Thursday, October 17, 2024
台湾军方向民营公司开放生产“军用商规”无人机
今年8月底,台湾国防部公布获选制造军用级无人机的民间厂商名单,长荣航太、智飞科技、神通资讯科技和中光电智能机器人四家公司分别在总共六款机型得标,总值近70亿新台币(约2.13 亿美元)。这是台湾军方首度向民间发出“军用商规”无人机标案,从召开招标说明会到决标,历时近两年。
中国警告美国 “勿开绿灯”台湾前总统蔡英文访问美国
中国警告美国 “勿开绿灯”台湾前总统蔡英文访问美国
美国政治新闻Politico报道,正在欧洲访问的台湾前总统蔡英文将在未来几周内访问美国。中国驻美大使馆表示坚决反对,并警告美国勿对此次行程“开绿灯”。
Politico 15日引述知情人士指出,蔡英文打算在欧盟访问行程结束后前往美国,可能是11月总统大选投票日前,也可能是投票后,新总统当选人尚未宣誓就职前。
但报道指出,无论是上述哪两个时间“都会激怒中国政府,因其视蔡英文为支持独立的倡议者”。
两名知情人士向Politico的国家安全新闻NatSec Daily透露,如果蔡英文在11月5日美国总统大选前抵美,很可能成为共和党和民主党议员争相合照的对象,并藉此塑造对中国强硬的形象。
如果蔡英文在大选投票日后、新总统就职前抵达,届时无论是共和党总统候选人特朗普或是民主党总统候选人贺锦丽胜选,都可能会接见蔡英文,表达美国对台湾的支持。
特朗普于2016年当选时,曾经突破禁忌接了时任总统蔡英文的恭贺电话。
对此,中国驻美大使馆发言人刘鹏宇在回应Politico报道时警告美国,若为此次访问“开绿灯”,就代表是“与台湾合作,纵容台独分裂份子在美国进行分裂活动……中国坚决反对并强烈谴责”。
访欧抵巴黎发罗浮宫照
另一方面,蔡英文卸任台湾总统后首度出访,14日在捷克出席公元两千论坛,以“证明民主的决心与韧性”为题发表英文演说。15日抵达此行第二站法国巴黎,蔡英文在脸书发文表示,她将前往罗浮宫,也会与法国的好朋友们见面、交流,持续传递台湾对民主、自由与人权的信念,深化与法国的伙伴关系。
蔡英文卸任后首度出访欧洲,第一站抵达捷克,参加公元两千论坛,演讲前临时更改讲稿,回应中国联合利剑军演,强调台湾民主,绝不妥协。17分钟演讲后,不少听众起立鼓掌致意,捷克总统帕维尔也出席,跟蔡英文握手寒暄。
蔡英文15日抵达此行第二站法国巴黎,他透过脸书发文,强调会持续传递台湾对民主、自由与人权的信念。
蔡英文此行也将造访比利时布鲁塞尔,创下台湾卸任元首拜访欧盟总部首例。
听其言,观其行 - 习近平称愿和美国做伙伴和朋友
习近平星期二(10月15日)在给美中关系全国委员会2024年度颁奖晚宴致贺信中表示,中美各自的成功是彼此的“机遇”,应成为对方发展的助力,而不是阻力。他表示,中国愿意同美国“做伙伴、做朋友”。针对习近平的这番言论,美国观察人士认为,美国需要“听其言,观其行”。
习近平在致贺信中说,中美关系是世界上最重要的双边关系之一,攸关人民福祉和人类前途命运。
中共外交部在当天发布的简讯中援引习近平称,中方始终按照相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢原则处理中美关系,始终认为中美各自的成功是彼此的机遇,两国应该成为对方发展的助力而不是阻力。
习近平在信中重申中国对“开放”的承诺,强调中国将加大制度型开放力度,持续建设一流营商环境。
“中国愿意与美国做伙伴、做朋友。这不仅造福两国,也惠及世界,”习近平在致信中说。
“听其言,观其行”
前国防部长办公室资深官员约瑟夫·博斯科(Joseph Bosco)告诉美国之音,这种示好的话中国以前也说过,但往往并不持久,很快就又回到“美国助台独立”那一套强硬话语中去,所以他并不认为习的“和美国做朋友”有什么重大的立场改变。
博斯科说:“中国可以通过一些举措来证明他们的诚意啊,比如停止在台海军演,停止越过中线。他们可以停止实施反分裂法,可以在台湾人民同意的前提下要求统一,而不是武力解决。”
博斯科强调,美国确实需要“听其言,观其行”。“我们的态度是:话听起来是好听的,但是说比做容易,我们需要看到真正的合作行动。”他说。
布鲁金斯学会外交政策项目资深研究员何瑞恩(Ryan Hass)认为习近平表示和美国“做朋友”一说无足轻重。他对美国之音说:“美国民众现在主要关注即将到来的总统大选。除了美国那些关注中国事务的人士,习近平主席的言论不太可能引起太多关注。”
值得一提的是,就在去年11月,习近平曾经说过类似的话。习近平在2023年11月15日旧金山亚太经合组织(APEC)论坛期间出席欢迎宴会时表示,中国希望安抚全球企业,应对中国吸引外资的困难。习在半个多小时的致辞中说:“中国愿意同美国做伙伴、做朋友。我们处理中美关系的根本遵循就是相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢。”
乔治城大学美中全球议题对话项目研究员韦德宁(Dennis Wilder)直言,他完全不把习的说法当回事。他告诉美国之音:“如果习近平真的想成为美国的合作伙伴,那为什么在俄罗斯非法入侵乌克兰这件事上,他是普京最重要的合作伙伴?”
习近平面临困境,希望为美中关系保持底线?
华盛顿智库史汀生中心的高级研究员罗伯特·曼宁(Rober Manning)则认为,习的说法值得观察,跟他目前面临的经济困境有关。
曼宁告诉美国之音:“我不知道习近平真正的想法,但他面临当下中国的经济困境:债务占GDP的310%,地方政府破产,消费者在房地产危机中失去了信心,财富也大量流失。而到目前为止,他的刺激计划旨在管理债务,而不是促进消费所需的结构性改革。因此,习近平正在寻求稳定的外部环境,并希望为中美关系保持底线。”
曼宁认为,习近平这一主张值得测试,看他是否准备采取对等措施来解决紧张的根源:“他是否愿意改变中国的做法?是否愿意在世贸组织谈判新的补贴规则并重新平衡他们的经济?是否愿意减少在南中国海的强硬军事举动,并认真谈判西太平洋海上行为准则?”
史汀生中心东亚项目共同主任孙韵在邮件中回复美国之音时候评论说:“这句话是中国的默认立场,尤其是在自去年峰会以来双边关系一直相对积极的情况下。另外,美国将在三周后举行大选。中国除了希望与美国保持良好关系外,别无他言。这是中国目前能发出的最稳定、最善意的信息。”
X平台中文区充满了嘲讽
在X平台的中文用户中,大部分评论者表示了嘲讽和怀疑。
路透社于10月15日对此进行报道,标题为“习近平称中国愿意与美国做伙伴、做朋友”。
路透社在社交平台X的这篇简讯得到4万多点击,不过截至目前只有16条留言,大多对习“和美国做伙伴和朋友”的说法冷嘲热讽。
一位叫“RobHeartNY”的网友直截了当的说:“狗屁。”
一位名为“Michel McMahon”的网友在路透的贴下留言说:“只有看到习近平在中美伙伴关系和友谊问题上采取切实行动,而不是空谈,我才会相信他。信任的缺失根深蒂固,仅靠热情的言论无法解决。”
另一位叫“Mr_d”的嘲讽道:“很简单,如果美国不干涉中国的行为,听中国的话,那么中国就是美国的伙伴和朋友。”
新加坡《联合早报》发布在X的帖子下面的一百多条评论中,多数对习“和美国做伙伴和朋友”嗤之以鼻。
网友“McFual”说,“千万别相信中共的鬼话连篇”;“Reykyavik”说:“习主席既要疯狂反美,又要和美国做生意”;另一位“Dennis Wahng”说:“美国受骗过多,不再像墙共老百姓那么容易受骗了!”
X平台上,“李老师不是你老师”对于习致信内容的转帖引来多达三百多条评论,大部分同样表达了习对美国示好的不信任和讥讽。
很多网友留下了“听其言,观其行”的简单评论,更多的则是尖辣的批评。
“洼地老刘”嘲讽道:“见风使舵是传统美德”;“王师傅不是黄师傅”说:“风向又变了,一百八十度转弯,包包是不是精神分裂”;“反抗者时报”说:“铁子们,这习近平真是越来越看不懂了!我们作为中国人民,天天在网上为祖国奋斗,痛批美帝,结果你自己却转身去跟美帝国主义勾勾搭搭,搞什么‘合作伙伴’?这种行为难道不是彻头彻尾的卖国行径吗?”
媒体询问中国军演及犯台 哈里斯:台湾有权自卫
媒体询问中国军演及犯台 哈里斯:台湾有权自卫
(华盛顿17日讯)美国民主党总统候选人、副总统哈里斯当地时间周三回应媒体询问中国对台军演相关议题、以及她对中国入侵台湾的立场。她重申她相信“一中”政策,她也相信台湾有自我防卫的权利。
台湾中央社报导,哈里斯在密歇根州底特律机场接受媒体短暂提问。有媒体指出,中国日前在台湾附近军演,中国国家主席习近平隔天到与台湾一海之隔的福建省视察,升高紧张情势,如果她是总统,她对中国武力侵台的立场为何。
哈里斯表示,她要重申她说过很多次的要点,她相信“一中”政策,也相信台湾有权自我防卫。有媒体问,美国政府是否会提供武器给台湾,也有媒体同时询问,她是否支持加州将举行加强惩罚罪犯的第36号公投。她未回答与台湾相关的追问。
哈里斯本月7日在美国哥伦比亚广播公司(CBS)新闻节目《60分钟》(60 Minutes)受访时指出,美国必须确保维持“一中”政策,包括支持台湾有能力自我防卫。至于美国是否出兵保台,哈里斯回应指,她不讨论假设性问题。
《60分钟》专访是哈里斯参选总统后,首度就中国武力犯台议题作出回应。
中国解放军本月14日进行围台军演,而根据官媒新华社报导,习近平15至16日赴福建考察。
英国前首相苏纳克国会质询 关切中国军演吁捍卫台湾民主 政府疑似阻挠台湾前总统蔡英文访英
英国前首相苏纳克国会质询 关切中国军演吁捍卫台湾民主 政府疑似阻挠台湾前总统蔡英文访英
(伦敦17日讯)英国国会下议院当地时间周三举行“首相答问”,前首相、现任在野保守党党魁苏纳克以中国近日在台湾海峡的军演作为质询第一题,并关切政府疑似阻挠台湾前总统蔡英文访英。
台湾中央社报导,苏纳克表示,他希望可望本周访问中国的外长拉米会“毫不含糊地”谴责中国此次军事升级行动、捍卫台湾的民主。
英国国会下议院在议事期间固定每周三举行“首相答问”,现任首相与主要在野党党魁之间的交错攻防是其中重头戏。今年7月卸任的苏纳克就国家安全议题,连番向工党籍现任首相斯塔默提问。
苏纳克劈头即问,中国本周在台湾海峡举行“无正当理由、具侵略性和恫吓意味”的军事演习,英国的盟友们同感关切,这也是正确的反应。不过,考量有令人忧心的报导指出,英国政府可能曾出手干预、试图阻止台湾前总统访英,斯塔默是否愿意证实,外长将利用本周在北京的会谈,谴责中国在台海的危险升级行为?
斯塔默回应,持续发生在台海的军事活动无助和平稳定;台海稳定符合“我们所有人利益”。
他接著就对中关系表示,英国将与同为联合国安全理事会常任理事国的中国在“净零排放”、公共卫生及贸易等议题尽可能合作,在利益分歧之处则进行竞争,并在有必要之处提出挑战,包括为了保卫国家安全、人权和英国价值观。
斯塔默强调,与中方往来时,英国政府会纳入“挑战”。
回应斯塔默,苏纳克指出,他同意英国有必要与中国接触往来,且应利用与中国的接触往来达成英国的国家利益。
苏纳克接著再度提到台湾,并表示他希望拉米会“毫不含糊地”谴责中国此次军事升级行动、捍卫台湾的民主。
敦促港府释放黎智英
苏纳克另指出,国会将关切民主活动家黎智英的命运。黎智英是英国公民,至今在香港已被不正当地监禁4年;前任英国政府向中国施压、要求释放黎智英。苏纳克问,斯塔默是否同意,黎智英被起诉是出于政治动机,也是中国违反《中英联合声明》示的中方对港法律义务。
斯塔默对此给予肯定答复,并重申“黎智英案”是英国政府优先事项;英国政府呼吁港府“即刻释放我们的英国国民”。
斯塔默提到,拉米与中国外长王毅首次会面时,即提及“黎智英案”,英国政府也将持续这么做。
拉米7月初上任,7月下旬在出席东盟外长会议期间,与王毅举行场边会谈,这是双方首度会面。
外长或本周访问中国
拉米可望本周访问中国,一旦成行,这将是继去年8月仍是保守党执政期间时任外长克莱弗利之后,再度有英国外长访问中国。
苏纳克另提到,中国已成为俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的“关键助力者”,俄罗斯进口的军用微电子产品及零组件绝大多数供应自中国。苏纳克问,斯塔默是否愿意制裁涉及助俄侵乌的中国企业或个人,包括对金融机构实施次级制裁。
斯塔默回应:“是。”苏纳克指出,保守党执政期间开始就俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争制裁中国企业与个人;美国政府近期扩大制裁实施范围,他希望工党领导的英国政府考虑采取同样行动。
苏纳克也就新政府对前政府推动的“外国影响力登记计划”(FIRS)及《高等教育(言论自由)法》全面实施喊停,向斯塔默提出质询。
苏纳克指出,相关计划与法规的主要目标之一就是预防中国对英国的政治干预、反制日益升高的威胁。
斯塔默在国会未对苏纳克的相关提问给予明确、具体答复。不过,首相府一名发言人强调,“外国影响力登记计划”未被取消,而是“延后”实施。
至于《高等教育(言论自由)法》,英国教育部之前曾表示,需在全面实施前进一步检视其影响和效益。
Wednesday, October 16, 2024
The Israeli Black Ops: The Strike on Syria
https://youtu.be/Qwtp3d-Q_jk
The Israeli military operation, codenamed "Orchard," executed in September 2007, remains a significant chapter in the annals of Middle Eastern geopolitics. A preemptive strike against a nascent nuclear reactor in Syria, constructed with the assistance of North Korean engineers, the operation underscored Israel's determination to safeguard its national security.
The reactor, a burgeoning threat to regional stability, was believed to be capable of producing plutonium, a crucial component for nuclear weapons. Israel, having closely monitored its development for several years, concluded that the facility was nearing completion. The decision to launch a military strike was a calculated gamble, a testament to the perceived urgency of the situation.
Eight Israeli F-16 fighter jets, flying at low altitude to evade Syrian air defenses, delivered a devastating blow to the reactor. The precision of the strike, which resulted in the complete destruction of the facility, showcased Israel's military prowess.
While the Israeli government has maintained official silence regarding its involvement, the details of the operation have been widely disseminated. The attack dealt a significant setback to the Syrian regime's nuclear ambitions, hindering its progress. Moreover, it served as a stark reminder of Israel's capacity to assert its interests in the region.
The justification for the operation has been a subject of intense debate. While Israel contends that the strike was necessary to prevent Syria from acquiring nuclear weapons, critics argue that it constituted a violation of international law. The incident continues to be a contentious topic, with no consensus on whether it was a justified act of self-defense or an unwarranted aggression.
Hezbollah falsely believed its domination of Lebanese politics was permanent
The Rise and Fall of Hezbollah
The group falsely believed its domination of Lebanese politics was permanent.
Hilal Khashan
The rise of Hezbollah began in the early 1980s. Following the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini sought to export the ideology of the revolution throughout the Arab region. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, he saw an opportunity to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization from its bastion in the country. He sent a small contingent of troops from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Lebanon to spread his revolutionary principles. Hezbollah attributed its success to the vision of its organized and unpretentious leaders, who came from impoverished socio-economic backgrounds. Its efficient and personal way of communicating with its Shiite support base also aided its rise as Lebanon’s unrivaled political and military organization.
But its emergence on the political scene put it on a collision course with another Shiite political force: the Amal Movement. Founded by Musa al-Sadr and backed by Syrian President Hafez Assad, the group evolved as the armed wing of the Movement of the Dispossessed, which was established in 1974 on the eve of the Lebanese Civil War. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement fought for two years beginning in 1988 in what came to be known as the Fraternal War. It ended in 1990 with the signing of the Damascus Agreement, effectively placing Amal under Hezbollah’s wing.
This arrangement aided Hezbollah’s growth and appealed to a broad sectarian constituency that was oppressed for a millennium by Sunni-dominated imperial states. For centuries, Shiites had searched for a heroic leadership to redeem them. However, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was assassinated by Israel last month, adopted a propagandistic political posture that exaggerated the party’s military resources and grossly downplayed Israeli capabilities. The party failed to understand how sectarian power-sharing works in Lebanon. It also failed to make strategic concessions that could have prevented its own demise.
Charismatic Leader
Once in Lebanon, IRGC forces headed to the city of Baalbek in the northern Bekaa Valley, where they proselytized a Shiite cadre to follow Khomeini’s rule as the jurisconsult, or supreme religious leader. Khomeini argued that this interim arrangement, which did not have a specified end time, was a prerequisite for the return of Muhammad al-Mahdi, the twelfth Shiite Imam who went into occultation in 874 and was expected to return to defeat evil and lead humanity to salvation.
Hezbollah mastered the art of martyrdom and turned it into a highly effective weapon through which it gained popularity and credibility. The death of one of Nasrallah’s sons in a confrontation with the Israeli army in 1997 dramatically increased Nasrallah’s popularity because no Arab leader had ever before sent his children to the frontlines to fight against Israel. Nasrallah always said that a fighter’s strength was determined not by the type of weapon he carried but rather by his will and willingness to die. Hezbollah considered the pursuit of martyrdom without hesitation to be the key to its victories and what distinguished it from Israeli soldiers who did not want to die in war. Nasrallah presented himself as a man on a mission to transform Lebanon into an Islamic state following the Iranian model and further its regional pursuits as a religious duty. His charisma and religious zeal and the promise of better days ahead appealed to Shiites, who cherished his forceful and convincing political rhetoric.
Propaganda Obscured Israel’s Resolve
Successive victories against Arab armies since 1948 had given Israel an aura of invincibility. But its decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000 gave Arabs the impression that Hezbollah finally succeeded in doing what no other Arab army managed do before. Nasrallah declared that Israel was “weaker than a spider’s web.”
In 2006, war broke out when Hezbollah, facing steady pressure from other Lebanese groups to disarm, launched a cross-border raid, capturing three Israeli soldiers. To prove the worth of its military wing, Hezbollah hoped to swap them with Lebanese prisoners in Israel. Israel had no interest in going to war against Hezbollah, but the death of 13 soldiers in the raid compelled Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to action, which inflicted a heavy toll on Hezbollah and displaced hundreds of thousands of Shiites. Nasrallah appealed to then Prime Minister Fouad Seniora to convince the U.S. to back a cease-fire. Washington supported the issuance of U.N. Security Council resolution 1701, which demanded Hezbollah’s evacuation from the border area to north of the Litani River. When the war ended, Nasrallah called it a “divine victory.”
In 2022, Nasrallah threatened Israel with harsh retaliation if it assassinated Hamas or Islamic Jihad officials on Lebanese territory. However, his response to the assassination of a senior Hamas official in the southern suburbs of Beirut early this year was superficial, consisting of a few Katyusha rockets, most of which the Iron Dome intercepted. Nasrallah expressed Hezbollah’s approval of any agreement between Lebanon and Israel to delimit the borders of their respective economic zones. After a deal was concluded in 2022, Nasrallah said he agreed with the Lebanese government’s compromise – but not before he threatened to prevent Israel from exploiting the Karish gas field if Lebanon did not get a fair deal.
Nasrallah declared that Israel wanted to avoid a war because of Hezbollah’s military strength, especially its missiles, which are capable of hitting targets anywhere in Israel, including the Dimona nuclear facility in the Negev desert and the city of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba. Hezbollah officials claimed that Israel was unprepared to deal with the massive human and material toll its advanced weapons would inflict.
Hezbollah misunderstood the social implications of the massive demonstrations in 2023 throughout Israel against the government’s planned judicial reforms. In addition to the protests, several thousand reserve soldiers announced their abstention from military service in protest against the proposal, which would have reduced the powers of Israel’s Supreme Court. Nasrallah misread the warnings of senior Israeli military personnel (including the army chief of staff) about the dangers of approving these amendments for the army’s combat readiness and the fabric of Israeli society.
In his eulogy for Hezbollah’s chief of staff, who was killed by Israel in July, Nasrallah warned that the party would fight without restraint if a widespread war with Israel broke out. However, even after his assassination last month, this threat rang hollow. Israel has said the group has lost more than two-thirds of its missile arsenal, which Lebanese media claimed in recent years totaled 200,000 missiles. (Hezbollah has launched up to 10,000 rockets against Israel to support Gaza since the war there began more than a year ago.)
Neglecting Lebanon’s history
Hezbollah considered its domination of Lebanon permanent and belittled the country’s rich history. Just north of Beirut, the stelae of Nahr al-Kalb documents Lebanon’s deep history with 22 inscriptions outlining foreign armies’ conquests of the country, starting with Ramses II’s military campaign in the 13th century B.C. In 2000, Hezbollah intruded on the stelae by placing an inscription marking Israel’s voluntary withdrawal from southern Lebanon as a liberation, as if it represented the final cycle of Lebanese history.
When France granted Lebanon independence in 1943, the leaders of this religiously heterogeneous country created a confessional political system predicated on a delicate sectarian balance. Civil war broke out in 1958 mainly because President Camille Chamoun allied himself with the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan and supported the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, which was vehemently opposed by the popular Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The unconditional approval of Muslims of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s military presence in Lebanon placed the country on a collision course as Christians viewed the arrangement as an infringement on Lebanon’s sovereignty and destructive to its sectarian balance. This eventually led the country to a 19-year civil war, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties and the destruction of the Lebanese economy. Hezbollah took shape between 1982 and 1985, during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. It thought that resistance to the occupation, penetration of Lebanese politics, and the ideological and material sponsorship of the Iranian Revolution would ensure not only its survival but also its permanence in and domination of Lebanese politics.
Hezbollah failed to appreciate that popular movements cannot last indefinitely in Lebanon’s political system. The assassination of towering Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh in 1951 eroded the balance of power between Christians and Muslims, encouraging Chamoun to promote regional policies unpopular among Lebanese Sunnis and effectively facilitating the 1958 civil war. The assassination of charismatic President-elect Bashir Gemayel in 1982 delivered a severe blow to the Christian Lebanese Forces, effectively shelving its political project. In 2005, Hezbollah killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, ending his post-war reconstruction efforts. It became unavoidable that Israel would deliver the coup de grace to neutralize Hezbollah after its devastating military setbacks. The party’s survival hinged on Nasrallah as its central public figure. Killing him would drive a wedge between Hezbollah – whose poor military performance stunned Shiites – and its base of popular support.
Negotiations Closed
The U.S. president’s special envoy to Lebanon, Amos Hochstein, paid five visits to Lebanon to try to prevent war with Israel, focusing on the need for Hezbollah to de-link itself from the Gaza conflict, implement Security Council resolution 1701, and withdraw to six miles north of the border with Israel. Hezbollah refused to comply with these conditions. Even the pro-Hezbollah Beirut newspaper al-Akhbar indicated in a front-page story its opposition to Hochstein’s plan, describing him as an Israeli mediator. This prompted the Biden administration to inform the Lebanese government shortly before Israel assassinated Nasrallah that the door to negotiations was closed. Israel promptly launched a massive air campaign ahead of a major ground offensive to drive Hezbollah away from the south, creating an unprecedented internal displacement, which the government in Beirut is ill-equipped to handle.
After Israel’s success in eliminating Hezbollah’s military and political leadership, Nasrallah’s deputy, Naim Qassem, informed Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati of the party’s readiness to withdraw to north of the Litani River. He also authorized the head of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri, who has been parliamentary speaker since 1992, to negotiate arrangements on behalf of Hezbollah to stop the war, paving the way for placing the party under the mantle of the Amal Movement, which would be a major shift in the balance of power among the Shiites of Lebanon.