马 哈蒂尔和 ​​他的经济助手不知道金融市场的运作机制

全球基金经理人在吉隆坡证券交易所即他们是股市重量级的主要参与者。 有这么多的资 金，那一刻，他们从市场撤出他们的投资，它在几天内引起崩溃。 马哈蒂尔的亲 信，借银行的钱输光，无法捍卫的崩溃和丢失亿美金。 他们失去了两 次，一是由于在股份价格下跌而蒙受金钱损失，其次，他们欠银行室的数十亿美元，他们无法偿还。 阿 旺Abdillah
我们已经看到了 在他的任期为总理马哈蒂尔曾滥用他的权力，即巫统在全国最大的单一政党，成为最强大的单涵盖所有方面的实体在该国成功地转向。
他是通过支持独 裁统治的不民主做法能够实现这样一个伟大的政治壮举。
他首先减少的其 他BN党的权力分享权利，从而使巫统，以达到
类似的一党政府的状 态。 马哈蒂尔与国民党在政府行政权力非常小，是能够通过政府机构的完全控制bloster他 个人的行政权力。 由政府机构的完全控制，他是能够钳制媒体，放置在他的直接控制下的特殊政府机构即警察， 欧共体和MACC变成他的电源按钮。
马哈蒂尔与指挥 等行政权力，是可以移动一步带走立法机关和司法部门的独立性，使他的党，不仅是马来西亚的事实上的政府，但给他的个人权力控制的政治，行 政并在该国的法律实体，使自己实现状态
一个不民主暨独裁的领 导者。
在这种恶劣的政 治环境下，反对派无法进行检查和平衡的作用，作为一个真正的民主制度下的需要。 然后在一些国家，一个不民主的 领导人可以转成一个独裁者，因此这并不奇怪，因为他们的边界线，有时纵横交错，彼此。
这样一个不民主 的独裁的政治制度与共产主义的政治制度有某些相似之处
共产党在执行政府的完 全控制。 的手段来实现电源的差异。
有了这样一个地 方的政治制度，马哈蒂尔制订旨在有利于自己和他的亲信一个前所未有的最大规模​​的大型经济模型为基础的经济政策。
不同的人量身定 做的政策，个人量身定做的服务主要是政治精英缺阵，而广大人民群众的需求。 最终会浮现这种政策和做法的愚 蠢，一旦权力施虐者离开政治舞台。
马哈蒂尔的经济 管理蠢事
1）赌博远离国家的外汇储备
有了这么多的政治和经 济力量在他的控制之下，1992年M医生认为，马来西亚的经济，准备采取对西方列强的经济。 武装与外汇储备的中央银行（采 取的实际金额仍是一个谜），他有信心他可以通过伦敦外汇市场的投机活动影响。
然而，正如我们 知道马来西亚M医生特大赌博活动已经失去了通过中央银行的重要外汇十亿美元。 从未向公众披露的实际数额的巨 大损失。
因此这个非常巨 大的损失，削弱中央银行的能力恢复时间，即继续遭受低外汇储备最多的时候，当马来西亚在1997年金融危机重创。
2）未能阻止泰国1997年经济危机的涟漪
当1997年的经济危 机重创泰国的金融市场和股票市场，直接击中马来西亚的后遗症，最初是在涟漪只有形式。 然而，马来西亚政府不知道如何 处理这样的经济现象，从而未能捍卫其“金融变量即林吉特和股票，从间接的冲击。
的时刻，政府不 能找到一个快速解决方案，成为市场的恐慌。 敏感的情绪开始在下降趋势的推动林吉特。 敏感的情绪，在短期内变成一个 无法控制的挥发性。
强大的抛盘压力 达到严重的外汇市场和股票市场。 当时的关键问题是保卫林吉特的价值或停止动荡的抛盘压力情绪。 由于中央银行的外汇储备低，有 没有办法来保卫林吉特。 马哈蒂尔和中央银行认为，马来西亚的基本面比泰国强，从而让市场力量调整林吉特汇率。
所以他们允许林 吉特和股市上的攻击，直到实行资本管制，直到1998年9月1日超过一年，继续！ 这是一种行为，是太少，为时已 晚。 林吉特下跌如此之低，它必须在RM3.8以1US美元挂钩，而在吉隆坡证券交易所综合指 数从1300点跌到1998年9月由第二届于1997年初262点！
甚至英国盯住英镑的德国马克在 欧洲汇率机制（ERM）前
前floatng 2 07 1997年，于1992年，泰国的货币贬值，盯住美元的泰铢。 马来西亚应该已经完成​​，停 止敏感的情绪，之前就挥发。 因此，经过一段长时间（超过1年），未能收回的自由落体林吉特破坏股市！
作为货币的商品 （在马来西亚林吉特）是在全球贸易和金融市场的基础商品，联交所的稳定是非常依赖在外汇市场的交易活动的成果。
外国基金经理担 心林吉特币值的下降将导致其股票价值的巨大损失，如果他们出售他们，其次，他们将蒙受损失时，他们交换了林吉特对美元（出售股票）在外汇 市场之前，他们可以拿出了马来西亚的外国货币。 因此，在外汇市场敏感的恐慌情绪在整个金融市场的动荡事件引发的链！
全球基金经理人 在吉隆坡证券交易所即他们是股市重量级的主要参与者。 有这么多的资金，那一刻，他们 从市场撤出他们的投资，它在几天内引起崩溃。 马哈蒂尔的亲信，借银行的钱输光，无法捍卫的崩溃和丢失亿美金。 他们失去了两次，一是由于在股 份价格下跌而蒙受金钱损失，其次，他们欠银行室的数十亿美元，他们无法偿还。
因此，许多银行 留下不良贷款（NPL）的数十亿美元。
作为一个大型投机者 自己，M医生应该理解，为什么尽管中央银行已使用10亿美元的外汇交易英镑，但未能推动其在伦敦外汇市场的货币价值，而遭受巨大损失时英 国政府的货币贬​​值。
伦敦外汇市场是 世界上最大的货币交易中心每天完成数十亿美元的货币交易。 因此，有许多全球外汇交易的球 员，当时英镑捕食。 中央银行
只是其中之一。
英国英镑是除了 美元，欧元和日元之间的4个顶级的全球货币。 这些被认为是货币的重量级人物。 M医生想而资深炒家索罗斯选择'打'一个受伤的重量级战斗机，谁也打一场淘汰赛一位经验丰富的重量级战士。
英国拟以货币贬 值来刺激它的经济复苏，而马哈蒂尔只是想使钱做反向。 索罗斯只是想从英国的经济衰退 中获利。 那么，谁是聪明的家伙呢？
马哈蒂尔应该首 先从英镑的投机失败，强劲的宏观经济基本面和健全政府的经济政策和做法的经验教训中学习，能承受敏感的市场情绪，甚至遏制任何形式的影 响，包括市场投机者的活动从市场情绪波动。
其次，马哈蒂尔 应该知道，另一方面，泰国弱宏观经济基本面以及金融变量，尤其是摇摇欲坠的货币会下跌炒家带或不带任何时候。 因此，敏感和动荡的市场情绪， 以“贸易，泰铢对美元带来泰铢的崩溃。
因此，股市受到 重创，因为股票价值在泰铢。 投资者的强烈情绪，以出售股份导致股市崩溃。

挂 的经济学

金融市场是敏感 的市场因素，这是正常的，但是当它变成挥发性（攻击模式），有两种选择 - 保卫货币，如果你有强有力的宏观的经济基本面和金融变量，如足够的外汇储备来购买令吉停止下滑，或停止了攻击本身，如果你没有储备。
在马来西亚的情 况下，它缺乏稳健的经济基本面和金融变量当时保卫林吉特。 在这种情况下，马来西亚应该停 止实行外汇管制，即挂挥发攻击
令吉立即美元。 其次，你决定要修复的 林吉特对美元的多少是另一个棘手的问题，然后才可以挂它。
挂，可以在3种 方式 - 固定汇率回到原来的汇率，或修复林吉特，比原来的速度，即贬值，或固定在一个更高的水平，即林吉特升值。 如果当局要停止挥发的销售情绪 攻击，固定汇率回原即1US RM2.5。 如果他们希望减缓动荡的情绪，说1美元林吉特贬值2.8令吉。 但是，如果你要停止挥发阿塔克 以及扭转市场气氛，那么你修复即比原汇率较高的欣赏价值说1US马币2.3林吉特，从而扭转林吉特和股票出售的情绪，即恢复金融市场的两 个部门。
但马来西亚做的 是让林吉特自卫，即允许林吉特兑其他货币的浮动而不利的情况下约13个月股市留下满目疮痍！ 在哪里马钛博士的所谓经济专家 在关键时刻或赌博的专家？
盯住一种货币到 另一个具有的优势时，多少你解决你的货币到另一个 -
i）为实施损害控制由于对林吉特的抛售压力
ii）提供时间为马来西亚的调整即经济的变化来刺激出口和减少进口，从而赚取更多的外汇。
iii）由中央银行获得更多的外汇，可以有足够的资金来调节时，它会漂后林吉特。 冷却期可从6个月至1年不等。
iv）如果挂仍无法产生更多的外汇，然后马来西亚借用国外贷款，以获得足够的外汇。 这里没有风险自林吉特一直盯住 美元。 贷款成本不会增加太多只要林吉特已修复。
V）反向货币交易
这是一个选项，我相信 没有一个国家在面临货币危机之前完成。 不过，我会讨论这个选项，如果民联形成未来的联邦政府。

救 助
救助银行和公司，受经 济危机的打击，是不必要的，如果货币控制，即挂在早期阶段实施。 资本管制是不必要的过只要你所 施加的货币控制。 政府没有诉诸公积金和Petronas十亿令吉调，以恢复这些实体的公共借款。

Mahathir and his economic aides did not know about the mechanism of the financial market operation

The global fund managers were the major players in the KLSE ie they were the stock market heavyweights. With so much funds, the moment they withdrew their investments from the market, it caused the collapse within days. The Mahathir cronies who gambled with borrowed bank money could not defend the crash and lost billons. They lost twice, firstly lost money due to the fall in the shares’ prices, and secondly they owed the banks RM billions which they could not repay.

Awang Abdillah

We have seen during his tenure as the premier how Mahathir had abused his power by successfully turning the largest single political party in the country namely UMNO into the most powerful single entity in the country encompassing all aspects.

He was able to achieve such a great political feat through undemocratic practices backed by authoritarian rule.

Firstly he reduced the power-sharing rights of the other BN component parties thereby enabling UMNO to achieve the
status similar to that of a single party government. With BN component parties having very little executive power in the government, Mahathir was able to bloster his personal executive power by taking full control of the government apparatus. By having full control of the government machinery,he was able to muzzle the media, placed the special government agencies namely the police, EC and MACC under his direct control and turned them into his power buttons.

With such commanding executive power, Mahathir was able to move one step further by taking away the independence of the legislature and the judiciary, making his party not only as the de facto government of Malaysia, but giving him personal power to control the political, executive and legal entities in the country enabling himself to achieve the status
of an undemocratic-cum-dictatorial leader.

Under such harsh political environment, the opposition could not undertake the check-and-balance role as required under a true democratic system. Hence it is not surprising then in some countries an undemocratic leader can turn into a dictator, because their border lines sometimes crisscross one another.

Such an undemocratic-dictatorial political system has some similarities with the communist political system where the
communist party has full control over the executive government. The differences are in the means to achieve power.

With such a political system in place, Mahathir could devise economic policies based on mega economic models that were designed to benefit oneself and his cronies on an unprecedented maximum scale.

Unlike people tailored policies, personal tailored ones serve mainly the political elite while the needs of the masses are sidelined. Eventually the follies of such kind of policies and practices will surface once the power abuser leaves the political scene.

Mahathir’s economic management follies
1)      Gambling away nation’s foreign reserves
 With so much political and economic power under his control, by 1992 Dr M thought Malaysia's economy was ready to take on the economies of the Western powers. Armed with the foreign reserves of Bank Negara (the real amount taken remains a mystery), he was confident he could influence the London forex market through speculative activities.

However as we know Malaysia had lost $billions of Bank Negara vital foreign exchange through Dr M mega gambling activities. The actual amount of the colossal loss was never revealed to the public.

Consequently this very massive loss had crippled Bank Negara’s ability to recover in time ie continued to suffer low foreign reserves up to the time when Malaysia was hit by the financial crisis in 1997.

2)    Failed to block the ripples of Thailand’s economic crisis of 1997
 When the economic crisis in 1997 hit Thailand's financial and stock markets directly, the aftereffects that hit Malaysia initially was in the form of ripples only. However, the government of the Malaysia did not know how to handle such an economic phenomena, thereby failed  to defend its’ financial variables ie the ringgit and the equity stocks from the indirect onslaught.

The moment the government could not find a quick solution, the market became panicky. The sensitive sentiment began to push the ringgit in a downward trend. Within a short period the sensitive sentiment turned into an uncontrollable volatile one.

The strong selling pressure hit the forex and stock markets badly. The crucial issue at that time was to defend the ringgit value or to stop the volatile selling pressure sentiments. Since the Central Bank was experiencing low foreign reserves, there was no way to defend the ringgit. Mahathir and Bank Negara thought that Malaysia’s fundamentals were stronger than Thailand and hence let the market forces adjust the ringgit exchange rate.

So they  allowed the attacks on the ringgit and the stock market to continue until 1 september 1998 more than one year until the capital controls were imposed! It was an act that was too little, too late. The ringgit fell so low that it had to be pegged at  RM3.8 to 1US dollar while the composite index of the KLSE fell from 1300 points in early 1997 to 262 points by 2nd September 1998!

Even Britain pegged its sterling to the German mark under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) prior to the
devaluation of the currency in 1992 and Thailand pegged the baht to the US dollar before floatng it on 2 07 1997. What Malaysia should have done was to stop the sensitive sentiment before it became volatile. Consequently, the free fall of the ringgit over a long period (more than 1 year) that failed to recover had devastated the equity market!

As the currency commodity (ringgit in the case of Malaysia) is the base commodity in the global trade and the financial market, the stability of the stock exchange is very much dependent on the outcome of the trading activities in the forex market.

The foreign fund managers feared that the fall in the ringgit currency value would cause a substantial loss in the value of their stocks if they disposed them, and secondly they would suffer losses when they exchanged the ringgit (from sale of stocks) for the US dollar in the forex market before they can take out the foreign currencies out of Malaysia. Hence the sensitive panic sentiments in the forex market triggered the chain of volatile events in the whole financial market!

The global fund managers were the major players in the KLSE ie they were the stock market heavyweights. With so much funds, the moment they withdrew their investments from the market, it caused the collapse within days. The Mahathir cronies who gambled with borrowed bank money could not defend the crash and lost billons. They lost twice, firstly lost money due to the fall in the shares’ prices, and secondly they owed the banks RM billions which they could not repay.

Consequently many banks were left with billions of non-performing loans (NPL).

Being a mega speculator himself, Dr M should have understood as to why albeit Bank Negara had used $billions of foreign exchange to trade for the pound but failed to push up its’ currency value in the London forex market  and instead suffered massive losses when the British government devalued the currency.  

The London forex market is the biggest currency trading center in the world where billions of dollars of currency transactions are done daily. Hence, there were many global forex players preying on the pound at that time. Bank Negara
was just one of them.

The British sterling is among the 4 top global currencies besides the US dollar, euro and yen. These are considered currency heavyweights. Dr M wanted to knockout a seasoned heavyweight fighter while veteran speculator Soros chose to ‘fight’ an injured heavyweight fighter who could not put up a fight.  

The British intended to devalue the currency to stimulate its’ economy to recover, while Mahathir only wanted to make money by doing the reverse. Soros only wanted to profit from the British economic downturn. So who was the smart guy?

Mahathir should firstly learn from the lessons of the pound speculation fiasco, that  strong macro economic fundamentals and sound government economic policies and practices can withstand sensitive market sentiments and even curb volatile market sentiments from any form of market influences including the speculators’ activities.

Secondly, Mahathir should know that Thailand on the other hand had weak macro economic fundamentals as well as the financial variables especially a shaky currency that would tumble any time with or without the speculators. Hence  the sensitive and volatile market sentiments  to ‘trade-in’ the baht for the dollar brought the collapse of the baht.

Consequently,  the equity market was badly hit because the stocks were valued in baht. Investors’ strong sentiments  to sell the shares caused  the stock market to crash.

The economics of pegging

It is normal that a financial market is sensitive to the market factors but when it turns volatile (on attacking mode), there are two options  – defend the currency if you have strong macro economic fundamentals and financial variables such as sufficient foreign reserves to buy the ringgit to stop its slide, or stop the attack itself if you don’t have the reserves.

In the case of Malaysia it lacked the sound economic fundamentals and financial variables at that time to defend the ringgit. Under such circumstances, Malaysia should stop the volatile attack by imposing currency control ie peg the
ringgit to the dollar immediately. Secondly, how much you decide to fix the ringgit to the dollar is another tricky question before you can peg it.

Pegging can be done in 3 ways –  fix the exchange rate back to the original exchange rate, or fix the ringgit lower than the original rate ie depreciate it or fix the ringgit at a higher level ie appreciate it. If the authority wants to stop the volatile selling sentiment attack, fix the exchange rate back to the original ie 1US to RM2.5. If they want to slow down the volatile sentiment, depreciate the ringgit at say  1 US to RM 2.8. But if you want to stop the volatile atack as well as reverse the market sentiments then you fix the ringgit at an appreciative value ie higher than the original exchange rate say 1US to RM 2.3, thereby reversing the selling sentiment of  the ringgit and the  stocks, ie you restore both sectors of the financial market.

But what Malaysia did was to let the ringgit defend itself ie allow the ringgit to float against other currencies under unfavourable circumstances for about 13 months while the stock market was left devastated! Where were Dr Ma Ti's so called economic experts or gambling experts at the crucial time?

Pegging one currency to another has a number of advantages depending on when and at how much you fix your currency to another -
     i)  To implement damage control  due to the selling pressure on the ringgit
     ii )To give time for Malaysia to adjust to economic changes ie to stimulate exports and reduce imports, thereby earns more foreign exchange.
      iii) By gaining more foreign exchange Bank Negara can have sufficient funds to regulate the ringgit when it will be floated later. The cooling period may range from 6 months to 1 year.
      iv) If the pegging still could not produce more foreign exchange, then Malaysia has to borrow foreign loans to get enough foreign exchange. There is no risk here since the ringgit has been pegged to the dollar. The cost of the loan would not increase too as long as the ringgit has been fixed.
     v) Reverse currency trading
     This is an option that I believe no country has done before in the face of a currency crisis. However I will discuss this option if the Pakatan Rakyat forms the next federal government.

Bailout
Bailing out banks and corporations that were hard hit by the economic crisis is unnecessary if currency control ie pegging was imposed in the early stages. Capital controls was unnecessary too  as long as you have imposed the currency control. The government did not have to resort to public borrowing from EPF and Petronas to the tune of billions of ringgit to restore these entities.