Writing China: James Jiann Hua To, ‘Qiaowu侨务: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese’

Tourists read Chinese newspapers on the banks of the Main River in Frankfurt, Germany.

One of the greatest movements of people in history  is under way: travel out of China by vast numbers of students, business executives and tourists. More than 100 million crossed the border last year.
Everywhere they go, they will be shadowed by the Leninist state they leave behind. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council is in charge of ensuring their loyalty to China and the Communist Party. Their activities are known as qiaowu.
James Jiann Hua To, a New Zealand political scientist, is a foremost authority on China’s efforts to shepherd its overseas Chinese – the “thousand grains of sand.” He is the author of “Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese.” China Real Time’s Andrew Browne spoke with him by email. Edited excerpts:
What’s the definition of qiaowu?
The purpose of qiaowu is to rally support for Beijing amongst ethnic Chinese outside of China through various propaganda and thought-management techniques. For the vast majority of the 48 million overseas Chinese around the world, many will be oblivious to qiaowu and its activity. The main target groups are those who are open to and even welcome receiving qiaowu and closer links to China and its foreign service, such as newer migrants or PRC students abroad.
How is qiaowu playing out amid the enormous increase in Chinese outbound tourism, emigration and study?

Brill

Firstly, a clear distinction must be made between Chinese nationals going and living overseas, and ethnic Chinese overseas. Beijing is very careful to ensure that it is not seen as interfering in foreign matters by way of a fifth column. However, because qiaowu work is so broad in scope, all ethnic Chinese are potential subjects of interest, and the distinction becomes quite blurred.
The PRC has the capability to monitor overseas Chinese affairs throughout the world – in particular matters concerning anti-Chinese sentiment or natural disaster. Moreover, Beijing has publicly stated it is prepared to go “all out” to protect overseas Chinese from racism, harassment and damage to property.
How does China seek to influence Chinese-language media and cultural activities abroad?
For decades, the CCP has used newspapers, radio, television and other media sources to influence the perceptions and behaviors of overseas Chinese. Beijing’s main objective is to encourage reunification, stimulate nationalist pride and to oppose anti-[Chinese Communist Party] movements. However, Beijing is very careful not to appear as if it is interfering.
While mostly successful with new migrants and Chinese students abroad who may already have pro-Beijing sentiments, this kind of work has little or no influence on well-established ethnic Chinese already grounded with foreign values. However, Beijing actively seeks to guide the way in which traditional festivals are celebrated by offering free decorations and cultural resources, stoking ancestral sentimentality and showcasing China’s rise on the international scene.

How China Keeps Its Citizens Loyal Overseas

A recent report showed that 64% of China's rich are either migrating overseas or have plans to leave the country. Political scientist James To, who has written a book on the subject, tells the WSJ's Deborah Kan how the Chinese government is using propaganda campaigns abroad to ensure loyalty from overseas Chinese.

Could this collide with democratic values in host societies like the U.S., Australia and New Zealand?
With Beijing’s increased influence in Chinese cultural and media circles, alternative interpretations of ‘Chineseness’ find themselves sidelined. In countries where freedom of speech and independent thought are highly valued, qiaowu has worked in a way such that overseas Chinese themselves are self-censoring to maintain warm relations with Beijing so as not to jeopardize access to its resources and economic opportunities.
Is the growing debate over Confucius Institutes a sign of things to come?
The Confucius Institute program is China’s foremost public diplomacy and cultural outreach effort. Its long-term objective is to gather a wide spectrum of support for China to influence the development of host-country foreign policy so it is favorable to Beijing. Institutes actively promote putonghua Mandarin, not other dialects such as Cantonese, simplified characters and pinyin pronunciation.
A CCP-derived interpretation of what it means to be Chinese is the sign of things to come for overseas Chinese communities, unless they actively work to preserve their uniqueness.
How will China’s mission to protect Chinese nationals abroad influence its global security posture?
As Chinese investment abroad grows, Beijing might consider naval diplomacy or military protection to oversee assets under overseas Chinese control, or intervene when overseas Chinese are in trouble. For example, it has advocated dispatching PRC police officers to assist investigations following attacks on overseas Chinese.
China desires acceptance in the international community and refrains from anything that might be perceived as aggressive behavior. For example, it has been hesitant to send in uniformed assistance; it has chartered commercial airplanes instead of sending military aircraft; and military vessels are dispatched as goodwill naval visits.
Will the issue of Chinese national loyalties in Southeast Asia resurface?
In the 1980s the Singapore government sought to disempower the ethnic Chinese elite and their links with China by preserving only the politically inoffensive cultural aspects of various overseas Chinese clan associations. In the early 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew expressed his fear of potential racial discord should overseas Chinese respond to Beijing’s line of a common Chinese culture.
While support for Beijing is most evident amongst new migrant groups and PRC students studying abroad, most ethnic Chinese who have resided in their host countries (many for generations) have little inclination to support Beijing. The problem is that locals may not be able to distinguish between these very different groups, and hence all ethnic Chinese become tarred with the same brush.
There have been several cases of industrial espionage in the U.S. involving Chinese nationals. Is this part of qiaowu policy?
While qiaowu includes intelligence gathering on overseas Chinese and their activities, the boundaries between the qiaowu administration and the state become blurred when mobilizing overseas Chinese for national interests that go beyond its mandate. In these cases the qiaowu administration prefers to leave aggressive and coercive practices for other agencies to handle.
As China’s ‘Thousand Grains of Sand,’ PRC nationals and those of Chinese descent abroad are prompted to provide information or technology for China’s development in the form of decentralized micro-espionage. Targets are often unaware that they are the subject of such manipulation. Many respond positively and voluntarily by appealing to their ethnic pride and sympathies in “helping the motherland advance.”