa’ida.

The third recommended form of jihad is ‘jihad by campaigns’, which is warfare using armies directed by the Caliph.  This is the mode the self-declared caliphate known as the Islamic State is following today.

The phenomenon of individuals launching a personal jihad against non-Muslim infidels is nothing new.  The precedents in the life of Muhammad are well-known and some of these were cited in the Ottoman ‘Universal Proclamation’.  As the Ottoman fatwa indicated, the phenomenon was already a thorn in the side of colonial authorities a century ago.

In the Dutch occupation of Aceh, the phenomenon of individual Muslims killing Dutch people was frequent enough to be given a name, Atjeh-moorden ‘Acehnese murders’.  The Dutch authorities conducted investigations into the mental state of perpetrators of such attacks.  This was not always easy: because the attacks were mounted with the intention of ‘killing and being killed’ to attain martrydom, only a minority of attackers survived in a fit state to be investigated.

The Dutch wrestled for decades to understand the phenomenon.  The psychiatrist R.A. Kern conducted a study of Atjeh-moorden and concluded that while Islamic theology accounted for the common pattern of the murders, this was not enough to determine which particular individuals might be triggered to mount such attacks: for that one needed to look to the personal circumstances of the individuals.

Nevertheless, repeated psychiatric studies of perpetrators showed that they were not mad.  David Kloos summarized their findings: “Over the years, a consensus had formed among the Dutch that the Ajteh-moorden were committed deliberately, in ‘cold blood’ and thus ‘rationally’.[2]  Going for individual jihad was not normally a symptom of mental instability.

There are striking parallels between the Broken Hill massacre a century ago, and the recent Martin Place siege.
  • In both cases the media puzzled over the motivation of the attackers.  The Barrier Miner wrote in 1915 “The question has been asked over and over again, and by many people since yesterday morning’s tragic occurrence, as to the motive of the men in attacking the picnic train with its load of women and children…”
  •  
  • The attackers in both cases had resided for many years in Australia and were well-known in their communities.
  • Both attacks were individual acts;  although the 1915 attack by two individuals working together, they were not part of a larger network of jihadis, but were merely combining their individual efforts.
  •  
  • In both cases the attackers subscribed to the dogmas of jihad in the path of Allah, and martyrdom in Holy War.
  • In both cases, attackers were mobilized in response to a global call to jihad: in 1915 issued by the Ottoman Caliphate; in 2014 issued by Islamic State.
  •  
  • Both global calls to jihad had specifically invited Muslims around the world to commit individual acts of jihad by killing infidels (see here on the Islamic State’s call to Muslims to run over infidels with their cars).
  •  
  • In both cases the perpetrators had been experiencing difficulties with the law: in the 1915 massacre, Mullah Abdullah had been convicted days before for slaughtering sheep on an unlicensed premises.  In the Martin Place siege, Hojat al-Islam Muhammad Hassan Manteqi (AKA ‘Sheikh’ Man Haron Monis) was facing criminal charges as an accessory to the murder of his ex-wife and had a history of convictions for serious offenses.
There were also similarities in the way the wider community and the media responded:
  • In both cases the media took pains to point out that the majority of people in the Muslim community abhorred the killings, and reported that no-one from the Muslim community wished to claim the bodies (see here and here).
  • In both cases there were no reprisals against Muslims. However the Broken Hill German Club was burned down in 1915;  the killings were considered to be linked to the World War I conflict as a whole, rather than as manifestations of individual jihadism.
Michael Wesley, professor of International Relations and director of the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the Australian National University confidently wrote in The Australian that ‘this is a new and more dangerous form of terrorism’, which he called ‘third-generation’ terrorism.

According to Wesley, ‘first-generation’ terrorism only appeared in the world in the 1960’s, ‘second-generation’ terrorism in the 1990’s, and this, in its turn, ‘morphed’ into ‘third generation’ terrorism, which we are experiencing today.

Is individual jihad really a new phenomenon?  Nothing could be further from the truth.  It is, on the contrary, an old, old form of warfare, as old as the origins of Islam itself.  The Ottoman fatwa writers knew their Koran and were qualified to draw conclusions from it, which did not differ from the long-established mainstream of Islamic teachings about jihad.

To discuss such things the term terrorism is inadequate and even misleading.  It confuses experts like Professor Wesley, who attempt to lump the Martin Place siege into a conceptual grid which includes the IRA, in apparent ignorance of the well-documented history of jihadism.

Also misleading is the widely used term lone wolf, which implies social disengagement and dysfunction, including disconnection with the broader jihadi movement.  This very @estern secular construct overlooks the considerable attention in Islamic jurisprudence to the idea of warfare as an ‘individual obligation’ (fardh al-’ayn), which is incumbent upon Muslims as individuals, even if they are not enlisted in a jihad army.

The West puzzles and puzzles over jihad.   The Martin Place hostage taker ‘Sheikh’ Monis certainly seems to have been a very unpleasant individual, and many have been tempted to write him off as ‘crazy’.   However what fascinates and terrifies most is the utter ordinariness of so many jihadis.   Here in Australia article after article has been published in the media pointing out how normal the young men are who have joined Islamic State.  We have read how they enjoy social media, made YouTube videos, do well at school, are liked by their friends, go partying, have girlfriends, support local football teams etc.  And all this is related to us as if it was the most amazing news.

Given the terrifying ordinariness of the jihadis, it is tempting to apply pejorative labels to them, to write them off as deranged misfits. This is an attempt to marginalize the problem. Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop called it ‘idiotic’ to refer to those who die in jihad as ‘martyrs’.

However such attempts to push the jihad phenomenon to the edges of our rational world are doomed to fail. Instead the same question keeps arising, like a persistent itch, that the Barrier Miner put on January 2, 1915: ‘The question has been asked over and over again, and by many people since yesterday morning’s tragic occurrence, as to the motive of the men in attacking the picnic train with its load of women and children…’

This question will simply not go away.  In reality, the will to ‘go forth’ for jihad is not a manifestation of craziness – many of its actors are entirely sane.  It is not a manifestation of stupidity – many of its actors are quite intelligent.  It is not a manifestation of social dysfunction or poverty – many of its actors come from stable and wealthy homes.  It is not a manifestation of weirdness – many of its actors are quite ordinary.  Nor is it a manifestation of ‘morphing’ trends in international relations – jihadism is as old as the hills.

Jihadi terror is a manifestation of Islamic theology.

Read it all at markdurie.com blog.

The Provocative History of French Weekly Newspaper Charlie Hebdo

"If we can talk about anything in France apart from Islam or the consequences of Islamism, that is annoying"

The motivation behind the attack that has left at least 12 people dead at the office of French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo on Wednesday appears to be its long history of mocking religions, in particular Islam. According to some witnesses, the gunmen said they were defending the Prophet Muhammad as they opened fire.
The most recent tweet from the publication featured a cartoon of the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Yet this isn’t the first time the provocative left-wing weekly has found itself under threat.
Charlie Hebdo was introduced in 1970 after another publication, Hara-Kiri, was banned for mocking the death of former French President Charles de Gaulle. Much of Hara-Kiri’s staff simply migrated to the new publication, which was named in reference to Charlie Brown comics. Hebdo is short for hebdomadaire which means weekly in French.
Front Pages React to Paris Terror Attack
<i>Aftenposten</i>, Norway
<i>DeMorgen</i>, Belgium
<i>The Independent</i>, United
                  Kingdom
"France is bruised" / <i>La
                  Croix</i>, France
 
Aftenposten, Norway
1 of 19
Though the publication has never found wide circulation, it quickly made a name for itself thanks to its incendiary cartoons, which took shots at high-profile figures, including the far right, politicians and celebrities, and religions of all kinds. Just last month, an edition featured a cartoon of the Virgin Mary, spread-eagled, giving birth to Jesus.\

In 1981, Charlie Hebdo ceased publication because of a lack of funds, though it was resurrected in 1992. In 2006, the publication caused widespread controversy when it republished the controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that were first printed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten and prompted protests from Muslims around the world. Charlie Hebdo’s reprint of the cartoons — not to mention the addition of their own work — gained it as much notoriety as the Danish newspaper. The issue saw unusually high sales, but drew criticism from many Muslim groups. France’s then President Jacques Chirac released a statement at the time saying, “Anything that can hurt the convictions of someone else, in particular religious convictions, should be avoided. Freedom of expression should be exercised in a spirit of responsibility.”

Charlie Hebdo responded by publishing a letter, signed by 12 writers and intellectuals including Salman Rushdie and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, which read, in part, “We, writers, journalists, intellectuals, call for resistance to religious totalitarianism and for the promotion of freedom, equal opportunity and secular values for all.”

The following year Charlie Hebdo was sued by two French Muslim associations, the Great Mosque of Paris and the Union of Islamic Organisations of France, for reprinting the Danish cartoons. A French court rejected the case, saying the publication’s decision to publish the images did not incite religious hatred.

Yet the backlash over the publication’s provocative critique of Islam continued — sometimes with violent consequences. On Nov. 2, 2011, Charlie Hebdo’s offices were firebombed and destroyed the day after the magazine announced the Prophet Muhammad as its “editor in chief” for its next issue. The cover also carried a caricature of the Prophet. As that attack took place in the early morning hours, no one was injured.

The publication’s editor Stéphane Charbonnier, who also published cartoons under the name Charb, told the BBC following the firebombing, “If we can poke fun at everything in France, if we can talk about anything in France apart from Islam or the consequences of Islamism, that is annoying.” Charb is believed to have been killed on Wednesday.

The following year, after the weekly published more provocative caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, French officials announced they would temporarily close French embassies, consulates, cultural centers and schools in more than a dozen Muslim countries for safety. Despite the condemnation from multiple groups, Charlie Hebdo defended its editorial choices.

“The aim is to laugh,” Charlie Hebdo journalist Laurent Léger said at the time. “We want to laugh at the extremists — every extremist. They can be Muslim, Jewish, Catholic. Everyone can be religious, but extremist thoughts and acts we cannot accept.”


 

Sunday, December 28, 2014

中国宗教负责人说要抵制基督教对 华渗透

在湖南,一些学生昨日身着汉服来到长沙太平街的圣诞活动现场,手举“抵制圣诞节”等标语,呼吁市民“回归中国传统节日,理性过节”。
在湖南,一些学生昨日身着汉服来到长沙太平街的圣诞活动现场,手举“抵制圣诞节”等标语,呼吁市民“回归中国传统节日,理性过节”。
在中国的基督徒数量与日俱增的同时,国家宗教局也日渐不安。周四 (12月25日),中国国家宗教事务局在其网站上引用局长王作安的话说,中国要“坚决抵制”境外利用基督教对华渗透。
他的这番言论,正值中国官方大举复兴传统文化,弥合价值观断层的危机之际。这其中,基督教并不被官方认为是传统文化的一部分。今年,中国多 地的教堂被当地政府拆除,信徒和当局多次产生冲突。
一些浙江的基督徒说,浙江省政府今年已经拆除了温州等地的多所教堂。本周,一些中国高校、城市和年轻人团体也呼吁,中国人不应该过“媚俗洋 节”,并通过多种手段阻止学生外出过平安夜。

抵制“境外渗透”?

王作安还表示,基督教要积极开展公益慈善事业,团结引导信教群众,为实现中国梦贡献力量。
王作安还表示,基督教要积极开展公益慈善事业,团结引导信教群众,为实现中国梦贡献力量。根据中国国家宗教事务局网站的消息,王作安在昨日上午走访了北京基督教朝阳堂和天主教宣武门堂。
他说,天主教要“继续高举爱国爱教旗帜,坚定坚持独立自主自办原则,坚持走与社会主义社会相适应道路”;基督教要“发掘基督教教义中与社会 主义核心价值观相通的内容”,且要“坚决抵御境外利用基督教对我进行渗透活动”。
王作安还表示,基督教要积极开展公益慈善事业,团结引导信教群众,为实现中国梦贡献力量。此前,在十八届中央候补委员中排名第二的王作安递 补成为中央委员。他还曾批判“人为造神”。
与此同时,在湖南,一些学生昨日身着汉服来到长沙太平街的圣诞活动现场,手举“抵制圣诞节”等标语,呼吁市民“回归中国传统节日,理性过 节”。一些标语还说,“别被一个苹果(指美国苹果品牌)收买”。
另外,西安的西北大学现代学院在圣诞期间出现“争做华夏优秀儿女,反对媚俗西方洋节”、“国人慎对圣诞节,走出文化集体无意识,挺立中国文 化主体性”等宣传标语。该校还在昨日晚间组织学生集体观看传统文化宣传片。
但这一举动也遭到了许多学生的反感。一些学生在微博上抱怨称,“别的学校学生都出去过平安夜,我们为啥要待在学校看宣传片?”连官方的《人 民日报》也在微博上说,“在多元时代,不妨少一些行政干预,让个人决定过不过圣诞!”

基督徒挑战

今年8月初,中国官方媒体《人民日报》称,目前中国的基督徒在2300万至4000万之间。不过,中外学界普遍认为这一数字并不准确。这其中,
            较为主流的数据认为,目前中国的基督徒和天主徒的总数在7000万至8000万之间。今年8月初,中国官方媒体《人民日报》称,目前中国的基督徒在2300万至4000万之间。不过,中外 学界普遍认为这一数字并不准确。这其中,较为主流的 数据认为,目前中国的基督徒和天主徒的总数在7000万至8000万之间。
与西方许多国家不同的是,圣诞节在中国从来不是公共假日。但即便如此,中国都市年轻人中却十分兴盛庆祝这一节日。圣诞节也备受中国商家的喜 爱。商家们说,每逢圣诞节,他们的销售额就会大幅上涨。
共产党自称是无宗教信仰的马克思主义政党。过去,中共对基督徒充满怀疑,比如在文革期间,当局将这一信仰与“颠覆国家”和“反革命”联系起 来。直到近几年,中国当局对基督教的管制才开始逐渐放松。
今年8月初,中国官方媒体《人民日报》称,目前中国的基督徒在2300万至4000万之间。不过,中外学界普遍认为这一数字并不准确。这其 中,较为主流的数据认为,目前中国的基督徒和天主徒的总数在7000万至8000万之间。
这一迅猛的增长,让许多虔诚的基督徒看到了希望。拿中国浙江省的温州市来说,一座高达55米的三江教堂成了近年来温州基督徒的骄傲,也让沿 海经济发达的浙江省获得了“中国耶路撒冷”的称号。
然而,今年以来,这里的基督徒却发现他们的信仰遭遇了外部危机。四月,浙江政府以“违反规划要求”拆除了三江教堂。《纽约时报》在今夏的一 篇报道中援引一份政府内部文件称,拆除教堂是限制基督教公众影响战略的一部分。

封校禁“圣诞节”有点“掩耳盗铃”


每年的圣诞节都会引起两方的争论。一边说:圣诞节能带来很多快乐和新奇的东西,同时还能促进消费,应该过;另一边说:不能一味地崇洋媚外,淡 漠自己的传统节日。日前,西北大学现代学院封校禁止学生过平安夜,引发争论。(12月25日《华商报》)

校方的初衷充满了善意,可以理解,但是,通过封校、处分等方式,强制学生与平安夜绝缘,有点掩耳盗铃,很值得商榷。

圣诞节在中国的兴起,折射出很多方面信息。首先,互联网将整个世界变成“地球村”,中国综合国力与日俱增,政治、经济、文化多方面融入世界, 同时也受其他国家一些事物和文化影响。其次,中国经济和社会发展成就显著,物质生活极大丰富,民众开始追求生活品质,消费理念深入人心。此 外,社会节奏加快,各种竞争加剧,民众工作和生活压力较大,大家渴望越来越多的节日放松。

现实中,圣诞节确实刺激消费,缓解压力,营造社会和谐氛围,民众尤其是年轻人热衷,无可厚非。一些学校禁止学生过圣诞节,既有侵犯私权之嫌, 也会变相加重学生对洋节的好奇和喜爱。以西北大学现代学院为例,封校,挡住了学生外出过圣诞节的脚步,但是阻挡不了学生内心的狂热。比如说, 大家可以通过短信、微信、QQ等即时聊天工具,互致圣诞快乐,或者在学校餐厅聚餐,这同样也是在过节。而这些方式,学校根本无法封堵。

此外,热衷过洋节,跟淡漠中国传统节日是两回事,不能混为一谈。通过封校等刚性手段,禁止大学生过圣诞节,强制他们观看传统文化宣传,这种填 鸭式的教育,不但会引发学生反感和舆情质疑,而且对增加学生对传统节日的逆反,结果和初衷背道而驰。

诚然,学校引导学生热爱和尊重传统文化和节日,很有意义和必要。但是,不能急于求成,要把功夫下在平常,比如说在端午、中秋等传统节日,引导 学生解读节日背后的历史文化,举办一些寓教于乐的活动,让学生们在欢声笑语中切身体会传统节日内涵和乐趣。此外,这也不是学校一己之力就能一 蹴而就的事,需要全社会集体参与,共同营造一种厚重的传统文化氛围。无论如何,厚此薄彼、掩耳盗铃之举,可以休矣。

基督教为何在中国兴起?


 
站在炎炎烈日下,目睹着十几台推土机在三江教堂的 墙垣间横冲直撞,戴先生(音译)感到莫大的悲伤和担心——既担心自己,也担心他的基督徒教友的未来。他说:“大批警察封锁道路和周围的山。他 们之前已经切断整个区域的供电,切断手机信号,试图阻止任何人靠近。”
 
 

戴先生假扮拆迁人员,成功越过外围由防暴警察组成的警戒圈,挤进半山腰的一群教徒中,目睹着庞大的教堂被强拆。“语言形 容不出这 场面有多让人心痛,”这位虔诚的基督徒说道。他从另一片教区赶来,加入到试图保卫这座教堂的教徒行列中。“我只是不住想到耶稣的话——‘他们 所作的,他们 不晓得’——他们没有意识到,但他们定会遭到神的审判。”

2014年4月28日,这座屹立于中国沿海城市温州市郊的新教大教堂被拆毁,标志着政府大张旗鼓地开始打压基督教这一在 中国发展 最快的宗教,而中国名义上是一个无神论国家。世界上人口最多的国家如今有大约1亿基督徒,多于拥有8670万党员的执政党——共产党。按照西 方的思想传 统,现代性理应带来世俗化,但在共产党执政的现代中国,伴随现代性出现的却是曾被贬为“人民的鸦片”、因而遭禁的各种宗教大举卷土重来。

或许最让人惊讶的是,既属于“外国”宗教、又与之前以炮舰和帝国主义为代表的时代存在紧密联系的基督教(尤其是新教教 派),在争 夺中国人心灵归宿的竞争中成为大赢家。按照目前的发展速度,中国很有可能在未来15年内成为全球基督徒最多的国家。中国的威权领导人既鄙视又 担心任何不受 自己直接控制的力量,对他们来说,这一看似不可阻挡的趋势非常令人不安。
温州三江教堂被拆毁,标志着政府遏制基督教崛起行动的开始。政府的行为包括骚扰和拘押教徒,拆除温州及浙江省各地的十字 架和教堂。左图为2014年4月28日的教堂,右图为一天之后的场景。

“到2030年,中国的基督教徒数量几乎肯定将超过世界上任何一个国家,共产党对此非常警惕,”普渡大学(Purdue University)宗教与中国社会研究中心主任杨凤岗表示,“中国官员经常援引波兰的经历,他们认为当年天主教会帮助推翻了波兰的共产党 统治。虽然两 国的国情并不真正具有可比性,但是党仍将基督教视为需要压制的严重威胁。”

4月份,政府无视数千名在三江教堂边上搭营抗议数周的当地基督徒,强行拆除了该教堂。这座教堂历时6年建成,成本约为 3000万 元人民币(合310万英镑),形似摩门教徒的礼拜堂,顶上是一个红色大十字架。它的拆除只用了不到一天。之后又有几座教堂被毁,整个温州乃至 浙江省各地多 达300座教堂上显眼的十字架也被当局强拆,有几次强拆发生在当局与教徒激烈对峙之后。数百人被短暂拘留,一些人至今仍然在押,面临通常被用 于惩罚政治异 见人士的含糊罪名。
基督教中国“殉难记”


温 州和浙江政府在公开场合声称,拆毁教堂和拆除十字架只是在执行有关城市规划和违章建筑的规定。但根据对数十名教徒、宗教学者、分析人士和地方官员 的采访, 以及英国《金融时报》看到的文件,很清楚拆毁三江教堂是一场持续一年的联合行动的开始,旨在遏制基督教在浙江省的发展。

对于担心这一“颠覆性”宗教传播的政府而言,基督教徒人数众多、在中国素有“东方耶路撒冷”之称的温州是个明显的靶子。 直到不久 以前,市区和周围农村林立的装饰华丽的大教堂和巨型的霓虹灯十字架是温州最引人注目的特色之一。当地教会团体估计,温州人口中至少有10% ——逾120万 人——经常参加新教礼拜活动。就像在中国其他地区一样,天主教徒人数少得多,但也有数十万。今年,天主教徒也被迫拆除十字架,受到骚扰,因为 “非法”礼拜 活动受到的监视和拘禁有所增加。

理论上,宗教自由得到中国宪法的保障,但在实践中,一切宗教组织必须获得政府的批准,其活动受到严格的管控和监视。访华 的外国客 人如果来到官方批准设立的教堂,首先便会注意到警方的监控摄像头,它们安装在教堂内的显眼位置,目的是监视从事礼拜活动的牧师和教徒。中国天 主教徒只被允 许参加中国天主教爱国会(Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association)控制的教会;中国天主教爱国会直接向共产党报告,不承认教皇,也不与梵蒂冈维持关系。中国新教徒理论上只能参加由官方的“三自爱 国教会”(Three Self Patriotic Movement)运行、不分宗派的新教教会。

政府声称中国只有约2300万名新教徒和天主教徒,但即便是负责编纂和公布这些数据的官员也承认,该数字对实际情况的低 估严重到 了荒谬的程度,捏造这样的数字主要是出于政治原因。参加官方“合法”教会的人数已经远远不止2300万人;不仅如此,中国还有数千万教徒参加 未经官方承认 或批准的地下“家庭教会”。这几万个地下教会(包括天主教和新教,但主要是新教教会)理论上是非法的,但往往得到地方官员的容忍,有时甚至被 允许公开活 动,前提是它们不公然“搞政治”。

中国许多较有吸引力的地下教会坚信“千禧年主义”(millenarian,即相信太平盛世终会到来——译者注)。殉难 以及国家 的迫害实际上让它们更加来劲;它们欢迎打压,视其为自己作出宗教牺牲的证明。这往往使得政府的镇压效果不佳,甚至适得其反。直到不久以前,浙 江省(尤其是 温州市)还被视为政府包容地下教会兴起的正面榜样。

“在很长一段时期里,温州对我们而言都是一个温和、包容的地方。温州人将基督教传遍全国各地是出了名的,”一家地下教会 的牧师表 示,该教会有8000多名教徒。他要求保密身份,因为当局曾警告,如果他接受国际媒体采访,将面临牢狱之灾。“直到不久以前,我们和政府之间 存在大量信任 和合作,家庭教会的礼拜人数总是远远多于官方(即政府批准的)教会。”

这位中年牧师和两位较年轻的男性教徒同意在一个深夜接受英国《金融时报》采访,地点是在温州远郊一条小巷的一间安全屋。 这间位于四楼的小公寓灯光明亮,墙上贴满了教会慈善项目的照片、圣歌的曲谱以及宗教圣像。一只大蟑螂爬上紧挨着卫生间的墙角。

两位年轻的教徒紧张地坐着,边剥边吃葵花籽,每当听到屋外传来脚步声,两人会轮流起身在门边听着。牧师本人开一辆新买的 小轿车,看起来与普通的中国商人无异,但口音浓重的普通话透露出的抑扬顿挫,表明他擅长于激励人心的讲道。

他介绍了独腿“苏格兰农民”传教士曹雅直(George Stott)将新教传到温州的历程。曹雅直1867年来到温州,一呆就是23年。英国循道公会传教士苏慧廉(William Edward Soothill)接手了曹雅直的工作,他1882年来到中国,在温州住了29年。苏慧廉的《论语》译本备受称赞,1920年回到英国后,被 任命为牛津大 学(Oxford University)中国语文教授。

19世纪末和20世纪初,数目渐增的温州教徒经历了历届政府的镇压和排外运动的压迫,但他们遭遇的最严峻考验是在信奉无 神论的共 产党1949年执政之后。1958年,浙江省和温州市被指定为消灭宗教试点地区,这场运动在1966至1976年血腥、混乱的文化大革命期间 达到顶峰。当 地基督教团体表示,即便是在“三自”官方教会被赋予清除新教任务的十年动乱期间,温州地下教会的教徒人数仍然增长十倍。在温州,许多人担心当 下拆除十字 架、拆毁教堂的行动是20世纪50年代政策的再现——浙江再次成为试点地区,为更大规模的宗教压迫行动铺路。
当前行动的直接负责人是浙江省委书记夏宝龙,据称他与中国国家主席习近平关系紧密。当地官员和数名自称知情的人士表示, 夏宝龙是 佛教徒,在个人层面对全省各地涌现的大教堂和十字架觉得反感。但数名研究中国宗教政策的专家表示,如果没有中央的明确批准,这样大规模的协同 行动绝不会被 允许发生。

该结论得到一个事实的支持:被拆的三江教堂并非由“非法”的地下教徒修建,而是官方的三自爱国运动的一个获得批准的分支 建造的。 “相当清楚的是,此次行动象征着全国层面的宗教政策开始发生重大变化,浙江和温州被选为试点,以观察国内外的反应,”傅希秋(Bob Fu)表示。傅希秋曾是中国的异见牧师,后来建立了总部位于德克萨斯州的基督教非营利组织对华援助协会(ChinaAid),该组织的宗旨是争取中国的宗 教自由。傅希秋称:“过去一年里全国各地有数千名教徒被拘押,我认为,这场打击基督教的运动在规模和蛮横程度上是文革之后未见的。”
英国《金融时报》数月以来多次试图与中国的中央和省级宗教管理部门交谈,但没有任何官员同意接受正式采访或对当前政策进 行澄清。

那么,是什么引发了这场旨在遏制基督教在华影响力上升的行动?浙江省运动发生的背景是一项覆盖范围更广的打压政策,自从 习近平主 席两年前掌权以来,该政策已导致数十名温和派知识分子和批评人士被羁押,各种形式的异见受到严厉压制。一些分析人士提到习近平高调弘扬“中国 人的”宗教和 传统,如佛教和儒学。他们表示,目前的反基督教运动与习近平对西方的怀疑有关,甚至可能与他暗地里也许信佛有关。习近平在被提拔至中国最高领 导层之前,曾 在浙江担任了5年的省委书记,这意味着浙江省的运动更不可能在未经他点头的情况下发生。

北京方面的意图不是镇压基督教乃至所有宗教——即便这确实是目标,也是不可能完成的任务——而是迟滞它的迅速兴起,置其 于更强的 控制之下。除了发展速度之外,党还非常关注皈依基督教的人群类型。20世纪80年代,在政府解除对宗教信仰的限制、整个国家在文革过后迎来复 兴之时,中国 的基督教徒主要是贫困、农村、未受教育的人士,而且多为女性和老年人。20世纪80年代末,中国基督教徒八成生活在贫困的农村地区。
如今,新信教者多数来自繁荣的城市,受教育程度和影响力日益增加,对个人自由和个人权利的要求越来越高。

而在放弃了空想共产主义和围绕毛泽东的个人崇拜之后,党在过去30年里也一直依靠这些中产阶层人士的支持。20世纪80 年代初, 党作出了痛苦的改变,从试图消灭宗教和古老文化,转向告诉人民“致富光荣”。如今,在经历了物欲横流和不平等加剧的几十年后,就连中国的高层 领导人也叹 息,现代中国社会充斥着犬儒主义和物质主义,缺乏理想和道德。

为了填补这种道德空白,习近平领导下的中共诉诸于旧方法和旧符号,煽起对日本和英国等昔日侵略者的民族主义仇恨,并且重 新搬出上 世纪60年代那套宣传套路。普通百姓再一次被铺天盖地的优秀共产党员形象包围,如不知疲倦的石油工人“铁人”王进喜,以及偷偷给战友们洗袜子 的模范战士雷 锋。但对于日益精明和世故的城镇中产阶层而言,这些灌输“传统”价值观的努力只能凸显出“中国特色社会主义”的官方意识形态多么空洞多么苍 白。这些英雄形 象让许多人注意到中国体制的矛盾——号称社会主义,却连提供基本的社会服务也有困难,而顶层被一小群积累了巨额个人财富的威权政治精英所垄 断。

楚延庆是中原家庭教会的牧师,该教会于2004年在北京郊外的一家酒店成立。它的24名成员多为政治活动人士,他们持续 受到当局 的监视和骚扰。楚延庆曾是1989年天安门广场民主运动的学生示威者,该运动最后遭到流血镇压。那段经历给他留下创伤,产生深深的幻灭感,最 终促使他在 2003年皈依新教。他和他的小教会正是中共最忌惮的组织有方的基督教徒政治活动分子。

他滔滔不绝地描述道,中国社会的瓦解,开启了他所称的基督教当下在中国的“黄金时代”。“中国比以前富有得多,大多数人 够吃够 穿,但没有精神上的营养;既然我们的物质需求得到了满足,我们便需要言论自由、人权以及文化和精神上的食粮,而基督教能提供这些,”楚延庆表 示,“事实 上,唯一能匹敌共产党权力的力量就是基督教,基督教是中国唯一的希望。”

基督教首次接触到中国是在公元7世纪,由信奉聂斯托利派(Nestorian)的东叙利亚教徒传入。罗马天主教教士13 世纪抵达 中国,14世纪初的北京(即元首都大都——译者注)甚至短暂出现过方济各会大主教。但大多数中国人、乃至大多数中国天主教徒认为,基督教正式 进入“天朝” 是在1601年,会说中文的意大利籍耶稣会会士利玛窦(Matteo Ricci)建立了长驻的传教团。
之后的100多年里,耶稣会传教士得到中国君主的容忍,甚至被请入皇宫,让他们与东道主分享西方的技术和艺术知识。但随 着18世纪末罗马天主教廷颁令禁止多项中国习俗,清朝皇帝宣布基督教为非法,对被发现在华传教者一律处死。

率先在中国传播新教的英国传教士马礼逊(Robert Morrison)于1807年抵达中国,开始学习中文,翻译《圣经》,而当时这两种行为均可被处死。马礼逊还兼任不列颠东印度公司的翻译,在日后的两次 鸦片战争和其他外国侵华战争中,这一点成为基督教和中国所受屈辱之间紧密联系的象征。在将香港等地割让给西方战胜国的“不平等条约”中,明确 列入了允许传 教士向中国人传教的条款。但即便有此相助,新教传教士仍然算不上特别成功。马礼逊在中国传教27年,仅仅说服25人皈依。到了1900年,历 经数千名传教 士将近一个世纪的努力,中国新教徒的人数也只有10万。

共产党1949年革命胜利时,中国有约80万名新教徒,人数远远少于大约300万名天主教徒,而当时中国人口为5.4亿 人。 2010年,皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)估计中国约有900万名天主教徒,逾5800万名新教徒。根据每年增长10%的保守估计,杨凤岗等人推测目前中国的基督徒总数已有1亿人左 右。在天主教徒人数增速慢得多的同时,新教教会(尤其是“非法”的家庭教会)在全国各地迅速蔓延,新教的发展速度甚至快于在中国占主导地位的 宗教——佛 教。

耶稣会会士、学者魏明德(Benoît Vermander)继承了利玛窦的传统,他是上海复旦大学哲学系的终身教授。他在谈及中国的“信仰市场”,以及新教为何能够成功满足这个市场的宗教信仰 需求时,听上去颇像个经济学家。

“新教在很大程度上是中国新的民众宗教。它迎合中国的仪式和社群传统,又使人感觉国际化,觉得自己是全球团体的一员,” 他表示, “天主教在更大程度上基于神职人员的权力,因此信徒对于发展团体的责任感较轻,而新教更具创业性质,它向信徒提供更多自由和权力,任何人都可 以创立教会团 体。”在地下活动的天主教团体需要与梵蒂冈教廷建立秘密联系,但新教徒只要拿着一本《圣经》便可以与别人一起创立自己的教会,这一概念与中国 公民社会及个 人赋权的兴起很相配。

王依林(音)是家里的第四代天主教徒,虽然只有16岁,但相貌和举止都老成得多。他的父亲是中共党员。尽管没有朋友或同 学是教 徒,但王依林表示,他们觉得他的天主教信仰很酷、富有异国情调。近期一个周日的下午,他独自去北京市中心一座装饰华丽、拥有百年历史的天主教 堂参加弥撒。 之后他表示,在一个秩序混乱、压力沉重的社会,天主教“让我的生活更有序,让我有规则可循,让我培养自控力”。

10分钟车程外是北京现存最古老的新教教堂,在这里,20岁的设计师韩闯(音)描述道,自己在一年前迁居中国首都之后, 重拾了身 为农民的外婆的新教信仰。“我小时候病重差点死掉,但我外婆拼命祈祷,结果我活了下来——我的外婆和母亲都是农民,她们相信这是奇迹,相信基 督教带来好 运、健康和好生意,”韩闯表示,“我搬到北京之后开始去教堂,我觉得,在混乱和腐败的现代社会,教会为人提供了一种道德根基,而且有助于培养 一种自尊 感。”韩闯和王依林均表示,他们认为天主教比新教更严格、更严肃,新教则更受欢迎,容易吸引那些家里没有信基督教传统的年轻人。新教的灵活性 也留下了充分 的个人解读空间。因此,不足为奇的是,中国许多非正统和极端宗教组织大多发端于富有感召力的地下新教教会边缘团体。

10月中旬,29岁的张帆及其父、55岁的张立冬被判处死刑,他们在华东某地的一家麦当劳(McDonald's)餐厅 残忍杀害 了一名女子,因为受害者拒绝与他们一起信奉“全能神”教。这一传播末日论、笃信千禧年主义的团体又称“东方闪电”,声称其数百万信徒均相信耶 稣已经回到世 上,化身一名中国女子,直到不久前还居住在中国中部。该团体还认为中共——即它所称的“大红龙”——是其死敌,告诉信徒他们的责任是搏斗并杀 死“魔鬼”。 今年5月,一则用手机拍摄的视频在网上流传,引发全国震惊。视频中,张氏父女和其他四人(包括一名12岁少年)用椅子和棍棒将受害女子殴打至 死,同时其他 顾客旁观或逃跑。作为回应,政府在全国范围开展针对“全能神”的镇压行动,在官方电视台上播出张立冬的画面。张立冬在电视上认罪,但辩称受害 女子是“恶 魔”,用超自然力量攻击自己,而他是在自卫。
中国政府2009年将14个邪教组织列入监视清单,其中12个均是

根据某种形式的基督教而创立。中国与一些神神秘秘的基 督教信仰 之间的关系漫长而又动荡,此类信仰容易在迷信、难以管束的内陆农村生根发芽。至今,太平天国(1850年诞生、1864年覆亡)叛乱仍是历史 上最血腥的内 战,超过2500万人被杀。
太平天国运动的创始人洪秀全是失意的知识分子,四考科举而不中。在一次赴考途中,洪秀全从一位美国传教士那里获得一本 《圣经》的 中译本。在压力和失落的折磨下,洪秀全精神崩溃,之后他灵光一现,认定自己其实是耶稣的弟弟,被派往世间创立“天国”,消灭当时统治中国的满 族“恶魔”。 在近20年的战争后,洪秀全和他的追随者终于被获得英法殖民军队帮助的清军击败。在巅峰时期,太平天国的疆域覆盖了中国南方的半数地区,定都 南方大城市南 京。中国现在的领导人对地下教会等群众宗教运动的忌惮,在一定程度上源自对太平天国屠杀的记忆。但奇怪的是,中共的官方立场对洪秀全及其追随 者抱着一种宽 容甚至浪漫的观点。

太平天国历史博物馆坐落在南京老城区一座典雅的传统中式宫殿内,四周为巧夺天工的古典园林,这座“爱国主义教育基地”表 述了党对 太平天国的官方定论。博物馆入口处是一座英雄般的洪秀全半身像,中英双语写成的铭文歌颂太平天国“英雄儿女……挺身而出,用鲜血和生命谱写了 伟大的反帝反 封建史诗。”展品将叛军描绘为共产党人的爱国主义先驱,以赞许的态度强调叛军并不认真的土改努力,尤其是他们对英国等“外国侵略者”的反感。 整个博物馆仅 有一处提及基督教和太平天国的宗教信仰,那是在后廊的一个小展区,这是令人愕然的历史修正主义行为。

在南京的另一边,在该市郊外一个新的工业区,世界最大的《圣经》印刷厂刚刚印制了它的第1.25亿本精装版《圣经》。在 巨大的厂 房中央,数百本为肯尼亚圣经协会(Bible Society of Kenya)印刷的《圣经》正从生产线下线,叠放在一起,旁边是中文版《天主教青年圣经》(Catholic Youth Bible)和《牛津英汉词典》(Oxford English-Chinese Dictionary)。

直到今天,世界各地(尤其是美国)的教会团体仍向教徒募捐,目的是购买《圣经》并偷运至蒙昧、异教的中国,他们认为《圣 经》在中国仍是禁书。他们中的大多数人并没有意识到,他们在国外购买的《圣经》很有可能是在南京的这座工厂印刷的。
该厂由全球组织——联合圣经公会(United Bible Society)和爱德基金会(Amity Foundation)合办,后者是中国首家以宗教信仰为基础并获得政府批准成立的非营利组织(NGO)。工厂的最大客户是政府控制的中国基督教协会 (China Christian Council),该协会向全国约5.7万座教堂提供补贴并发放《圣经》。爱德基金会副董事长邱仲辉解释了政府为何允许该厂在1987年成立,印刷在之前 几十年的共产党统治期间被查禁和焚毁的《圣经》。“如果中国教堂没有《圣经》,你能想象会冒出多少极端宗教组织吗?”他表示,“政府认识到它 不能阻止人们 信教,因此它宁可让人们获得《圣经》,信守基督教的主流教义。”

邱仲辉是新教在中国最受政治认可的代表。为了低调从事传教活动,爱德基金会全面与政府合作。它利用印刷业务利润和国内外 捐款,在 全国范围内开展从扶贫到环保等一系列慈善计划。在此过程中,它小心翼翼,不违反任何一项针对传教的政府禁令。“我们不会一手拿着面包,一手拿 着《圣经》, 因为我们不认为这是传播福音的有效手段,而且也是不允许的,”邱仲辉表示,“如果人们想知道我们为何帮助他们,那么我们可以告诉他们,这是因 为我们的信 仰。”

邱仲辉表示,作为基督徒,看到浙江省和温州市教堂和十字架被拆的图片让他不安。但在他所在的江苏省,政府和宗教管理部门 尚未改变政策,也没有动用邻省浙江那样比较高压的政策。

回到温州,一座已经长成的果园被移栽至近6个月前三江教堂屹立的地方。一位在果树间穿行的中年妇女指着泥地中露出的几块 砖头说: “过去这里是一座很大的建筑,几里外就能看到房顶的十字架。我听说这惹怒了官员,于是他们拆毁了它,还抹去了痕迹。”拆除行动甚至激怒了当地 的非教徒,他 们认为这是当地官员在省委书记心血来潮的授意下践踏法律的行为。

对浙江的基督徒和熟悉政府宗教政策的人士而言,这场行动的含义无疑不止于此——它是一个压制宗教的试点项目,如果当局认 为浙江取得了成功,它很有可能在别处复制。

但即使北京方面真的将反基督教斗争扩展至全国,它充其量只能指望中国成为世界第一大基督教国家的日子晚点到来。“目前的 打压以及 拆教堂、拆十字架、抓人入狱的行动,不会显著减慢信教者人数的增加,”普渡大学的杨凤岗表示,“如果说有什么作用的话,它实际上会为基督教在 中国的复兴火 上浇油。”

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Kurds Are “Fighting For America” Against Islamic State


The group known as the Islamic State, also often called by its former name, ISIS, (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), has established itself as the world’s largest, most ruthless and most successful terrorist organization. To achieve its goal, it has incorporated two of the Arab world’s most potent weapons: religion and oil.

And both Islam and oil are proving to be powerful weapons, even when confronted by the best technology in weaponry that money can buy. Religion is buying them recruits, and oil is buying weapons and providing the funds needed to maintain their war effort.

The group’s  construed form of Islam they profess to follow is far removed from the true meaning that Islam is meant to convey. As removed from reality as the group’s business practices, which include kidnapping and extortion.

Having consolidated some of the territory it captured, ISIS is now gearing up for a new round to begin as the air campaign aimed at crippling it continues. The terrorist group is at a crucial point today as it tries to demonstrate to its followers and potential recruits that it can face the full brunt of the joint aerial assault unleashed on its positions by the United States and its Arab and European allies, and continue to thrive.

And at the center of this war now lies a public relations battle; the battle for control of the town of Kobani. The outcome of this battle could very well end up shaping the future of the current Middle East conflict.

In a way Kobani represents a microcosm of the complexity that is the politics of the Middle East today. Allies are not what they used to be and neither are foes. The Middle East has always been an area of conflict, but in the past there seemed to have been some political guardrails. The balance that once existed through the pro-American countries and those supported by the former Soviet Union gave the region a certain amount of stability amid the generalized instability.
Today it seems as though the gloves have come off and everything is permissible.

Kobani, a small nondescript town close to the Turkish-Syrian border is at the very center of the cyclone. It is being defended by Iraqi Kurds, who have been promised support by the allies, which include Turkey. Except that one of the conditions put forward by Turkey to help the anti-ISIS coalition is not to give the Kurds too much help. Turkey has long faced issues with its own Kurdish population and has labelled the PKK, the Kurdish Worker’s Party, a terrorist organization.

 Despite more than a week of intensive aerial bombing by the U.S, Arab and European allies on ISIS positions around the town of Kobani,  it appears to have had little effect on the group’s ability to recruit more fighters.

U.S. officials seem to be split on the decision of how to proceed in Kobani.  The Kurds, who are fighting with their backs to the Turkish border – in other words with no escape – have managed to slow down the ISIS onslaught.

Some U.S. State Department officials, however, have said that they do not consider Kobani as “strategic.”

James Jeffrey, a former ambassador to Iraq, said it was a mistake for U.S. officials to suggest they didn't view Kobani as a critical fight.

"If we lose this thing, what message is this going to send to regimes in the region about American steadfastness?" Jeffrey asked. "What would compel American officials to say that publicly?"

He said Kurds are fighting hard in the city to keep it out of the hands of militants. "Those Kurds are fighting for America."
ISIS is in dire need of a victory, at least a public relations victory. It is no coincidence that the group is now aiming to surround Baghdad, and if they manage to reach even  the remote outskirts of the Iraqi capital it would be a huge victory.

Sunday, August 31, 2014

Islamic State Supporters Vow to 'Take Back' Spain


A photo of an Islamic State supporter
        holding the IS black flag of jihad in front of Aljafería Palace
        in Zaragoza. The image was tweeted on social media.
A photo of an Islamic State supporter holding the IS black flag of jihad in front of Aljafería Palace in Zaragoza. The image was tweeted on social media.
Radical Muslims in Spain have launched a social media campaign aimed at generating support for the jihadist group Islamic State [IS].
The campaign involves posters that include images of famous Spanish landmarks and monuments emblazoned with Arabic slogans such as, "We are all the Islamic State" and "Long Live the Islamic State."
One poster includes an image of the medieval Islamic Aljafería Palace in the Spanish city of Zaragoza and the black flag associated with the IS. Another uses an image of the famous La Concha beach in the Basque city of San Sebastián. Yet another includes an image of the statue of Jesus Christ on Monte Urgull in San Sebastián, with the Arabic words "Al-Andalus Country" instead of "Basque Country."

Al-Andalus is the Arabic name given to those parts of Spain, Portugal and France that were occupied by Muslim conquerors (also known as the Moors) from 711 to 1492. As the Basque Country is surrounded by mountains, however, the Moors never succeeded in occupying it.
The poster campaign comes after IS jihadists produced a video in which they vow to liberate al-Andalus from non-Muslims and make it part of their new Islamic Caliphate.
The video shows a jihadist speaking in Spanish with a heavy North African accent. He says:
"I say to the entire world as a warning: We are living under the Islamic flag, the Islamic caliphate. We will die for it until we liberate those occupied lands, from Jakarta to Andalusia. And I declare: Spain is the land of our forefathers and we are going to take it back with the power of Allah."
Radical Muslims (and many moderate Muslims) believe that all territories Muslims lost during the Christian Reconquista of Spain still belong to the realm of Islam. They claim that Islamic law gives them the right to return there and re-establish Muslim rule.
In recent years, the return of "occupied" Al-Andalus to the fold of Islam has become an obsession for Muslims of all stripes, and calls to reconquer al-Andalus have become more frequent and more strident.
Commenting on the latest video, Spain's Secretary of State for Security, Francisco Martínez, said Spanish police were remaining "vigilant" in the face of a "grave" jihadist threat.
Meanwhile, Moroccan authorities have warned Spanish police that some of the more than 3,000 Moroccan jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq are beginning to return home, and that many of them are likely to attempt to infiltrate the Spanish mainland via the North African Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.
The Moroccan Interior Minister, Mohamed Hassad, recently identified 1,221 Moroccan citizens who have joined jihadists groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as another 2,000 ethnic Moroccans who are citizens of other countries, including Spain.
Spanish and Moroccan counter-terrorism forces have stepped-up efforts to break up jihadist cells that have been proliferating in both countries.
On August 14, nine members of a recruitment cell for the IS were arrested in northern Morocco, not far from the North African Spanish exclave of Ceuta.
The arrests were made in the Moroccan cities of Fez, Tétouan and Fnideq, in what the Spanish Interior Ministry said was a joint intelligence operation between Moroccan and Spanish counter-terrorism police.
All the detainees are Moroccan citizens, several of whom made repeated trips to Ceuta to recruit jihadists and raise financial support for the IS.
"The jihadists recruited by the cell received instruction in weapons handling, assembly and placement of explosive devices and car theft, in order to participate in suicide terrorist attacks or to fight in conflict zones," a statement by the Spanish Interior Ministry reported.
Some of those recruited by the cell are believed to have participated in beheadings in Syria and Iraq. Police say they are also examining computers and data storage devices to determine if there were plans to carry out a terror attack on Moroccan soil.
On August 4, a 19-year-old Spanish woman and a 14-year-old Spanish girl were arrested in Melilla just days before they were due to join the jihad in Syria. They are first Spanish females to be prevented from becoming jihadists.
"Both were trying to cross the border to Morocco with the aim of contacting the network that would move them immediately to a conflict zone between Syria and Iraq," the Spanish Interior Ministry said in a statement.
The 19-year-old was released after surrendering her passport. The 14-year-old—who police say appeared "completely convinced" that she was doing the right thing by becoming a jihadist—is currently being held in a juvenile detention center where she has no access to the Internet. The girl's parents said she had recently become radicalized after spending time perusing jihadist websites.
In June, Spanish police in Madrid arrested ten individuals (eight Moroccans, one Argentine and one Bulgarian) on allegations that they were members of an international network that recruited jihadists for the IS.
The ringleader was a 47-year-old Moroccan national named Lahcen Ikassrien, who was arrested in Afghanistan in 2001, and released after three-and-a-half years in Guantánamo. In July 2005, the U.S. government handed him over to Spain, where he faced charges of cooperating with al-Qaeda. In October 2006, the Spanish High Court acquitted him on the grounds that no firm evidence existed of his ties to the terrorist group.
Ikassrien, who lives in Madrid, was part of a cell led by Abu Dahdah, a Syrian-born Spaniard sentenced to a 27-year prison term in Spain for his part in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and for being one of the founders of al-Qaeda in Spain. In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court reduced the Abu Dahdah's penalty to 12 years because it said that his participation in the 9/11 conspiracy was not proven. He was released in May 2013.
In May, Spanish police broke up a cell in Melilla that allegedly recruited 26 jihadists (24 Moroccans and 2 Spaniards) for al-Qaeda groups fighting in Libya and Mali. All six members of the cell are Spanish citizens. One of them, Benaissa Laghmouchi Baghdadi, is the first Spanish jihadist known to have returned from the fighting in Mali. Police say the cell used social media platforms such as "Sharia4Spain" to recruit jihadists.
"Clearly Spain forms part of the strategic objectives of global jihad," Fernández Díaz said on the eve of the anniversary. "We are not the only ones but we are in their sights."
In March, police in Spain and Morocco arrested seven suspected jihadists who belonged to cell operating in the southern Spanish city of Málaga. Four of the suspects were arrested in Spain and the other three in Morocco. Spanish officials said the cell was one of the largest of its kind in Europe and responsible for recruiting more jihadists than any other network discovered in Spain so far.
The suspected ringleader of the cell is a wheelchair-bound Spanish convert to Islam named Mustafa Maya Amaya. Maya, 51, was born in Brussels after his Spanish parents moved to Belgium in the 1960s to look for work there. After converting to Islam, he changed his given name from Rafael to Mustafa.
Police say Maya—who maintained close ties to jihadist cells in Belgium, France, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Syria—is suspected of recruiting dozens of volunteer jihadists on the Internet and, after a careful selection process, sending them to join terrorist organizations in the Middle East and North Africa.
The sting operation was conducted on March 14, just three days after Spain marked the 10th anniversary of the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people and wounded nearly 2,000. Since then, more than 470 suspected Islamic extremists have been arrested in Spain, according to Spanish Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz.