日本准备好大战中国　航母级护卫舰服役

日本海上自卫队最大的舰艇、直升机护卫舰「出云」號开始服役。

海上自卫队表 示「出云」號不具备能让战斗机等固定翼飞机起降的功能，因此並不属於航母。

日本海上自卫队最大的航母型护卫舰「出云」號，在横滨市JMU公司磯子船厂举行交接仪式。防卫省已在打造第2艘同型的「出 云」號航母型护卫舰，也將在明年3月前后投入使用。两艘「出云」號航母型护卫舰投入使用后，將大大提高日本的离岛防御能力，並具备远离日本本岛作战的 能 力。

部署在神奈川县横须贺海上自卫队基地、编號为「183」號舰的「出云」號，排水量1万9500吨，舰艇长度超过现役中最 大的轻型直升机航母「日向」號，有248公尺，可以搭载9架直升机。最大特 点是，舰面跑道前后贯通，事实上可以起降战斗机。

「出云」號的舰员为470人，另外有可以搭乘450人的长期居住设施，以及电子指挥室和手术室等设施，

有战斗机海上基地、燃油支援基地和海上救难基地等功能。

日本军事专家们称，日本已经预购的F35B型隱形战机可以直接在「出云」號上起降。因此，它虽然被称为护卫舰，事实上是一艘標准的航空母舰。
防卫相中谷元週日在防卫大学毕业礼上表示，中国国防费用连续5年增加10％以上，显示正急速强化军事力量，呼吁对中国军 队的动向提高警觉。

小日本由天到地勇斗伟大祖国

日介入抢生意‧中 国拒泰苛刻条件    争泰国铁路生变

中国媒体11日报道，由于日本介入抢生意，加上中国拒绝泰国提出的苛刻条件，原本已经是中国囊中物的泰国两条铁路发展计划出 现变数。

《中国青年报》报道，泰国首相巴育已经下令交通部长巴津与日本就泰国境内的两条新铁路线进行磋商，并于4月晚些时候向内阁提交报告。这两条线 路分别是：曼谷—彭世洛—清迈，线路长约700公里，日本建议泰国将此条线路规划为高铁；北碧—曼谷—亚兰，此条线路为普通铁路线。

巴津表示，因从昆明途经寮国修建到泰国的铁路线谈判失败，中国已经拒绝在上述铁路项目上投资。

但中国驻泰国大使馆在接受中国媒体采访时表示，中国拒绝投资泰国两条铁路的消息不实，新一轮中泰铁路谈判将于5月在昆明举行。从昆明途经寮国 到泰国的铁路线路谈判也未失败。

报道指，中国和日本角力泰国的铁路建设，显然让泰国等中南半岛国家受益。

日本海外铁路建设成本比中国高，但日本为了最终拿下泰国铁路建设的大单，不惜采用“政府开发援助”的方式向泰国铁路提供资金支持。此举必将给 日本政府财政带来一定的压力。这表明日本在围绕泰国铁路建设的竞争中，其策略已经超出经济领域，加入了明显的政治意味。

 

日本海上自卫队比中国海军强在哪

66岁的山内敏秀是日本海上自卫队前军官，官至一等海佐，指挥过海上自卫队精锐的潜艇部队，也被称为是日本了解中国海军“第一人”。

在东京见到精神矍铄的山内，他拿出自己写的一本关于中国海军和海事的书籍，如数家珍。

1988年，山内担任潜艇舰长，后来离开自卫队到防卫大学做教授。1994年，他在著名的青山学院大学国际政治系，认识了日本中国通天儿慧， 对方建议他研究中国方面，特别是研究中国海军的动向。

日本首相安倍晋三2012年12月再度执政，去年7月，安倍内阁做出变更宪法解释以行使集体自卫权的内阁决议，引起中国的警觉和不满。

在去年年底的大选中，安倍领导的自民党大获全胜，舆论认为，这给了安倍修改和平宪法的舞台。

其时，中国官方媒体指责安倍政府“准备发挥日本的防卫能力，旨在一环一环突破‘和平宪法’的限制，显示其妄图坐实扩军修宪的野心。”

孰强孰弱

日本自卫队最大的驱逐舰“出云”号直升机驱逐舰25日交付，正式开始服役。

那么，“日本海上自卫队与中国海军相比，强在哪儿？又弱在哪儿呢？”这是记者见到山内敏秀最想问的问题。

他说：“能不能用优秀我不清楚，但我很自信地说，我们在海上训练的时间至少比中国海军 长，我们在seamanship上还是比中国海军优秀。”

英语seamanship指的不仅是操船技术，而更多侧重航海的技术和经验， 山内认为，在这方面日本更具优势。

他说：“中国海军也在沿海训练，海军不是仅仅是操作舰船，而是无论在什么情况下，船要与海成为好朋友，完成作战的任务。”

山内对航海的认识是，无论海洋情况如何，即便有大风大浪、情况危险，他的潜艇或战舰也也能与大海“成为朋友”。

他说：“中国也在训练，但练习技术是不够，不管出现什么情况，你要征服大海来作战。

山内接着提到另一个英语单词“man-machine system”, 也就是人与机器的一体化，他认为， 只有“人与机器融为一体，才能发挥最大效力”，而日本在这方面也有优势。

他说：“海上自卫队的装备都是自己研发出来的，我们能更好地使用机器，长于别人的。很多东西都是通过我们自己的想法研发出来的，当然也有从美 国引进的，但哪怕是美国的东西，也像自己的东西一样，我们用得很熟练了。”

“进博物馆”

那么，日本就没有比中国海军弱的方面吗？

山内先是开玩笑地反问：“有弱的吗？”然后正面回答了这一问题。

他说，中国海军的优势在数量上，中国海军追求量，有数量密集的船，中国的海军的年鉴也谈到“有多少船舰”。

“虽然中国海军有数量上的优势，但是很多船舰得进博物馆了。”

山内言下之意是，中国海军舰艇的质量不高、技术落后。但他也提到，中国政府1990年代后，也开始在质和量这两方面追赶。

他说，中国海军“旅沪级”的051、052型驱逐舰还不错，但也是试用，能跟日本等先进 海军打的中国舰艇现在只有一种型号。

山内敏秀说，他对中国造船技术世界一流持有很大疑问。他说，中国买船的船主，在买自己造的船的时候，都是国际市场价格的70%的价格购买。日 本不一样，只要提出要求，日本就能很完全地按照你的意愿造出船来。

他说，日本造船技术，相当稳定，一直将“大和战舰”的精神传承到现在。

曾指挥潜水艇的山内自然对中国潜艇感兴趣。他说，中国建造了元级潜艇，集中了海军最强力量，所以水平高，能力非常好。但要量产、委托造船厂 造，一下子就不行了。因此，中国海军的造船产业，水平还能低。 

 

小日本欢庆变态节日, 不过我喜欢

日本欢庆“男根节” 抬巨型生殖器模型游行 当众亲吻男根

地时间2015年4月6日，日本川崎，当地民众庆祝神道生育节到来，人们抬着粉色的巨型男性生殖器的模型 游行。在这个节日里，人们膜拜男性生殖器的图腾，祈祷神明能给自己带来好运气，并保佑自己的生育能力。

 

小日本应当要求美帝的东京大屠杀道歉 !

二战结束前美军向东京实施大规模轰炸的空袭行动周二（3月 10）满70周年。东京都慰灵协会当天在东京墨田区的东京都慰灵堂举行日本称为“东京大空袭”70周年追悼法事“春季慰灵大法要”，首相安倍 晋三、天皇次子秋筱宫王子和王妃等政府和皇室成员，以及约600名遗属出席了法事。

安 倍致辞时说：“我们向和平宣誓，谦虚地面对过去、把惨痛的战争教训铭刻在心，为了世界永久和平作最大限度贡献”，然后他上了香、合掌哀悼。

东京周二还有多处其它的悼念活动。70 年前的3月10日凌晨，美军约300架B29轰炸机在东京墨田区等平民区投下约1700吨炸药，造 成估计10万人死亡、4万人受伤来促使日本投降。战后东京 都在墨田区设立了为东京大空袭和1923年关东大地震死亡者的慰灵堂，供奉了约16万3千名不明身份死难者的骨灰。

2000噸燃燒彈、10萬具焦屍

不是在廣島與長崎，而是在東京；不是原子彈，而是燃燒彈；然而同樣恐怖，同樣悲慘。70年前的3月10日，日本第一大城、首都東京化為人 間煉獄。1945年，第二次世界大戰的最後一年，3月9日深夜，美軍334架B-29超級堡壘戰略轟炸機（B-29 Super fortress）從馬里亞納群島（Mariana Islands）出發，展開「會議室行動」（Operation Meetinghouse）。

10日淩晨時分，279架B-29飛臨東京上空，從610到760公尺的高度，投擲大量500磅（230公斤）的E-46集束炸彈 （cluster bomb），每一枚帶有38顆M-69燃燒彈（M-69 incendiary），也就是「凝固汽油彈」（napalm）。美軍總共投了多少燃燒彈？超過2000噸。

空襲開始兩個小時，東京的消防能力全毀。第一批B-29鎖定東京的江東區與中央區，以熊熊烈火在地面畫出一個「Ｘ」，讓後續的B-29瞄 準。強風為大火助陣，東京旋即被烽火爆（firestorm）吞噬，4090公頃（東京的1/4）土地化為火海，10萬5400人化為焦 屍，上百萬人無家可歸。大火之後的清理工作進行了25天。

 

小日本人是世界上最淫贱

 

日本为何未禁绝描写未成年人色情的漫画？

去年6月，日本收紧法例，禁止藏有侵犯儿童的真实影像，是经济合作与发展组织（OECD）中最后一个将藏有这类影像列入违法的成员国。 日本漫画和动画举世闻名，也是一项庞大的文化产业，不过其中有些 内容 却令人咋舌——在明显有性意味的场面中出现少年儿童。为什么日本还没有禁止这类素材？
那是个周日的下午，东京一个叫“Sunshine Creation（阳光创作）”的地方正热火朝天。数以千计的漫画迷（大多数是男性）挤在一个展览中心，埋头在各摊位展销的一大堆漫画杂志当中。
很多海报上都是长着精灵面孔、眼神如小兔子一般的漫画少女，而且当中很多衣不蔽体，身材却又曼妙得不可思议。这些海报令一个偌大的会场 变成 了一个色彩斑斓的庙会。
“这一区主要是卖性爱作品的”，活动的组织者之一秀（Hide）说。
我们停在一个展位前，上面展出的漫画封面是两个没有穿上衣的女孩。在我看来，她们的样子像是10岁多一点。

其 他好几个展位都是卖类似的东西。在英国、

澳大利亚或者加拿加这样的国家，这些东西绝对会引起争议，甚至根本不合法，但在这里，却是小菜一 碟。 “人人都知道侵犯儿童不是好事”，秀说，“但是有那样的一种情感却是自由，沉浸在跟一个小孩的性爱场面幻想中并没有被禁止。”
他 的直接吓了我一跳。然后，他教了我一个词：“萝莉控（Lolicon）”，它来源于“Lolita complex（洛丽塔情结）”。这个词指的就是这种描述有少女出现在明显带有性意味场面中的漫画。它可以联系到乱伦、强奸以及其他禁忌性话题，只不过秀 个人的趣味更多是高中的爱情故事。
“我喜欢描述年轻少女的性作品，‘萝莉控’只不过是我众多嗜好的一个而已”，他说。
他妻子就站在旁边，我问她，怎么看待他的“嗜好”。
他抢答说：“她应该觉得没有问题，因为她自己喜欢少男和少男之间的性互动。”
在日本年销售额大约360亿美元的漫画产业中，这样的内容只是极小的一部分，但是它却引起了很高的关注和很多的争议。
2014年6月，日本国会表决通过一项禁令，禁止藏有娈童的真实影像。这类影像的生产和发行自1999年起就已经被列入违法，但日本是 经济 合作与发展组织（OECD）中最后一个将藏有这类影像列入违法的成员国。
当时还有声音呼吁，将出现未成年人角色的“虚拟”——漫画、动画以及电玩等——性爱影像也列入违法。然而在多番辩论之后，日本国会决定 不通 过。这个决定遭到了保护儿童倡导者以及非政府组织的抨击，尤其是在日本以外。
要理解这件事，其中一个线索是秀在我们初次见面一分钟后就能如此津津乐道地跟我谈论他的“嗜好”。虽然这些描绘少年儿童的漫画的确引来 了某 种社会公愤，但是与青春期少年有关的性题材，在这里是一种算得上主流的趣味。
日本的法律制定者看起来并不愿意将数量巨大的漫画迷——可能以百万计——划入违法的类别。
像秀这样的漫画迷辩称，他们只不过是享受一种无害的幻想。他表示，没有儿童模特或者演员参与其中，所以“创作性题材的漫画并没有侵犯儿 童”。
漫画迷（大多数是男性）挤在一个展览中心，埋头在各摊位展销的一大堆漫 画杂志当中。 在英国、澳大利亚或者加拿加这样的国家，儿童色情漫画绝对会引起争议， 甚至根本不合法，但在日本，却是 小菜一碟。 、
但是，幻想与现实之间的界线是否总是那么清晰？
东京秋叶原是漫画界的圣地。在这里，霓虹灯标志和嘈杂的流行音乐会令你的耳目吃不消。街上满是楼高数层的书店，出售太阳底下一切题材的 漫 画。
在他们仅对18岁以上人士开放的成人专区，不难找到像“Junior Rape（幼奸）”或者“Japanese Pre-teen Suite（日本少女套房）”之类的漫画标题。
“人们受某些东西刺激而兴奋，然后就变成习惯了”，一家成人店售货员说，“所以他们总是要找些新鲜的东西，并且被年少、未成熟的女性挑 起性 趣。”
批评者们担心的正是这个——即使在创作性爱漫画的过程中没有人受到伤害，但这种东西却可能被正常化，从而促使或者导致性侵犯风险的增 加。
没有人知道事实是不是这样——这方面的调查尚未有结论。但是，很多日本人，特别是女性，还有更大的担忧。他们将这类影像看作是社会的一 部 分，这个社会正在对极端的色情影像（这些作品还常常贬低女性）以及年轻人的“性化”（sexualisation）视而不见。

日本作家LiLy说，在她上学的时候，男人会走近她和她的朋 友 们，提出用钱换她们的袜子和裤子。 漫画翻译家和言论自由倡议人兼光丹尼尔真表示不喜欢儿童色情漫画，但又 说，“但是如果你给一些人权力去 监管别人可能会做或者别人想什么，那就是思想监管。” 在日本，你很容易能发现一种对青春少年的着迷。少女流行组合会对着一群成年男性表演，而从漫画标题板到广告，女学生的影像随处可见。
LiLy是一个流行作家，创作关于年轻女性的作品——她说那是东京风的“色欲都市”。她告诉我，在她上学的时候，男人会走近她和她的朋 友 们，提出用钱换她们的袜子和裤子。
“我觉得那很恶心，非常猥琐”，她说，还认为，对青春年少年的着迷“完全就是源自男人对权力的渴望，他们受不了坚强独立的女人”。
LiLy的父母那一代的家庭模式，在今天的日本仍然占主导地位——一个负责挣钱的父亲，和一个留在家里当主妇的母亲。不过，日本经济的 疲弱 已经令男人很难实现这一切。
“或许有些人在事业上不成功，于是他们就栽进‘萝莉控’漫画的幻想中。”
“我讨厌这个，真的讨厌。我希望日本把这些变态都赶走，让少年儿童远离这种性变态，甚至连幻想都不可以。”
但是，对于政府应该如何界定何为“好”或者“合适”的标准，以及如何执行这种标准，还有政府应该介入到什么程度，另一些人却是持怀疑态 度，
“批评很有道理，这没有问题”，漫画翻译家和言论自由倡议人兼光丹尼尔真（Dan Kanemitsu）说，“但是如果你给一些人权力去监管别人可能会做或者别人想什么，那就是思想监管。”
那么，他会为那些画少年儿童以及有强奸、乱伦这些禁忌的漫画创作者维权吗？
“我对这种东西并不感到舒服，但告诉人们应该想什么或者与别人分享什么，并不是我的权力”，他说，“只要它不侵犯人权，有一套幻想生活 又有 什么问题？”
保护儿童倡议人金尻和奈（Kazuna Kanajiri）则认为，有些问题比动漫更严重。
她带我去了秋叶原一家楼上漫画店，其中一个房间里放满了DVD。她从架子上抽下来一张，上面是一个小女孩，川尻和奈说她只有五岁。小女 孩穿 着一件尺码偏小的泳衣，模仿着成人色情电影，摆出有性意味的姿势。那家店里的其他DVD里面，全是真实的小孩。
“我觉得这些小孩好可怜”，川尻和奈说。
这些所谓的“少年偶像”DVD，在1999年儿童色情作品被列为非法之后，变得流行起来。只要小孩的性器官被挡住，它们就能够躲过法律 的监 管。不过川尻和奈说，去年6月相关法律收紧之后，这些作品也变成违法了。
“违法的人应该得到相应的惩罚”，她说，“这完全是非法的，但警察还没有采取措施。”
这些产品或许引起很多关注，但一些倡仪者表示，他们目前还是集中精力于保护真正的孩子上面。
但川尻和奈告诉我，她还没有放弃希望，令这些漫画和动画将来完全被禁。
“我想让它们消失”，她说，“到2020年奥运会在日本举行之前，我们要使日本不再被人称作是一个变态国家。”
很多漫画迷或许会反对这样的说法。但随着奥运会临近，外界的目光将会转向日本，这将令日本动漫界备受压力，它们要令动漫文化展现一个 “很酷 的日本”，而不是“变态的日本”。

日本的未成年人色情制品：

• 日本在1999年将制作和发行未成年人色情音像制品列入违法—— 比英 国晚21年；
• 2013年，美国国务院将日本形容为“儿童色情制品制作交易的国 际基 地”；
• 日本警方在2013年共报告1644宗儿童色情制品违法案件，为 1999年立法以来最多的一年；
• 2014年，日本禁止藏有真实儿童色情影像，人们有一年时间清理 他们 藏有的此类制品。

 

小日本 Unfriend" 伟大祖国

 

 

日本人对华感情再 恶化 日本内阁府周六（12月20日）傍晚发表的今年《外交舆论调查》说明，日本人被访者 对中国和韩国“没亲近感”的比率都刷新有统计以来的最高记录。 其 中 “对中国没亲近感”的被访者有83.1%，比去年增加2.4%；“有亲近感”和“算是有亲近感”的被访者合计为14.8%。 “对韩国没亲近感”和“算是没亲近感”的被访者合计有66.4%，比去年增加8.4%%，虽然感情恶化幅度比对中国更大，但“有亲近感” 的被 访者仍有31.5%。 40年的调查 内阁府1975年开始每年实施《外交舆论调查》，通常在12月前后发表结果。今 年的 调查在10月16日至26日期间实施，调查对象是3000名20岁以上的成年人，结果得到6成人答复。 日本外务省周六承认调查结果“反映了调查期间国民的感情”，而立场亲中的大报《朝日新闻》则强调“调查后的11月日本首相安倍晋三与中国 国家 主席习近平举行了时隔两年半的会谈”。 不过在日本，习近平与安倍11月握手时的态度看来并不会增加日本国民对中国的好感，BBC记者一个多月来在日本听到对习安会的评论，无论 是公 开还是私下、无论是研究中国的专家还是升斗市民的反应全是负面。 不难想像，如果调查在习安会后实施，结果可能更糟。 恶感的由来 内阁府的《外交舆论调查》显示日本人被访者对中国显著没亲近感是从2008年开始。 当年中国石家庄天洋食品厂出口日本的冷冻水饺含毒的事件发生后，中国公安部与河北省政府再三在记者会上指责投毒地点在日本，否认日本警方 的调 查结果。 后来因同样产品在中国也发生中毒事件，中国才破案并逮捕了投毒者，但日本对中国 的处 事方式印象已坏。 此后该调查随着中国反日示威中愤青的打砸行为、因中国国内发生毒奶粉等毒案、因中国政府在海洋主权争端中的行动，日本人“对中国没亲近 感”的 恶化趋势，几乎每年刷新记录。 今年9月中国英文《中国日报》与日本“言论NPO”组织宣布每年分别在两国做的民意调查结果，说明日本对中国印象不佳的被访者刷新了 93%的 最高记录，当时该调查还公布了理由，其中最多的理由是“中国不遵守国际规则”。 周六内阁府公布的调查结果虽说并不出人意料，但主流日媒还是广泛报道。 Click here to Reply or Forward 1.46 GB (9%) of 15 GB used Manage ©2014 Google - Terms - Privacy Last account activity: 35 minutes ago Details

Shinzo Abe’s Critics Are Wrong: ‘Abenomics’ Has Been A Huge Success In Japan

Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s critics have their knives out today: the Japanese prime minister has called a snap election for the country’s lower house.

The decision comes pretty much straight after some dreadful GDP figures for Japan. So there’s been no shortage of people declaring that Abenomics has failed. 
Here’s why they’re wrong. For one thing, people seem to forget that unemployment in Japan is only 3.6%, 0.1 percentage points from a 16-year low. That doesn’t exactly scream “recession”. In the UK and the US it’s around 6%, and in Europe it’s above 10%. On that metric, the West can only dream of the Japanese level of “failure”. (More on that later.)

Forecasts for the Japanese economy in Q3 were absolutely awful, as the Financial Times’ Ben McLannahan noted. Even the most bearish forecasters missed the drop by miles. Japan’s sales tax was raised from 5% to 8% this April, and wasn’t expected to have such a debilitating effect on the economy,
However, one group did get it pretty much bang on. Now-Casting, developed by Lucrezia Reichlin at the London School of Economics, called the slump. And they see a “dramatic improvement” on the way in November and December. The effects of the tax hike won’t last forever, and the Bank of Japan jump-started its already large QE programme at the end of October. 
It’s also big mistake to think that the sales tax hike was an important part of Abe’s overall plan. The tax hikes were planned under former prime minister Yoshihiko Noda, and passed as a cross-party move. In Abe’s first five quarters, before the tax rise came into effect, average quarterly growth was 3.26% annualised. That’s strong, especially for Japan, where an ageing population makes the natural rate of growth pretty slow.

BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, Cabinet Office

Abe deliberated over whether to delay or scrap the increases, and ultimately it looks like he made the wrong decision. But the plan for the second part of the hike is out of the window for at least 18 months, so long as Abe wins the election. Fudging your recovery and changing course is better than not having a plan for recovery.
The most important part of Abenomics was always about raising Japanese inflation and ending the country’s deflationary decades. So far, it has done pretty well. Inflation (after stripping out the tax increase) has been at or above 1% for more than a year now. It’s slipped a little since the summer, but it’s still way above what he inherited. Japan hasn’t had another period of year-long inflation over 1% in the 21st century. 

Here’s what inflation markets expect two and five years ahead: 

Bank of Japan

Why is that important? Japan’s lack of any inflation has kept the economy nominally the same size or shrinking for decades. This means that economic growth and inflation combined have not been enough to raise the amount of money in the economy (in terms of yen), so public debt grows and grows in comparison to the size of the economy: debt was 100% of GDP in the late 1990s. It’s now an eye-watering 227%.

The Bank of Japan’s (so far) credible promise to raise inflation to 2% and keep it there is the absolute crux of Abe’s plan. Matt O’Brien offered a great explanation just before Abe’s election of why Japan needs more inflation (or rather, more nominal economic growth).

Another common criticism is that Japan’s wage growth has been low: that’s undoubtedly true, but it’s rising as unemployment falls (and forces employers to hike wages in an effort to hold onto their staff). Wages are rising at the fastest pace in six years (with the first growth for small firms since the financial crisis), an effect that should be even more obvious as the temporary effects of the sales tax increase cool:

Daiwa Capital Markets Europe, MIC

The incredibly low unemployment referenced earlier should also help this: as the pool of unemployed workers falls, and employees become more confident in quitting and moving jobs, employers are forced to raise wages to keep hold of their staff.

There’s one element on which the Abenomics programme can be criticised: the ‘third arrow’ of structural reforms has undoubtedly been slow. The government has undoubtedly made some slow achievements, but in reality elements like raising the female participation rate will take years and decades to achieve: it’s a little far-fetched to suggest that they have failed less than two years after the programme began.  

In short, in the only major areas on which Abenomics can be reasonably judged so far, it’s doing well. Reform could be pushed through the pipeline a little quicker (though this is true just about everywhere), and Abe deserves at least a smidgen of credit for going back to Japan’s electorate to scrap a stupid set of plans that he inherited. In the years to come, people may feel less sure that judging Abenomics on the back of a couple of quarters was wise.

The Border Disputes That Could Tear Asia Apart

As the US makes a military and strategic “pivot to Asia,” it is entering a highly complex and fluid geopolitical environment.

China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea have become a major point of contention in the region and maybe even a source of future violent conflict — and the rising superpower is far from the only country in the area with conflicts on its borders.

This map shows that the borders in Asia aren’t nearly as fixed as they might seem. China and India, the two most populous countries in the world, have a number of simmering boundary disputes. So do regional powers like Russia and Japan, along with more peripheral players in central Asia and the South China Sea.

日本1/7住房空置成“鬼屋”



Yoko Irie常来清扫这栋房屋外人行道上秋天的落叶。不过，

过去四年里，她都不曾在这屋里住过，也没有其他人在这住过。
相比之下，其他的屋主就没有这么考虑周到了——他们甚至可能已不在人世。目前，日本大地上散布着逾800万户无人居住的空置房屋。部分房屋已被弃 置，部分由于荒废而长满杂草。也有部分房屋则像61岁的Irie女士的房子一样，处于精心打理之下，配备着地暖和榻榻米房间。
在日本，大约七分之一的房屋是空无一人的“鬼屋”。这一方面反映了人口的减少，另一方面则反映了被一位分析师称为是一种“房子坏了就盖新的”心 理。2008年，日本人口达到顶峰，并在此后一路下滑。由于日本的生育率是平均每位妇女只生养1.4名子女，移民所占比例也极低，这种人口减少的 态势不太可能出现逆转。
根据野村综合研究所(Nomura Research Institute)房地产部门Wataru Sakakibara的说法，上世纪80年代，典型的日本房屋都是木质结构，设计寿命大约是30年。2000年以后，日本房屋的设计寿命增加了不止一倍， 达到大约70年。不过，相对欧洲标准来说，这也只是一眨眼的功夫。
他说：“考虑到多发的地震，日本人并不打算把房子的年限做得太长。相反，人们有一种‘房子坏了就盖新的’心理。”
全球其他国家主要把精力放在建造更多房屋容纳更多人口上，而日本面临的却是如何填满（或拆除）现存房屋的问题。日本政府估计，如果不采取任何措 施，到2050年，20%的居民区将成为鬼城。而根据野村证券(Nomura)的估计，到2023年五分之一的房屋将会空置。
Sakakibara表示，要避免这个问题，日本必须克服诸多体制性障碍。对于房主来说，拆掉旧房成本高昂——估计花费在50万日元到100万日 元之间（合4670美元到9340美元）。此外，这么做还会让屋主的土地税猛涨五倍。
根据一项在日本人口增长时期制定的政策，如果屋主建造房屋，按土地征收的固定资产税将会降低。到目前为止，曾有人多次试图逆转这一政策，都没有取 得成功。
这部分解释了日本房地产经济的反常。日本曾以全球最昂贵的房地产价格而自豪。然而自1992年的峰值过后，日本房价进入了或快或慢地下跌状态。住 房本身已成为一种迅速贬值的资产：据Sakakibara计算，只要20年，物业的价值就跌得只剩土地价值了。
因此，以日本政府公开数据的最近一年来看，2008年日本购房交易中只有13.5%的交易出自二手市场。相比之下，2009年美国这一比例是 90%，2010年英国这一比例是84%。二手房占比偏低的同时，新的住房和公寓不断还在不断被修建。

日本将迈向军国主义？

中国社科院世界经济与政治研究所战略研究室主任 薛力

Everything you have been reading in the local Chinese newspapers is nothing but about Japan's militarism as if Japan is definitely going to attack, invade and recolonize Asia. Not one of the writers say anything that Japan as the world's top 3 most powerful economy and a normal country as like any others need a strong military to protect their country (especially from China) . Of course the as ever China ass licking Chinese media say nothing about China's military adventurism or how many wars China had gone in after WW2.  

In every country, there are always the right and left wings(including China - Mao is extreme left, Deng is right/ USA has the right wing Neo-cons and Tea Party, the lefts have the Inconvenient Truth guy)

安倍内阁7月1日决定修改宪法解释以解禁集体自卫权，

这一政策变化在外界的预料中。由于干系重大，有些媒体将之解释为“历史性的转折”。因此，饱 受日本侵略之苦的国家（尤其是中国、韩国、朝鲜），有充分的理由想知道：这 是否构成着日本迈向“正常国家”的重要一步？照此发展下去，日本是 否将迎来军国主义的复兴？
对于第一个问题，我们的回答是：毫无疑义；对于第二个问题，我们的回答是：可能性甚微。
其实，日本走向“正常国家”的历程很正常。
战败国谋求恢复正常国家地位乃普遍现象，其中国防部的重设与军队的重建是重要标志。就二战战败国而言，意大利因为投降早，1945年居然成了战胜 国，自然有了国防部，组建的武装部队包括陆军、空军、海军与宪兵，多次参加国际维护行动并发挥领导作用，如2007年领导驻黎巴嫩维和部队。联邦 德国则在1955年恢复了国防部并组建了联邦国防军。1994年联邦宪法法院裁定国防军的防卫行动不限于德国境内。2003年德国与荷兰联手接过 了驻阿富汗国际安全部队的指挥权。
日本2007年1月把防卫厅升格为防卫省，自卫队还没有改名（未来改名的可能性很大），其在维和行动中的作用限于为盟国供油、提供运输工具、负责 裁军复员等。2013年底首次为韩国维和部队提供子弹并因此遭到批评。
战后的日本表现为奇怪的二重性：一方面拒绝对二战进行全面而彻底的反省以赢得其侵略受害国的谅解；另一方面则强调战争给日本带来的各种危害与灾 难，尤其强调自己的“原爆”唯一受害国身份，因而强调和平、不战。美国出于冷战的需要要求德国与日本均重整军备。与德国总理阿登纳的做法不同，时 任日本首相吉田茂审时度势，对此加以拒绝，确立了“安全上依靠美国、集中力量发展经济”的吉田路线，这一路线因为“吉田学校”的众多学生而得以长 期执行。
随着冷战的结束，小泽一郎在1990年代提出了“正常国家论”。由于“五五体制”终结后的政局变幻，以及经济上经历“失去的二十年”，“国家正常 化”进展缓慢。但是，“实现国家正常化”已经成为大部分日本政治家的共识，差别在于实现正常化的途径与时机。
小泉五年多的执政为日本经济结构调整打下了一定的基础，他迎合日本因为少子高龄化等原因导致的社会整体右倾保守化趋势，试图以“靠拢美国疏远中 国”的方式推进“正常化”进程，参拜靖国神社就是这一路线的集中表现。但他2006年9月出乎意料地自我结束了政治生涯，并选择安倍晋三为接班 人。
安倍虽然实现了从防卫厅到防卫省的升格，但自民党的弱势地位与随后民主党的崛起打断了这一进程。民主党外交上的摇摆与内政上的无所作为兼失误让老 百姓倍感失望，从而给了自民党东山再起的良机。2012年12月挟高民意支持率第二次上台的安倍因而有本钱展示：“我这次不一样了”。安倍经济学 的三支箭虽然此前只射出两支（为了强化其改革，最近才提出新的“第三支箭”议程），客观上还是产生了一些效果。2013年7月的参议院选举验证了 这一点：执政联盟虽然没能获得三分之二的多数，但席位过半，改变了“扭曲国会”，显示执政联盟依然有过半民意的支持。这给了安倍进一步推进“正常 化”的动力。因而在9月份提出“积极和平主义”，12月底为韩国维和部队提供子弹。进入2014年，基于修改宪法第九条的民意基础尚不具备，他改 变操作方式，一方面希图修改宪法第九十六条以降低修宪门槛，另一方面则通过修改宪法解释来解禁集体自卫权，并在6月底实现了对公明党的说服工作。
可以预期，在社会整体保守化的趋势下，政权相对稳固的安倍政府，会继续把中国的崛起描绘成对日本的威胁，以此作为推进“国家正常化”的一大动力。 实力相对下降的美国在东亚奉行“再平衡”战略，乐见日本在安全问题上发挥更大作用，从而成为安倍推行其“正常化”政策的另一动力。
那么，又怎么证明整体保守化的日本，在变成“正常国家”后，不会走上二战时期的军国主义老路？
军国主义大致上可以定义为：把国家置于军事控制下，使政治、经济、教育等各个方面均服务于扩军备战和对外战争的思想和政治制度。换言之，军国主义 要求做到，一个国家的意识形态、国家制度、国家行为等方面都贯穿“以武力实现国家政策目标”。而国际环境、国家制度设计、民众意识等方面都阻止日 本再度变成军国主义国家。
国际环境方面，核武器有助于防止主要大国之间爆发全面战争；北约与美日同盟是美国保持世界领导地位的两大军事支柱，美国不会允许日本摆脱同盟关系 进而成为对自己构成重大威胁的国家。美日同盟的功能包括支持日本与约束日本两个方面。
国内方面，国际经济合作让日本实现了二战时通过军事手段未能实现的目标：源源不断获得原料，产品与投资进入外国市场，等等。天皇虚位制、三权分立 制度、文官制度等则从制度上防止日本恢复为二战时的军国主义国家。
民众意识是很重要的一点。大部分的日本问题研究者与观察家大概会同意：日本的军国主义教育制度已经被铲除；二战后的日本，和平主义深入人心，日本 人现在津津乐道的一点是，二战后日本自卫队迄今没有因为战争原因死亡一个人；日本政府拒绝像德国那样反思二战侵略罪行的原因有多重，但这不意味着 日本人依然好战如昔；日本的和平宪法是在美国主导下制定的，但反对修改和平宪法的力量主要来自日本国内而不是美国。
按照日本官方的解释，解禁集体自卫权只是规定，与日本关系密切的国家遭到武力攻击、从根本上对日本国民的生命和权利形成明确危险的情况下，允许日 本行使“必要最小限度”的武力。也就是说，以前日本只能在遭受侵略时予以反击，现在可以在自身未遭受侵略时动用武力。这离向海外派遣作战部队还有 一段距离。像意大利那样领导维和部队是下一步的事情，像德国那样领导国际安全部队则是下两步的事情。
至于日本以武力侵略他国（比如韩国与朝鲜），很难想象会获得日本国民的支持，也会因为违反时代特征而难以获得其盟友美国的支持。
也许世界战争难以杜绝，但中国现在可以有把握地说：不怕任何国家来侵略。这对于经历百年屈辱的中国来说，具有特殊的重要性。因此，外交部发言人洪 磊7月1日下午在记者招待会上也只是说：日本方面应切实尊重亚洲邻国的合理关切，谨慎处理有关问题，不得损害中国国家主权和安全，不得损害地区的 和平稳定。其间透露出来的信息是：对于日本的这一变化，中国注意到了，但不紧张。

Why Japan’s Smaller Military Could Whack China's

A Japanese F-15.

China’s soaring military spending — up 12.3% this year — and aggressive gestures in the region could be setting the scene for major conflict. With various countries feuding over Pacific territory, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe compared the ratcheting tensions to Europe before World War I. 

China’s $188 billion military budget far surpasses the $49 billion budget of Japan, its biggest regional rival, even if it doesn’t come close to America’s budget of $640 billion.

China’s military is also much bigger than Japan’s, with lots more equipment and 2.3 million active personnel compared to 58,000. Consequently, China ranks third on the Global Firepower Index, which heavily weights sheer numbers, behind the U.S. and Russia and ahead of Japan at tenth.

But is China’s military actually stronger than Japan’s?

First of all, it should be noted that any military conflict between China and Japan would likely draw in Japan’s superpower ally. The U.S. is bound by a mutual defense treaty to protect Japan, including the contested Senkaku islands, and it operates numerous military bases in Japan.

Even on its own, however, Japan’s smaller military has a qualitative advantage over China.

The majority of Chinese weapons systems are in various stages of decay, as detailed by Kyle Mizokami at War Is Boring. Only 450 of China’s 7,580 tanks are anywhere near modern. Likewise, only 502 of China’s 1,321 strong air force are deemed capable — the rest date to refurbished Soviet planes from the 1970s. Only half of China’s submarines have been built within the past twenty years.

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is a refurbished Soviet ship from the 1980s that is too small to launch most long-range places and will probably be limited to hugging China’s coast.
In comparison, Japan has been supplied with advanced military equipment from the U.S. In the coming year, it is slated to purchase new anti-missile destroyers, submarines, amphibious vehicles, surveillance drones, fighter planes, and V-22 Ospreys from the U.S. Japan also expects to receive deliveries of F-35s starting in March 2017.

The F-35 is Liaoning’s worst nightmare, China’s state-owned Global Times reported based on a Kanwa Asian Defense, which found that the F-35 could strike the Liaoning with hard-to-intercept joint strike missiles from a safe distance of 290km. The F-35 should also be able to locate and engage China’s main aircraft, the J-15, before the F-35 is even detected.

The Japanese islands are also well protected by a missile defense system equipped with Standard Missile-3 and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptors. These missiles are capable of shooting down a ballistic missile both inside and outside of Earth’s atmosphere.

“Japan has the strongest navy and air force in Asia except for the United States,” Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, the president of Asia Strategies and Risks, said in a presentation at  the Institute of World Politics last September. “They’re still restricted by Article 9 of the Constitution, which forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation … but you don’t want to mess with them.”

While Japan maintains a significant qualitative advantage, however, the vast size of China’s military should not be understated, nor its rapid expansion and modernization. No wonder Japan has responded with its first military expansion in more than 40 years.

小日本历史上原有土地 不允许别人侵略 !?

So, has Great Mother Country  been talking cock ? "Historically" these islands belonged to Japan too.

This 74-Year-Old Is The Only US Soldier To Defect To North Korea And Return To America

Noburu Hashimoto/Reuters
Charles Jenkins with his wife Hitomi Soga and their daughters Brenda and Mika in 2004.

We recently wrote about Japanese citizens mysteriously abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and ’80s and forced to teach North Korean spies how to act Japanese. 

One of those kidnapping victims was 19-year-old Hitomi Soga, who Japan believes was taken with her mother in 1978 when they were out shopping. After her abduction, Soga married a man whose arrival in North Korea is also shrouded in mystery — a U.S. soldier named Charles Jenkins. 

Jenkins is one of just four American soldiers who have ever defected to North Korea, and he is the only defector ever allowed to leave.
In 1964, 24-year-old Sergeant Jenkins was a squad leader stationed at the heavily militarized border of North and South Korea. During a patrol, he announced to his squad that he had heard something near their position and was going to investigate it alone, as CBS’ 60 Minutes reported. Instead, Jenkins walked to the border and surrendered to North Korean troops.

Jenkins, who claimed he wasn’t a communist sympathizer, said he defected to North Korea because he was being ordered to lead increasingly provocative patrols. He also heard his unit might deploy to Vietnam. 

Once in the enemy’s hands, Jenkins said he expected North Korea to give him to the Russians, who would in turn deliver Jenkins to America in a prisoner swap. Instead, Jenkins was brought to a house where he lived with three other U.S. military deserters — 19-year-old Larry Abshier, 21-year-old James Dresnok, and 19-year-old Jerry Wayne Parrish — who had all defected separately since 1962, according to Foreign Policy. 

There, the North Koreans forced the Americans to study the writings of North Korea’s then-dictator Kim Il-Sung eight hours per day for seven years, until they had memorized it all in Korean. The government used the Americans for propaganda fliers, forced them to portray evil Americans in movie productions, and made them teach English to soldiers and spies.

Jenkins’ home lacked heat and properly functioning toilets. When the North Koreans discovered a U.S. Army tattoo on Jenkins’ arm, they cut it off with scissors and didn’t use an anesthetic to dull the pain. 

In 1980, the key to Jenkins’ eventual release was delivered to him in the form of a 21-year-old Japanese woman, Hitomi Soga. Two years after North Korean agents kidnapped Soga in Japan, they brought her to Jenkins to become his bride. 

“This was one of the most bizarre things that happened to Jenkins in his entire time in North Korea and it ended up, much to his surprise, being his salvation,” CBS correspondent Scott Pelley reported in the 2005 60 Minutes segment.

Reuters
Sergeant Charles Jenkins heads to his U.S. military court martial in Japan in 2004.

The arranged marriage became real as the pair, both foreign prisoners who hated North Korea, gradually fell in love. Jenkins told CBS they always said good night to each other in the other’s native language to remind each other where they came from. Over 22 years, the couple remained close and had two daughters.

Then in 2002, North Korea’s dictator Kim Jong-Il finally admitted his country had abducted 13 Japanese citizens, although a Japanese government report puts the true number at 17, or possibly much higher. Soga was one of five victims returned to Japan that year. Two years later, Jenkins and their two daughters were released to join Soga.

Forty years after his desertion, Jenkins served a 25-day sentence in a military prison. He and Soga chose to continue their marriage after their release. They settled in Soga’s hometown, and the Japanese government granted Jenkins permanent residency status in 2008. While he lives in Japan, he has returned to the U.S. to visit his elderly mother.


Less is known about the other three American defectors who once lived with Jenkins in North Korea. Abshier and Parrish died in North Korea years ago, reports Foreign Policy. Dresnok still lives in North Korea with a family of his own, and he has claimed that he doesn’t want to leave.

Japan’s F-35s Could Give It A Big Advantage Over China

Andy Wolfe/US Navy
The F-35 highlighting its weapons pylons.

Japan, guided by fiery nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has committed to purchasing 42 F-35As with the possibility of ordering more in the future. 

Although the F-35 has had a controversial run in the U.S. due to problems with design and manufacturing and a history of going over budget, Japan sees the fifth-generation fighter as a key deterrent against the rising militancy of China. 

Beijing, for its part, appears to have a strong case of jet envy. China’s state owned Global Times tabloid said the F-35 is the worst nightmare for its Liaoning aircraft carrier, according to Taiwan’s Want China Times.

That article was based on a claim in Canada’s Kanwa Asian Defense that F-35s could strike the Liaoning with hard-to-intercept joint strike missiles from a safe distance of 290km. The F-35 should also be able to locate and engage China’s main aircraft, the J-15, before the F-35 is even detected.

For comparison, China’s J-15 carries air-to-ship missiles that have a range of only 180km.

China is also developing a fifth-generation fighter, the Chengdu J-20. The J-20 is meant to be a multi-role stealth aircraft, similar in scope to the F-35. However, this is China’s first attempt at building a stealth aircraft. As such, each of the three released prototypes of the J-20 differ substantially as the Chinese learn from their own designs what makes the craft functional.

In terms of absolute stealth, the F-35 has an advantage over the J-20′s design as it has a significantly lower noticeable radar cross-section. The F-35′ radar technology has a major advantage, too. The F-35 should be able to locate the J-20 due to its large fuselage and canard before it itself is detected.  

Due to Japan’s access to high quality military equipment, Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, the president of Asia Strategies and Risks, insists that Japan is the strongest military power in the Pacific.

“Japan has the strongest navy and air force in Asia except for the United States,” he said at during a presentation at the Institute of World Politics last September. “The most modern, the most effective. They’re still restricted by Article 9 of the Constitution, which forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation … but you don’t want to mess with them.”

Japan is planning on using the F-35, which should start being delivered to Japan in the coming years, as a front-line air defense fighter. The jet should start arriving in Japan in 2017.

小日本再次羞辱丑化伟大祖国

 

松 下(Panasonic)宣布将向派往中国的员工发放津贴，以补偿严重污染对他们的危害，成为开 此先河的第一家国际公司。

这家日本集团昨日公布上述变动，并将中国部分城市高水平的PM2.5值列为依据。
直径小于或等于2.5微米的颗粒物能通过人的肺部进入血液，加剧哮喘、癌症以及心脏疾病。
松下派往中国的员工一般都能得到比较优厚的薪酬待遇，因为外派中国属于“苦差”，但此前松下公司没有明确提到人们对中国可怕的空气质量越来 越大的担忧。

雾霾已成了中国公众不满的焦点，尤其是在北京这类繁华都市，该市曾在2月遭遇连续一周的“有 害”空气。

它也是外籍人员列举的离开中国的主要原因之一。
松下没有透露上述津贴方案所覆盖的在华日籍员工人数或具体金额。中国员工将不会得到额外津贴。
其他公司最近都在悄悄提高驻华外籍人员的福利，但松下是第一家公开承认这一问题的公司。
“这是我第一次听到有公司在这个问题上如此直白，”罗迈国际商务咨询(RMG Selection)的罗伯特•帕金森(Robert Parkinson)说，“通常的作法是将其粉饰成‘发展中国家津贴’。”

“这有点像是在说，我们知道我们让你 暴露于足以危及生命的环境，我们将承认这一点，并就此给予你补偿。”

在上周中国全国人大年会的开幕式上，中国总理李克强表示他的政府将“向污染宣战”。几天后，一份涉及中国74个城市的官方空气监测报告显 示，仅有3个城市达到了国家空气质量标准。
2008年美国大使馆在其驻京办公楼的屋顶上安装了一套污染监测系统，监测北京空气中的PM2.5浓度，这个问题自此引起更多国际关注。
中国政府已经在整顿重污染工厂和钢厂方面作出了一些努力，并承诺会尝试限制道路车辆数目。去年中国政府出炉了一个计划，拟在人口密集的东部 地区减少排放，降低造成污染的炼钢产能，但由于中国对燃烧煤炭的依赖，整治污染的尝试相当困难。

Three Hypotheses on Korea’s Intense Resentment of Japan

Another perspective on the troubled relations of the East Asian neighbors

Japan-Korea tension has reached a peak in the last year. South Korea’s president, Park Geun-Hye, refuses to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, even after a year in office. Park has met with Premier Xi Jinping of China, but not the Japanese leadership – even though Korea and Japan are both U.S. allies, and despite China’s controversial expansion of its air defense identification zone at both Korea and Japan’s expense. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel went to Japan in the fall of last year to strengthen the alliance as a part of the U.S. pivot to Asia, it was widely read in the Korean media as a snub of Korea. In a fit of pique, Park jetted off to Southeast Asia to pursue a separate, counter-Japanese diplomatic track in Asia. This was roundly cheered in Korea.

Abe, for his part, has visited the always-controversial Yasukuni Shrine and said nothing on recently reiterated Japanese textbook claims to the Korean-controlled Liancourt Rocks. He has repeatedly allowed the creepiest right-wing elements of his electoral coalition to overwhelm good sense in public without rebuke. The most recent disturbing, atrocity-denying outburst has come from NHK television. It is long overdue for Abe to make a high-level statement against this stuff.

China, the major geopolitical beneficiary of such tension, has happily stoked it by constructing a memorial to Ahn Jung-Geun at Park’s request. Ahn assassinated Hirobumi Ito, an early prime minister of Japan and governor-general of occupied Korea at the time of his death (1909). The memorial was built on the location of the shooting, which is today in China. Inevitably, Ahn is denounced as a “terrorist” by the Japanese and celebrated as a “freedom fighter” by Koreans. Korean-Japanese competition has even arrived in U.S. domestic politics, where intense Korean ethnic lobbying in the state of Virginia produced legislation that Virginian textbooks should use the name “East Sea” instead of the more widely used “Sea of Japan” to denote the body of water between Korea and Japan.

All of this significantly complicates the U.S. pivot to Asia, the U.S. confrontation with North Korea, and America’s slow-boiling competition with China in the western Pacific. Korean tension with Japan is a major stumbling block to a more coherent American posture in East Asia. It is arguably the single most important reason for the lack of an Asian NATO. South Korea simply will not accept alignment with Japan, forcing the United States to maintain parallel bilateral alliances with each, rather than a more efficient single multilateral structure. Indeed, were it not for the U.S. alliance, if Korea, Japan and China were acting alone, I would guess that Korea would align against Japan in a Sino-Japanese conflict. Korean dislike for Japan is that intense. By way of example, read this (in Korean), in which the sweater of a guest on a Korean TV show, which looked vaguely like the Japanese imperial flag, forced the guest to apologize to offended viewers, or this, in which a major Korean paper actually suggests Japanese samurai might invade the Liancourt Rocks.

The question then is why the Korean disdain for Japan is so high that even sweaters are offensive and fantastical samurai invasions go unremarked. I have said many times before (here, here) that Korea’s grievances with Japan are very legitimate: Japan sexually enslaved Korean women into wartime brothels; it attempted to erase Korea as a cultural entity by coercing the use of Japanese, even to the point of re-naming people (there are still Koreans alive who went through this); Japan has not really come clean about the empire and the war – a point made not just by Korea, but by China and the U.S. as well.

But Koreans do not stop there; they go over-the-top with things like the “Sea of Japan” re-naming campaign with no obvious point other than to provoke Japan, unfounded claims that Japan wants to invade Korea again, equating bad Japanese behavior in Korea with the far-worse Holocaust, or that Liancourt is worth going to war over – even though a Korean use of force against Japan would almost certainly result in a U.S. departure from South Korea and dramatically reduced Korean security. Other victims of earlier Japanese imperialism do not talk like this, and I think a lot of well-meaning Japanese, who do recognize what Japan did in Korea, are genuinely baffled by all the vitriol.

I see three possible explanations, and for any graduate students in east Asian studies, sociology or political science, this is a great research question. Again, the issue is not why does Korea dislike Japan. Japan’s imperial behavior and continued ambivalence all but ensures that. The real question is why Korean animosity is so off-the-charts. Here are three hypotheses:

1. Koreans have always been sharply anti-Japanese since the war; we just did not see that until democratization twenty-five years ago made expression of public opinion easier and less manipulated by the government.

Japanese colleagues often note to me that Korea did not start talking this way until the last few decades – the implication being that tension with Japan is the politicization of something no one cared about earlier. That may not be so, because of what social scientists call “hidden preferences” – under dictatorships, there are strong incentives to keep your true feelings to yourself. Opposition to regime preferences might land you in jail or worse. Korea was such a dictatorship until the late 1980s. So moves by earlier Korean leaders to deal with Japan may not have been approved of by a population which, however, was unable to impact policy. For example, there were mass protests against the Japan-Korea normalization treaty of 1965. Were Korea a democracy at the time, the treaty would likely have collapsed just as an intelligence sharing pact did two years ago. If this hypothesis is right, Koreans really do feel threatened by Japan and reconciliation is far away.

2. The late 1980s/early 1990s rise of intense anti-Japanese feeling coincides with the passing of the first generation of South Korea’s political and business elites.

There is a sharp ongoing historical debate about just how much South Korea’s first generation collaborated with the Japanese occupation. The founders of the chaebol are often particularly suspected, but it is no stretch to suggest that only collaborators would have had the education, political connections, wealth, skills, and so on to enter the postwar elite. This idea would suggest that as these guys died out and were replaced by a second, untainted post-colonial generation, that the new generation wanted to dig into the past the way earlier elites did not. Vitriol today on Japan may reflect embarrassment at Korean collaboration yesterday during the occupation.

3. When South Korea democratized, it needed some kind of legitimating story (unnecessary under authoritarianism).

Because of corrupted institutions, “deep state” elitism at the top, and a debilitating legitimacy competition with the DPRK that confuses loyalties, South Korea has struggled to connect with its own citizenry. It cannot be the anti-DRPK it should be, because not enough South Koreans share a strict “enemy image” of North Korea. Instead South Korea has fallen back on Japanophobia, being the anti-Japan, to legitimate itself, because all Koreans, north and south, can agree that Japan was bad.

All three of these are probably somewhat correct, but I would tilt toward the third. All add important psychological elements that help explain Korean hyperbole on Japan beyond otherwise reasonable concerns about history. Hostility toward Japan is not just a political posture, but is part of the South Korean political identity. Washington in particular should stop pretending that this is something that it can resolve with its typical, the-hegemon-is-here-to-save-the-day interventionism. It can’t.